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12 Section 1.1
This thesis is titled ”Essays on Market Dynamics and Frictions”. It contributes to the
dynamic price and search theory. As for the title, a multitude of alternative permutations
of its key concepts – ”market”, ”dynamics”, and ”frictions” – like ”Studies on Dynamics
and Frictions in a Market” were also considered. While the ﬁnal wording is rather arbitrary
and mainly aesthetic, each of these three concepts features as an important ingredient in
the three main thesis Chapters 2–4.
1. Market : In each core chapter, there is a market with several sellers and buyers. No
one seller has monopoly power nor one buyer has monopsony power. Instead, all
the players have to be considerate of competition or the strategic situation in the
market.
2. Dynamics: In each core chapter, payoﬀ relevant information keeps arriving over
time and either the sellers or the buyers have to make a dynamic decision of whether
to buy from this seller or from the next seller or in which store to continue their
shopping.
3. Frictions: In each core chapter, there are some sort of frictions. Either there is
asymmetric quality information between the traders and they have to wait to have
another trading opportunity or the buyers have to search more to come by additional
price information.
Chapter 2 deals with the classic problem of trading under asymmetric information
about the quality of the seller’s product. Chapters 3 and 4 are interlinked, though both
stand-alone, analyzing retailing strategies that lock in buyers by creating in-store frictions.
We provide a more detailed summary of each of these three ”papers” at the end of this
introductory chapter.
Next, to put our contributions properly into context and to oﬀer a broad motivation for
our work, we give a selective overview of the corner stones in the development of dynamic
price and search theory with incomplete information. The exposition is necessarily quite
condensed. For additional information, the reader is advised to consult the numerous
references provided.
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1.1 Simple price search
To gain an understanding on how the performance of a market is aﬀected by frictions, we
consider ﬁrst a text book market with several similar goods sold by many sellers.
The basic model can be developed step by step with increasing complexity and rich-
ness: starting from markets with no frictions, which serve as a benchmark, and proceeding
thereafter from search under an exogenous price distribution to search under an endoge-
nous price distribution (as in Chapters 2–4), from exogenous to endogenous search costs
(like in Chapter 4) and, ﬁnally, extending the basic model for asymmetric information
(like in Chapter 2).
We open this discussion by considering the Bertrand equilibrium and the Walrasian
equilibrium, which arise in markets without any frictions. They lead us to touch on two
counter intuitive results, the Bertrand (1887) paradox and the Diamond (1971) paradox,
which arise in markets with homogenous buyers and homogenous sellers – the former in
a setup without frictions, the latter in a setup with some positive frictions. We then add
some heterogeneity.
1.1.1 ”Law of one price”
One of the foremost observations spurring the development of price and search theory is
the failure of the ”law of one price”. It has been repeatedly documented that similar goods
are traded for diﬀerent prices in almost every market conceivable (see Baye et al. (2006)
and the numerous references therein). In the literature, this ﬁnding is typically regarded
as telltale evidence of there being some sort of frictions in the buying process – travel
costs, information processing costs etc. – which would have to be suﬃciently signiﬁcant
to prohibit the consumers from exploiting the opportunity to arbitrage. Otherwise, it is
very hard to reconcile, why a consumer would purchase for a higher price if there is also
a lower price available for exactly the same good.
To understand the implications, it might be helpful to contrast this evidence of price
dispersion with theoretical work. Consider the basic setup of Bertrand price competition,
which features no frictions: Sellers have similar goods for sale and choose their prices.
Buyers select from whom to purchase. Price information is available to the buyers with
no cost. In this frictionless case where the price is the only competition instrument, the
sellers are engaged in so harsh a price war that it completely eats up their price markups.
In other words, in the symmetric case without cost advantage, in the unique equilibrium
of this game, the sellers charge a price equaling their marginal cost and earn zero proﬁts.1
1The theoretical, underlying reason for this is that, when the buyers see every price, there is a discon-
tinuity in a seller’s proﬁt function with respect to the prices in the market such that, if the two lowest
prices are the same, the market is divided equally between the two sellers but, if one of the two lowest
prices is reduced anywhere below the other, the deviator captures the whole market. As a result, a seller
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This result is also called the Bertrand paradox.
At this point we would like to call some attention to the fact that the Bertrand equilib-
rium is much reminiscent of the Walrasian equilibrium, where the basic exercise it to ﬁnd
a price that clears the market by equating supply with demand. The Bertrand equilibrium
is a standard approach to oligopolistic markets, the Walrasian equilibrium is one of the
most important classic market models. Yet, for simplest, symmetric cases at least, the
price is equal to the marginal cost in both.2
In conclusion, for all the empirical evidence of price dispersion, these benchmark models
are unfortunately not able to generate it between similar sellers. Something appears to
be missing. As mentioned, we need some frictions to reconcile the coexistence of multiple
distinct prices for the same good. It does not make sense to buy for a higher price if a
lower price is at hand. To come up with a way to take this into account in the basic setup,
it is therefore imperative that some buyers fail to ﬁnd some prices. Interestingly, this is
not all however. If we only add a simple search cost to the basic setup, we essentially
just switch from one uniform price outcome, the Bertrand paradox, to another puzzling
outcome with a sole price, the Diamond paradox.
The idea can be illustrated in a model where the buyers obtain their ﬁrst price quote
for free but, if they want more, they have to pay a search cost. The sellers may consider
charging any price between consumer valuation and their own reservation value for the
goods. Nonetheless, remarkably, even when there is a number of similar sellers, the unique
equilibrium price is equal to consumer valuation: the monopoly price. This is so because
the sellers have an incentive to exploit the holdup problem, that the buyers face when
additional information is costly, by raising their price a bit above the price that the buyers
expect to discover elsewhere. As every seller is doing so, the only price that can be
supported in equilibrium is the maximal one.
This result that any positive search cost enables the sellers to charge the monopoly
price is known as the Diamond paradox. Note particularly that, if the buyers have to pay
for their ﬁrst price quote as well, they have no incentive to search. The cost is positive
and the beneﬁt is zero. It other words, this revolutionizing idea by Diamond (1971) also
demonstrates that, if sellers and buyers are identical, it is impossible to create a market
where diﬀerent sellers have diﬀerent prices and the buyers search despite the cost.
Indeed, as highlighted by Burdett and Judd (1983) some form of ex post heterogeneity
is necessary to generate price variation among similar goods. The buyers could diﬀer ex
ante, for example, in their search costs (Rob, 1985), storage capacity (Salop and Stiglitz,
always gains if it, depending on the start point, increases or decreases its price until it is just below the
lowest competing prices. This proﬁtable deviation destroys all candidate equilibria except the mentioned
one where the price is already as low as it can be.
2Note that the Bertrand equilibrium arises under imperfect competition (price setting, two sellers)
but the Walrasian equilibrium under perfect competition (price taking, a large number of sellers). The
coincidence of equilibia is noteworthy, suggesting that in order to reap the beneﬁts of competition, two
sellers can be as good as a large number of sellers.
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1982) or preferences (Sobel, 1984) or ex post, say, due to the randomness of their search
paths. There is a multitude of diﬀerent approaches to generating price dispersion in a
market by now: in some of them it is spatial (a diﬀerent price in a diﬀerent store, pricing
in mixed strategies), in others it is temporal (sale periods in between the business-as-
usual times, pricing in pure strategies) etc. Generally, what is needed is just a method to
introduce variation in the information under which the buyers are buying.
To give an example, in the classic papers by Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989) there are
informed consumers (shoppers) and uninformed consumers (searchers). The former enjoy
search and, thus, sample all the prices in the market whereas the latter dislike it and
prefer to cut it oﬀ as early as possible. In such an environment, the sellers try to balance
between attracting the former, by undercutting their competitor’s price, and exploiting the
latter, through the holdup problem. The equilibrium is in randomized pricing strategies
and converges to the Bertrand equilibrium, as the fraction of searchers vanishes, and to
the Diamond equilibrium, as the fraction of shoppers vanishes. Capable of avoiding these
extremes, the model is one of the main work-horses of industrial economics.
The Bertrand equilibrium and the Diamond equilibrium are still rather robust – reap-
pearing for appropriate parametrizations in many price search models with an endogenous
price distribution, including ours.
1.1.2 Models of search
There are numerous search models. The way the frictions and heterogeneity are introduced
usually matters. Some research questions could be more naturally addressed by a speciﬁc
approach, yet, some particularities of the results can usually be traced back to the approach
directly. For instance, in models which build on the consumers’ holdup problem such as in
Stahl (1989), the sellers use such pricing policies that the buyers typically search just once3
whilst, in models with horizontally diﬀerentiated products such as in Wolinsky (1986), the
buyers search until they ﬁnd a match value above a cutoﬀ. Competitive search models
tend to generate outcomes that are constrained eﬃcient as the so called Hosios (1990)
condition is satisﬁed.4 This list could go on.
Search models are applied in a number of ﬁelds. Sequential search models (optimal
stopping problems, see, e.g. Weitzman (1979) for the Pandora box model and Robbins
(1952) for the multi-armed bandit model) and non-sequential search models (ﬁxed sample
search, see, e.g., Stigler (1961)), and so called clearinghouse models (see, e.g., Baye and
Morgan (2001)) are prevalent in micro and industrial economics.5 Random search and
matching problems a` la Diamond (1982); Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and directed
(ﬁnite economy) or competitive (inﬁnite economy) search models a` la Moen (1997); Peters
3But see, e.g., Ellison and Wolitzky (2012)
4But see, e.g., Galenianos and Kircher (2009).
5See the excellent article by Baye et al. (2006) for a more detailed list of references.
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(2000); Burdett et al. (2001) are encountered, particularly, in macro and labor economics.6
Hence, while it is clear that frictions are essential in markets for various assets and
durables – labor, houses, mates, consumer goods etc. –, the ﬁeld is still in constant
progress and there is no overarching, commonly accepted, uniﬁed approach as for how
exactly the frictions should appear in a model.7 This work is no exception. Diﬀerent
research questions call for diﬀerent approaches. In Chapter 2, we build on a model with
random search and, in Chapters 3 and 4, we introduce a simple search model that features
in-store frictions. To put them into a perspective, we next review some frequently used
search models and extensions.
While ultimately our interest resides on dynamic price and search models with an
endogenous price distribution and an endogenous search cost, the development of search
models started with an exogenous price distribution and an exogenous search cost. Hith-
erto we have touched upon models with an endogenous price distribution and models with
an exogenous search cost. To cover the two other cases as well, we next take a look at some
distinctive contributions to search theory: search with an exogenous price distribution in
the classic Pandora box model and search with an endogenous search cost in the recent so
called obfuscation literature.
Search from exogenous price distribution: the Pandora box model
Generally speaking, search from an exogenous payoﬀ distribution refers to an optimal
stopping problem where the distribution of prices is ﬁxed. Consumers have to ﬁnd the
optimal way to sample from this distribution with free recall. They decide when to stop
the exploration of various alternative options or, in other words, when to concentrate on
the consumption – exploitation – of the best option they have so far discovered.
There are two especially noteworthy classes of such models: the Pandora box problem
with immediate discovery of the prize (in each ”box”) and the multi-armed bandit problem
with gradual learning about the payoﬀs (of each ”arm”). These problems got their ﬁrst
thorough treatise by Weitzman (1979) and by Robbins (1952), respectively. We next go
through the basics behind the Pandora box model. For multi-armed bandit models, which
could be regarded as an extension, we recommend the concise review by Bergemann and
Va¨lima¨ki (2006).
Various sequential problems of search can be cast into a setup where there is a number
of opportunities or ”boxes”, each of them with an individual search (opening) cost, search
(opening) time and expected reward inside. It is possible to open them only one-by-one
and to take home one of the rewards only.
6See the excellent review by Rogerson et al. (2005) for a more detailed list of references.
7Note that, generally, search theory can be regarded as an attempt to develop further the Coasian
argument for the signiﬁcance of transactions costs for the institutional structure and the functioning of
the economy. Without these costs and under clearly speciﬁed property rights, unlimited bargaining should
result in a social optimum (Coase, 1937, 1960).
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If the search cost and the search time for box i are ci and ti, respectively, and the
distribution of rewards xi ∼ Fi, each box can be assigned an index zi such that
ci = β
ti
(
zi
∫ zi
−∞
dFi(x) +
∫ ∞
zi
xdFi(x)
)
the decision-maker is exactly indiﬀerent between opening the box and receiving a certain
reward of size zi, which could hence be taken as the value of the unopened box.
Thereafter, the solution to the problem has a simple form:
• Choice across the closed boxes: The closed boxes can be ordered by their index
values zi. The best box is then the one with the highest index value.
• Choice across the opened boxes: The opened boxes can be ordered by the realized
rewards xi. The best box is then the one with the highest reward.
• Choice across the best closed box and the best opened box: the boxes can be ordered
by comparing the highest index value zi, for closed boxes, and the highest reward
xi, for opened boxes.
This determines for the decision-maker what to open (the best closed box) and when
to stop (when the best opened box is better than the best closed box). For the simplest
problems with identical boxes ci = c, ti = t, Fi = F for all i, the optimal solution has a
threshold structure: stop if x ≥ z and continue if x < z.
The result has been in extensive use since its discovery and reappears also here.
Search with endogenous cost: obfuscation and search costs inside a store
In sequential search setups in the spirit of Weitzman (1979), it is important to specify
where exactly the search cost lies - or, what the Pandora boxes stand for. Generally, there
could be a friction to transfer from home to a store, from the store to the next one, and
back home again (a box stands for a store) and frictions to navigate in a given store (a box
stands for an item in a store). Both might have signiﬁcant eﬀects on search and prices. As
a matter of history, price and search theory has, nevertheless, traditionally concentrated
on the former case and only recently started to analyze the latter one.
In addition, while the literature has typically regarded the former kinds of costs mostly
as exogenous as in Stahl (1989), the latter has been treated as endogenous from the very
beginning. For instance, the seminal article by Ellison and Wolitzky (2012), that marks
the birth of the so called obfuscation literature to be discussed right below, decomposes
search frictions into two parts: in their model there is an exogenous time cost to travel to
a store and an endogenous time cost to ﬁnd the price in the store. In general, there could
exist of course more than just these two possibilities (see Figure 1.1).
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Search costs Exogenous Endogenous
Within stores Chapter 2 Ellison and Wolitzky (2012)
Chapter 2 & Chapter 3
Across stores Stahl (1989) Hotelling (1929)
Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) Xefteris (2013)
Table 1.1: Examples of how search costs enter into a model
Before obfuscation literature gained popularity, the usual way to model sequential price
search in a homogenous goods market was founded on Stahl (1989). In that seminal paper
there is some ﬁxed cost to reach a store, and this is then also the cost of discovering the
price in the store. In other words, it is implicitly or explicitly assumed that once the buyer
is in the store it is easy to ﬁnd the price quote: it is either though to be immediate and
costless or the idea is that the cost may be regarded as negligible in comparison to the
much larger travel cost.
It is understandable that this might have seemed to be in accordance with experience
regarding consumers’ usual shopping patterns in the past when search involved physically
walking or driving to a store. However, today when online search is frequent, the situation
is typically the opposite: the click paths from a search engine to a store may not be
very long but it might take quite much clicking, scrolling and eying through the listings
to gather, say, all the information necessary to calculate the total price. Indeed, the
magnitude of frictions within the stores relative to those across the stores appears to be
so much larger online than oﬄine that in applications to the Internet it might no longer
be warranted to ignore all the in-store costs.
These ideas are related to the expanding body of work analyzing endogenous frictions
and, in particular, an individual seller’s incentive to increase the cost of search for the
buyers. After the widely quoted papers by Ellison and Ellison (2009) and Ellison and
Wolitzky (2012) were published this literature got associated with the term obfuscation,
referring generally to the multitude of possible ways in which the sellers can make shopping
time consuming, relevant price information hard to come by, or the properties of diﬀerent
products diﬃcult to compare.
In an econometric contribution, Ellison and Ellison (2009) provide convincing evidence
of obfuscation among a group of Internet retailers selling memory modules, diﬀerentiated
by the quality of the product and contract terms, in an environment where a price search
engine is the predominant channel of demand. As the price elasticities in this market
are quite large, about -20, the stores have obviously strong incentives to come up with
methods to curb down the price competition. The authors document various practices, at
least, seemingly designed to make comparing prices more diﬃcult, ranging from making
the product descriptions complicated or creating multiple versions of a product to using a
cheap low quality product to draw the consumers out of the search engine context to oﬀer
Essays on Market Dynamics and Frictions 19
them a more expensive, higher quality upgrade in the ﬁrm’s own store. Based on their
estimates, these kinds of obfuscation strategies are apparently quite successful indeed.
Despite the very high elasticities, the markups are still about 12%.
In a complementing theory paper, Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) develop several models
where ﬁrms have an incentive to hinder consumer search be elevating the costs of acquiring
an additional price quote from another store. One model is based on the convexity of search
cost in search time – say, a higher marginal return to leisure – whereby, if the start store
can delay the search long enough, it can make the second search too costly. In their other
model, consumers have imperfect knowledge of the cost of getting a price quote and, as
they have to base their expectations to their past experiences, they become less willing
to search if the cost is high in the ﬁrst store because they then presume that it is high
everywhere. In addition to these two widely known papers, there is by now a large number
of other papers analyzing similar research problems of which very good examples would
be, say, the papers by Ireland (2007), Wilson (2010), and Petrikaite (2012). We discuss
this more in Chapters 3 and 4, that deal with in-store frictions.
A noteworthy comparison to obfuscation literature is advertizing literature (see Bag-
well (2007) for a review) where, instead of making it costly for buyers to ﬁnd additional
information, sellers try to reduce these search costs. In practice, it appears safe to assume
that ﬁrms use a mixture of retailing tricks: some aimed at herding in new consumers
(”advertizing”), others to holding up old consumers (”obfuscation”).
1.2 Markets with quality uncertainty
Chapter 2 extends the setup for a new ingredient: asymmetric information, which is
generally regarded as one of the main impediments to attaining eﬃcient allocations. We
analyze a large search market where diﬀerent qualities are sold all together over time and,
initially, only the seller is aware of the quality of his product. This general setup could
be related to applications in markets for various diﬀerent kinds of assets and durables –
labor, houses, mates, consumer goods etc.
Classic papers on asymmetric information such as most notably the seminal article by
Akerlof (1970) consider a static Walrasian market in which the players’ trading opportu-
nities are extremely restricted as for when, with whom, and for what terms to trade and,
speciﬁcally, in terms of revelation mechanisms which might be available in reality. We
consider a richer market. To put this into a context, we proceed by summarizing some of
the insights developed by the literature.
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1.2.1 Asymmetric information in static Walrasian market
The literature begins with the classic sorting problem by Akerlof (1970)8 that is set up in
the static Walrasian market with the requirement of immediate adjustment and without
any strategic possibilities. One price should clear the market and buyers and sellers are
simply price takers.
There is a number of buyers and sellers each interested in buying or selling a good.
The problem is just that diﬀerent qualities are sold in the same market and, while the
seller does know the quality he is selling, it is not possible for the buyers to tell them apart
before buying.
If there are suﬃciently many high quality sellers, this asymmetric information need
not cause a market failure though. When the the expected gain from purchasing a good
from a random seller E(u) is above the high quality sellers’ reservation value ch, there
actually exists a continuum of prices p ∈ [ch, E(u)] that all the buyers and all the sellers
are willing to accept.9 However, in the opposite case, ch > E(u), the lowest price the
high quality sellers are willing to accept, ch, is higher than the highest price the buyers
are willing to pay for unknown quality, E(u). When that is so, it is impossible to trade in
diﬀerent qualities for the same Walrasian market price.
As an immediate corollary, this implies that when average quality in the market is low
diﬀerent qualities have to be traded for diﬀerent terms of trade if at all and, hence, that
some sort of information revelation has to occur before trade. Otherwise, it is impossible
to trade in goods of high quality. We thus say that a ”lemons market” arises.
The insight has spanned an extensive literature analyzing diﬀerent sorting mechanisms
which support trade also in high quality goods at least occasionally. Full eﬃciency is
generally not attainable since these mechanisms come with a signaling cost or information
rent to make the low quality sellers to opt out of the high quality sellers’ contract.
In some cases, it is possible to get quite close to full eﬃciency, however. Let’s take a
look.
1.2.2 Revelation mechanisms in dynamic search markets
In the frictionless static Walrasian market, the only way to reduce excess demand or excess
supply is to change the price. This implies that, if the average quality is low, high quality
will remain unsold – period. A natural follow-up question would however seem to be: then
what? Suppose the low quality goods have been sold and only the high remain. What
should be done with them? Can the high quality sellers and the buyers abstain from
trading now that it is known that all the low quality goods have been sold (is is rational
8One should also mention the seminal papers by Spence (1973) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
9Observe that this may involve a subsidy p− ul to low quality sellers.
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not to trade in high quality ex post)? And what if they cannot (is it rational to trade in
low quality ex ante)?
A very nice model that furthers this argument is provided by Bilancini and Boncinelli
(2013), where the knowledge of supply (how many goods are sold? how many are left?) is
allowed to play a role: The goods can be traded in two rounds. The idea is that the low
quality goods are sold on the ﬁrst one, for a lower price, and the high quality goods on the
second one, for a higher price. This is possible without any trading frictions because in
their model it is assumed that supply is common knowledge and what triggers the change
from round one to round two is the event of reduction in supply. The high quality sellers
pass the ﬁrst round because the price is too low and the low quality sellers participate
only in the ﬁrst round since, otherwise, the second one never comes.
This is a very nice special way to separate the qualities. Generally, when such a
round change triggering mechanism is not at work, however, similar-looking separation
mechanisms with a tradeoﬀ between price and liquidity have been described, for example,
in dynamic search markets. That represents a rich environment to work with compared
to the static Walrasian market where price is the only margin of adjustment. In dynamic
search markets it is possible to have adjustment both in the intensive margin (price or the
terms of trade) and in the extensive margin (liquidity, congestion, or the probability of
trade). This has been applied in various diﬀerent models in order to construct numerous
diﬀerent mechanisms to tackle the classic problem of adverse selection.
We review some of this work that goes under the heading of dynamic trading with
common transaction values next. A full summary is not in our scope. We ﬁrst take a look
at models where the separation of diﬀerent qualities is based on some sort of frictions and
then cases where some additional information is provided to support trading.
Before setting oﬀ, we think it deserves to be remarked that, generally, the problem can
be seen as that of competing mechanisms (see, e.g., Biais et al. (2000), McAfee (1993),
Attar et al. (2011), Epstein and Peters (1999) for the literature), which bridges the gap
between the mechanism design theory with one principal, one auctioneer, or one seller and
one buyer engaged in a bilateral trading relation and the general equilibrium analysis of
a market with many parties with private information. Usually, due to the complexity of
the problem, quite heavy assumptions must be made.
Search theory is one of the main approaches to these kinds of problems as, by allowing
for some sort of frictions in the meeting process between traders, it makes it possible
to shift the focus out of the analysis of the entire set of market participants at once to
that of smaller groups of matched buyers and sellers – with the bonus of explicit analysis
of the strategic interaction between these players. Obviously, the way the frictions are
introduced adds some restrictions of its own.10 This manifests also in the plethora of
10See Garrett et al. (2014), for a general approach to model diﬀerences in consumers’ information sets in
a competing mechanisms setting, and Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) for the eﬀects of the available matching
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diﬀerent modeling traditions followed in the literature.
Temporary separation mechanisms and the role of liquidity for durables
Inderst and Muller (2002) were among the ﬁrst ones to note that liquidity can act as a
natural separation mechanism in markets for durables. The sellers of diﬀerent qualities
could sort themselves into diﬀerent submarkets: the sellers of low quality to a market
with lower prices and the sellers of high quality to a market with higher prices but more
congestion and thus a longer circulation period. Surprisingly, they discover that welfare
can be the same for the case of complete information and private information, in spite of
the distorted liquidity for the latter. This is next to miraculous.
Interestingly, Inderst (2002) points out that the set of equilibria will converge to the
least costly separating equilibrium (that is, the Riley equilibrium or the Rothchild-Stigliz
outcome) when analyzing in a game embedded in search market where the sender oﬀers
the contract to the receiver (which corresponds to cases where the seller makes the oﬀer
and search is random).
Inderst (2005) reiterates the idea that the least costly separating equilibrium is neces-
sarily supported as an equilibrium when frictions approach zero. They consider a game
that is embedded in a search market model where the principal oﬀers the contract to the
agent or the other way (which corresponds to cases where the buyer or the seller makes
the oﬀer and search is random).
Wambach and Inderst (2002) extend this further for the case of limited capacity in a
competitive search environment. Guerrieri et al. (2010) present another such case where
they ﬁnd that equilibrium payoﬀs are unique but the equilibrium is generally not eﬃcient.
All these equilibria could be regarded as solutions to the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
nonexistence problem.11
The particularities of the contracting environment can obviously have a strong eﬀect
on the outcome, yet, a general bargaining setting with asymmetric information is typically
open to many equilibria. Although the multiplicity might be taken as an inherent feature
of a market, some view this lack of unique prediction as disturbing. Various restrictions
have thus been considered.
For instance, in Blouin (2003) the buyers and sellers play a bi-matrix game where their
selected bargaining positions map into a given price. He ﬁnds that every unit is traded over
time and every agent receives a positive value in expectation. This stands in stark contrast
with the outcome in the static Walrasian market. Yet, as the frictions get smaller and
smaller, Cho and Matsui (2013) show that, in a general random matching setup between
technology on outcomes.
11In Wilson (1977) a pooling equilibrium survives if, after a deviation, the principals can withdraw
contracts. In Riley (1979) a least costly separating equilibrium is sustained if, after a deviation, the
principals can add new contracts.
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privately informed buyers and sellers who form long term relationships that resolve from
an idiosyncratic shock or at will, any stationary equilibrium where participants sometimes
trade converges to that of the static Walrasian market.
Janssen and Roy (2002) analyze temporary sorting of diﬀerent qualities: low qual-
ity is traded sooner than high quality such that average quality of the ramaining goods
is increasing over time. They show that everything is traded in ﬁnite time but there
could be intermediate breaks of no trade. Janssen and Roy (2004) consider a ﬁxed-entry
model and show that, in addition to the unique stationary equilibrium – a repetition of
the static Walrasian market, there exists a cyclical equilibrium with regular ﬂuctuations.
They also demonstrate that in any non-stationary equilibrium the marginal quality sold
is non-monotonic over time as otherwise the buyers would ultimately face no uncertainty.
Interestingly, the range of qualities traded in these cases is strictly wider than that in the
static market.
Moreno and Wooders (2002) consider a market where trade is bilateral and prices
are bargained by the buyer and the seller. They proof that, although there is delay in
trade as the sellers try to distinguish between diﬀerent buyers, prices are asymptotically
competitive and the ineﬃciency vanishes with frictions – in spite of the persistent delay.
The surplus realized in a decentralized market can be larger than that in a centralized
market but the payoﬀs approach the competitive ones as the frictions get washed out.
Frictions could be welfare improving. Buyer mix between lower prices (accepted by all) and
higher prices (accepted by the low) such that low quality sellers trade faster and average
market quality increases. This quality boost relaxes the adverse selection problems in a
natural way.
The model by Moreno and Wooders (2010) is elegant and particularly easy to work
with. We use it as the basic building block for our model in Chapter 2.
Practical separation mechanisms and the role of additional information
Temporary separation is costly, however. The delay in trade necessary to achieve sorting
limits the gains from trading in high quality, in particular. If the gains from high quality
trade are much larger than the gains from low quality trade, the realized surplus could
be quite low. Moreover, if one thinks of any canonical market with adverse selection
problems such as the labor market, it just does not ring true that high quality workers
would have to idle long in the market to ﬁnd work; indeed, that seems like a very ineﬃcient
revelation mechanism. Instead, there are interviews, internships, CV’s, etc. In many
commonplace applications, buyers do obtain additional information that they can use
to update their beliefs about the sellers. For example, Hendel and Lizzeri (2002, 1999)
and Hendel et al. (2005) present several concrete revelation mechanisms that can help
to mitigate the problems of adverse selection in practice: warranties, sorting by vintage,
leasing etc. Other public or private signals could also be available in the market.
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Daley and Green (2011) consider dynamic trading of an asset in a market with public
news modeled by the Brownian diﬀusion process with some given drift, a function of the
unknown asset quality. They observe that there could be periods of market freeze or no
trade, that come to the end if there are enough good news to revive the market or enough
bad news to induce a ﬁre sale of some low quality assets. Better news quality does not
necessarily improve welfare. The described equilibrium structure is the same whether the
average market quality is above or below the high cost. In a sense, an endogenous market
for lemons is thus generated. Daley and Green (2014) have a static model where the
sellers face a tradeoﬀ of relying on a costly signaling action (such as education) and a
random free-of-cost signal (such as a performance test) that comes after. They ﬁnd that
separating equilibria do not survive a stability reﬁnement; depending on weather the type
distribution places enough weight on the high type, there is at least partial pooling.
The role of additional information provision and signaling is considered also in Taylor
(1999), Ho¨rner and Vieille (2009), Voorneveld and Weibull (2011) and Kaya and Kim
(2013) to name just a few. Taylor (1999) considers a setup where buyers update their
beliefs about house quality from the amount of time it spends on the market. He ﬁnds
that high quality sellers are better oﬀ it the consumers’ inspection histories are public.
Ho¨rner and Vieille (2009) study observability in bargaining with correlated values. Buyers
submit oﬀers to a seller one by one. If earlier oﬀers are unobservable bargaining is likely
to result in an impasse; otherwise, usually agreement is ultimately reached but with delay.
Voorneveld and Weibull (2011) considers a signaling game with a single seller and buyers
who obtain a noisy quality signal; this is a game with two-sided asymmetric information:
only the seller knows his quality and only the buyer knows her signal. Kaya and Kim
(2013) consider trading dynamics with a single seller and a sequence of buyers who receive
a signal of quality and make the seller a price oﬀer; this is a screening game with two-sided
asymmetric information.
Before we move into the analysis, we next give a brief summary of each paper.
1.3 Contributions
1.3.1 Dynamic trading with correlated information
Though a useful abstraction, information on common transaction values remains rarely
purely private all the way up to the moment when the terms of trade are negotiated. In
particular, when trading partners actually meet face-to-face, some information is necessar-
ily transmitted under both traders’ eyes. This gives them a piece of correlated information,
that could take their prospects of reaching an agreement either up or down.
We study the classic problem of dynamic trading with asymmetric information (e.g.,
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Moreno and Wooders (2002, 2010); Inderst and Muller (2002); Inderst (2002, 2005);
Wambach and Inderst (2002); Janssen and Roy (2002, 2004); Blouin (2003); Guerrieri
et al. (2010) and Cho and Matsui (2013)). Buyers and sellers meet randomly and pairwise
and, initially, only the seller knows the quality of his product. To explore a natural im-
plication of the idea that the trading process is decentralized and trade truly takes place
in small bilateral meetings within a larger market, we let matched trading partners share
additional information prior to trade. First, to endow the seller with more bargaining
power than usual in the literature, we let the (informed) seller oﬀer the price to the (unin-
formed) buyer. That makes our model a signaling game. Second, to capture the idea that
the buyer might be allowed to try the seller’s good under his watch, we let each pair get
a shared signal of the seller’s quality. It is observed before the seller’s price oﬀer is made.
The price can hence be conditional on the signal. This additional information local in the
sense that it is observed by the buyer and the seller but not by the others in the market
as a whole. Its overall eﬀects can still be far-reaching.
Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that asymmetric information and the communication opportuni-
ties, added to alleviate the asymmetry, create a market that is necessarily ineﬃcient. This
is so even when the average quality is high in the larger market. An endogenous market
for lemons arises because the traders have no incentive to trade if the shared signal is low.
As the buyers’ beliefs go down and the terms of trade get worse, they are better oﬀ if they
wait for a higher signal.
Since the seller makes the price oﬀer conditional on the shared signal, our model makes
it possible also to take a look at when a seller would prefer to rely in pricing on this costless
signal (pool to as high a price as the buyer is willing to pay after seeing the signal) or
whether to resort to costly signaling instead. The higher the signal, the higher the maximal
price oﬀer the buyers accept without any further revelation. We ﬁnd that all sellers gain
if they coordinate to an equilibrium where they refrain from full separation with a high
signal and use it only if they happen to get a low signal.
Interestingly, there exist stationary Markovian equilibria where all sellers simply return
to the market if the signal is low enough. This entails that, as a novelty, high quality is
traded faster than low quality: lower signals came more often from low quality sellers.
The result seems natural in markets with adverse selection issues, in markets for labor,
houses or other assets and durables. However, to our current reading, only papers in which
trading history or non-stationarities play a role (e.g., Taylor (1999); Vettas (1997); Kaya
and Kim (2013)) have so far reached comparable results.
All in all, our paper ﬁnds that the signals can be a two-edged-sword. Most of the
time they take the parties beliefs’ about the quality closer together. This eases the sorting
problem. However, because the signals are noisy, they can take the parties’ beliefs quite
far apart as well. When this disagreement is strong, the lemons problem shows up again.
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1.3.2 Obfuscation by substitutes: Shopping frictions
and equilibrium price dispersion within stores
The Internet is full of diﬀerent online stores and almost all oﬀer a lot of alternatives for
exploration. Click on one of these, and be ﬂooded by a visual stream of endless products
where a lower price or a better matched product is always, seemingly, just a click away.
Indeed, there could be so much to see at a single seller nowadays that, once you are done,
there is not much time left for shopping in any other store. De´ja` vu?
We show in this paper that the variability of alternatives within stores can be applied to
amplify the existing search frictions and create new barriers to switching in an environment
where none exist initially. This works even for simple price search. We ﬁnd that sellers
have an incentive to generate price variation across identical products in their store to
keep the buyers searching longer in there; this leaves them less time for shopping in other
competing stores.
Our paper hence contributes to literature analyzing retailer strategies to lock-in con-
sumers (e.g., Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) on price obfuscation and Klemperer (1987) on
switching costs) and to literature trying to explain price dispersion across homogenous
goods (see Baye et al. (2006), Burdett and Judd (1983) and Butters (1977)). Yet, while
the latter strand of literature has concentrated on price dispersion across stores we ﬁnd it
also within stores.
We consider a duopoly with two similar sellers and a unit mass of buyers. All items are
of the same given type but a seller could carry them in multiple replicas and set a diﬀerent
price quote for each. In the base line case, both sellers have exactly two items in stock.
This number is common knowledge but the prices are the sellers’ private information until
the buyers ﬁnd them.
We use a new dynamic model which abstracts from the hold-up problem present in
many optimal stopping problems with endogenous price distribution (Diamond, 1971).
Instead, we build on two novel features. First, the buyers search with a deadline. Second,
the prices in the stores are not found immediately once a buyer enters a store but randomly
and gradually one-by-one.
The buyers can switch the stores freely as long as they have time. There is no explicit
switching cost. However, when there are diﬀerent prices available in a store, we show that
the buyers optimally switch the stores only when they have discovered the lowest one. We
concentrate on a set of collusive equilibria where the sellers ﬁx one of the two prices at a
higher monopoly level but, for a probability strictly between zero and one, let their other
price be a lower discount price. Since the buyers know this, if they ﬁrst spot a monopoly
price, they have an incentive to keep on searching in their start store in hope of ﬁnding
another price at a discount.
This lock-in eﬀect, that lengthens a consumer’s search time within a store, reduces the
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sellers’ incentive to undercut each other’s prices compared to the case where both sellers
have one item; for that case, there exists a unique mixed equilibrium a` la Varian (1980)
and Stahl (1989) where stores almost never use the monopoly price. Price variation helps
the sellers also to discriminate better between buyers who end with more and less price
information. Additionally, we show that, as the number of these similar items in stock
expands, the sellers can extract more surplus. The limit equilibrium can look like the
Diamond (1971) outcome.
1.3.3 Splitting consumers: Equilibria with endogenous
shopping frictions
Managing the traﬃc of incoming and outgoing consumers is an important part of running
an online store. As consumers are typically busy, it is not irrelevant in which order they
sample the stores and how long a time they tend to stay in. The stores can aﬀect this
consumer turnover in many ways, particularly, ﬁguratively, by putting some sand or oil
in the wheels in terms of how the products are presented; the click paths could be made
either long or short, for example.
We study the eﬀects and origins of search frictions in a duopolistic price competition
model featuring endogenous frictions, inspired by online search. To abstract from hold-up
problems arising in sequential search setups with upfront payment of the search cost (Di-
amond, 1971), we use a model based on deadlines and gradual arrival of price information
in every store; there is no explicit cost of searching nor switching.
This modiﬁcation of the standard framework (Varian, 1980; Stahl, 1989) makes it
possible to capture endogenous frictions in a new reduced way: we allow sellers to adjust
the rates of the Poisson process that determine how fast a buyer ﬁnds a price in a store.
These frictions aﬀect both the number of trades and the shares of informed consumers and
uninformed consumers in the market, appearing in the classic papers by (Varian, 1980;
Stahl, 1989) that our model nests. This in turn enables us to put a number on the size of
the loss generated by the frictions and comment on where the market is likely to stand in
between the Diamond (1971)12 and Bertrand (1883)13 outcomes.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that there exist precisely two pure equilibria. In both of them,
one of the sellers – called prominent seller – has lower frictions and higher prices and the
other seller has higher frictions and lower prices. Although the sellers compete in frictions,
both generate positive frictions. This implies that some buyers always fail to ﬁnd a price;
under the Poisson process, this surplus loss amounts to 6 %.
Interestingly, using the jargon from Stahl (1989), we also ﬁnd that there are exactly
equally many ”shoppers” (with two price quotes) and ”searchers” (with one price quote).
12Where the sellers get all the surplus, MR=MC.
13Where the buyers get all the surplus, p=MC.
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This is a rather remarkable result because, arguably, our equilibria lie therefore precisely in
between the Diamond and Bertrand outcomes. While it is well known that models like this
where the buyers are divided into ”informed consumers” and ”uninformed consumers” span
both outcomes for appropriate parametric assumptions (Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989)),
despite the obvious interest in this division that dictates how competitive the market is,
not much has been said about the actual shares before this.
It is noteworthy that both sellers have a strategic incentive to generate frictions, which
does not arise, say, from a cost saving motive. Moreover, the universal incentive to generate
frictions for sellers and the half-and-half division of consumers into to the informed and
the uninformed, only depend on the existence of the deadline but not on what it is.
Our results are relevant especially for online search, where the greatest frictions are not
exogenous (limited by the speed at which computers process information) but endogenous
(limited by the speed at which consumers process information). They suggest that, though
base line search technology is constantly improving, frictions never disappear.
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List of symbols
θ = h, l seller index / seller’s quality
b buyer index
t ∈ Z time index
δ ∈ [0, 1] common discount factor
cθ seller’s valuation of quality θ
uθ buyer’s valuation of quality θ
λ = ul the gains from trade for θ = l
1− λ = 1− ch the gains from trade for θ = h
θ the fraction of type θ sellers entering to the market
 = (h, l) sellers’ entry shares
τθ the probability of trade for type θ sellers
τ = (τh, τl) sellers’ trading rates
γθ the fraction of type θ sellers remaining in the market
γ = (γh, γl) sellers’ market shares
s ∈ [0, 1] shared signal
Fθ(s) ∈ [0, 1] the distribution of shared signal for θ
pθ(s) ∈ [0, 1] seller’s price oﬀer
a(p, s) ∈ [0, 1] buyer’s acceptance probability of p
q ∈ [0, 1] seller’s quit rate
Eγ(u|s, p) buyer’s expected utility for γ, s, and p
σ = (σb, σh, σl) strategy proﬁle
V = (Vb, Vh, Vl) market value proﬁle
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Dynamic trading with
correlated information
Abstract
We investigate welfare and equilibrium trading in a decentralized search mar-
ket with asymmetric information and bilateral communication opportunities.
Sellers and buyers meet randomly and pairwise and view a shared signal of
the seller’s quality. In the following signaling game, the sellers can either rely
on this costless signal (pool) or costly signaling (separate). We observe that,
although the average market quality is high, additional information is not gen-
erally welfare improving. All equilibria are ineﬃcient. Contrary to the usual
tradeoﬀ between price and liquidity, we ﬁnd that the signals can help sustaining
stationary Markovian equilibria where higher quality is traded faster.
Keywords: Dynamic trading; Search; Asymmetric information; Learning;
Signaling. JEL-codes: D82, D83.
37
38 Section 2.1
2.1 Introduction
[In dynamic markets], the ineﬃciencies caused by asymmetric information
manifest in the fact that sellers of higher qualities need to wait longer than
sellers of lower quality in order to sell. The cost of waiting is an important
factor that must be considered in any assessment of the loss in welfare caused
by adverse selection.
[Nevertheless], observed market dynamics may diﬀer considerably from our
predictions. This is because in the real world, the price mechanism is aug-
mented by other non-market institutions and technologies that enable agents
to signal or screen information and they alter the behavior of agents as well as
the pattern of trade.
Janssen and Roy (2004, pp. 567-568)
Though a useful abstraction, information on common transaction values remains rarely
purely private all the way up to the moment when the terms of trade are negotiated. In
particular, when trading partners actually meet face-to-face, some information is necessar-
ily transmitted under both traders’ eyes. This gives them a piece of correlated information,
that could take their prospects of reaching an agreement either up or down.
We study the classic problem of dynamic trading with asymmetric information (e.g.,
Moreno and Wooders (2002, 2010); Inderst and Muller (2002); Inderst (2002, 2005);
Wambach and Inderst (2002); Janssen and Roy (2002, 2004); Blouin (2003); Guerrieri
et al. (2010) and Cho and Matsui (2013)). Buyers and sellers meet randomly and pairwise
and, initially, only the sellers know the quality of the good they have. To analyze some
natural consequences of decentralized trade, we let trading partners exchange additional
bilateral information.
This information is observable by them but not by the others in the market at large.
First, to endow the seller with more bargaining power than usual in the literature, we let
the (informed) seller oﬀer the price to the (uninformed) buyer. This makes our model a
signaling game. Second, to capture the idea that the buyer might have an opportunity
to see or try the seller’s good under his watch, we let each pair get a shared signal of
the seller’s quality. It is viewed before the seller announces the price, which can hence be
conditioned on the signal.
This constitutes a setup where it is possible to consider how the provision of addi-
tional correlated information aﬀects dynamic trading in markets with quality uncertainty.
Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that asymmetric information and the communication opportunities,
added to relax it, create a market that is necessarily ineﬃcient, even when the average
quality is high in the larger market. An endogenous market for lemons will arise because
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the parties have no incentive to trade if the shared signal is low. They are better oﬀ if
they resume their search instead and wait for a chance to trade under a higher signal.
Since the seller makes the price oﬀer conditional on the signal, our model makes it
possible also to take a look at when a seller would prefer to rely on this costless signal
(pool to as high a price as the buyer is willing to pay after seeing the signal) or whether
to resort to costly separation.1 The higher the signal, the higher the maximal price oﬀer
the buyers are willing to accept without further revelation (if they think that both sellers
oﬀer that price after that signal). In particular, we ﬁnd that all sellers gain if they refrain
from full separation when the shared signal is high and use it for low signals only.
There exist many equilibria in this kind of game with signaling. We ﬁrst characterize
the set of Perfect Bayesian equilibria2 in ”stage games”, played in the bilateral meetings,
and then zoom in on some noteworthy equilibrium classes of the full game – seller maximal
equilibria in particular. In ”stage games”, the sellers’ outside options are ﬁxed. In the full
game, the outside options are determined in equilibrium.
Interestingly, there exist also stationary Markovian equilibria where all sellers simply
return to the market if the signal is low enough. This entails that, as a novelty, high
quality is traded faster than low quality because these lower signals, that make the sellers
willing to pass an opportunity to trade, came more often from low quality sellers than
from high quality sellers.
The ﬁnding appears natural to us. However, to our current reading, only papers in
which trading history or non-stationarities play a role (e.g., Taylor (1999); Vettas (1997);
Kaya and Kim (2013)) have reached comparable results; mostly the literature has focused
on the tradeoﬀ between liquidity and price. In that standard case, higher quality is traded
more slowly than lower quality but for higher prices.
We feel that our result pushes the literature to the right direction since it is obviously
not the case that low quality is always more liquid than high quality, for example, in
canonical adverse selection markets such as that for houses and used cars or the market
for CEOs, GPs, APs, etc. An especially noteworthy feature of these markets is that the
asymmetric information gets transmitted from sellers to buyers in many ways prior to
trade and the gains from trade in high quality might be much larger than those in low
quality. The same properties make the diﬀerence also in this paper.
We think these eﬀects of correlated information on dynamic trading are unexpected.
The signals can be a two-edged-sword. Most of the time they take the parties beliefs’
about the quality closer together. This is nice because it makes the sorting problem easier
for the buyers and enables the high quality sellers to extract some returns to quality. This
part is intuitive.
1See Daley and Green (2014) for another paper with this feature. Again, our innovation is to condition
actions on signals and embed the interactions into a dynamic search market.
2To make sure we cover all the equilibria, we consider maximal punishments oﬀ the path. All the
equilibria are consistent with the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987).
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Nevertheless, because the signals are noisy, sometimes they also take the parties’ beliefs
quite far apart. From time to time, a high quality seller will give a very bad impression
or a low quality seller a very good impression to a buyer. If this disagreement among a
buyer and a high quality seller is strong, it might be best for both to split up since they
cannot agree on the gains or the terms of trade (this basically gives us Proposition 1: the
non-existence of an equilibrium where every meeting results in trade). Note however that
the low quality sellers can also beneﬁt from inﬂated beliefs to the extent that they might
opportunistically refuse to trade under accurate beliefs (this basically gives us Proposition
2: the existence of stationary Markovian equilibria where high quality is more liquid).
Therefore, trade will partially or completely break down for the lowest signals. The
ﬁndings can be traced back to the dispersion in buyers’ beliefs (the noise in the shared
signal) and to the elevation of the traders’ outside options (dynamics and the possibility
to wait for a better signal) suggesting that asymmetric information and variable buyer
sentiment could be quite bad a mix, irrespective of average market quality. This has
been observed by Daley and Green (2011) with a non-stationary public news ﬂow. Our
contributions show that similar issues hinder trading also in the microscopic anonymous
encounters between trading partners in a large stationary market. The key ingredients are
(i) dynamics and (ii) the partial revelation of quality uncertainty – public or private.
All in all, our ﬁndings thus highlight that the additional information is not generally
welfare improving. All equilibria are ineﬃcient once we add the shared signal. This is
quite surprising given that we specialize in cases where the average quality is high. In
other words, the static Walrasian market could still be eﬃcient for the parameter values
on which we focus.
Note that the presence of the shared signal enriches the dynamic trading patterns that
can be supported in a stationary Markovian equilibrium. The sellers can propose a pooling
price for one subset of signals, separate for another subset of signals, and execute their
search option for the rest. Without noisy signals, the sellers would have pick just one of
the actions or mix.
The underlying idea behind the shared signal is to allow the buyer to ”taste” or ”scent”
the seller’s quality under his watch.3 As a result, the buyer obtains a signal and the seller
obtains a signal of the signal. For instance, the seller of an old car would usually learn if
the car, say, broke down while the buyer drove it, the job market candidate knows herself
whether the job talk went well, and the sellers of a house can sense to a certain extent if
the buyers are motivated in the property viewings. For concreteness, it is here assumed
that the signal that the buyer sees and the signal that the seller sees are identical.
In a sense, the shared signal acts here as a meeting speciﬁc private coordination device,
which the buyers cannot simply ignore because it is informative: the higher the signal,
3See Voorneveld and Weibull (2011) for another paper with this feature. Again, our innovation is to
condition actions on signals and embed the interactions into a dynamic search market.
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the higher the probability that it comes from a high quality good rather than from a low
quality good. Still, it is possible to have also a highly misleading signal, and albeit this
is rare, it does pose a threat to high quality sellers (who might be taken for low quality
sellers) and provides some beneﬁts to low quality sellers (who might be taken for high
quality sellers).
A high enough signal will increase the buyers’ belief above the market average and
a low enough signal will decrease it below the market average. The former eﬀect can
temporarily boost trade but over time the prospect of shopping for a better signal can
make the sellers also more picky; the latter eﬀect obviously slows down trade. Overall,
the total value of this additional information could hence be negative.4,5
Our setup is much like in the seminal article by Moreno and Wooders (2010); the key
diﬀerence is that we have the shared signal and they let the (uninformed) buyer oﬀer the
price to the (informed) seller. Since diﬀerent qualities are traded at their own rates, the
average quality of the goods in the market is endogenous and so are, hence, the traders’
outside options if their price negotiations fail. This feature is present also, among others,
in Moreno and Wooders (2002), where either party could make the price oﬀer; they have
no shared signal.
Speciﬁcally, Moreno and Wooders (2010) consider bilateral trading in a large decen-
tralized market where the quality or the product is the seller’s private information all
the way until trade takes place. There exists a unique equilibrium where the buyers mix
between low prices (accepted by only low quality sellers) and high prices (accepted by
both low and high quality sellers). As a result, high quality is traded slower than low
quality, the average quality in the market gets higher, and the buyers become more willing
to oﬀer high prices. In other words, they ﬁnd that in the long run the lemons problem is
mitigated naturally by itself, through the implied boost in average quality (in a market
where average quality is initially low). We ﬁnd that adding the shared signal gives the
inverse result instead: if the buyers and sellers have access to correlated information, the
lemons problem arises by itself (in a market where average quality is initially high). Our
results complement one another.
Generally, our paper falls within the body of work concerned with welfare and dynamic
trading in a search market with uncertainty on common transactions values: Albrecht and
Vroman (1992); Inderst and Muller (2002); Janssen and Roy (2002); Moreno and Wooders
(2002); Blouin (2003); Janssen and Roy (2004) and Moreno and Wooders (2010) are some
4The outcome seems natural in the light of the celebrated contribution by Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1990) which shows that the possibility of conditioning on extraneous information might have a strong
eﬀect on equilibrium play. Yet, in our case the information is not irrelevant but highly payoﬀ relevant and
history has no role to play.
5The outcome is also akin to the so called Hirshleifer eﬀect, which refers to a decrease in overall welfare
with more information as opportunities for risk sharing are removed (Hirshleifer, 1971). When the sellers
use the optimal sorting method, there is risk sharing (pooling) between sellers of diﬀerent qualities only
for the highest signals.
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of the earlier examples whereas Guerrieri et al. (2010) and Cho and Matsui (2013) are more
recent ones. Most of this work is focused on ﬁnding solutions to the lemons problem, a part
of that, speciﬁcally, motivated by liquidity problems in ﬁnancial markets (see Camargo
and Lester (2010); Chang (2011) and Guerrieri and Shimer (2012)).6
One reoccurring, robust result in the literature is the tradeoﬀ between price level and
the probability of fast sale and the idea that it can be applied to support temporary sorting
of qualities in dynamic search markets. This is based on a single crossing condition. Since
low quality sellers are more willing to forgo a higher price for a higher probability of fast
sale than high quality sellers, it is possible to trade the low quality for lower prices and
the high quality for higher prices as long as the former are traded faster than the latter.
This represents a signiﬁcant improvement to the static Walrasian market where only
low quality sellers trade. The costs of delay might still be quite large, especially, when the
gains from trade are much more pronounced for high quality sellers. Luckily, if the use of
more elaborated sorting mechanisms is warranted, the outcome can typically be improved
from this. The lemons problem is shown to get alleviated, for instance, by leasing and
sorting by vintage (see Hendel and Lizzeri (2002) and Hendel et al. (2005), respectively).
On the other hand, it has also been remarked that additional information revelation
could hinder trade. For example, Kultti et al. (2012) ﬁnd that, with competition between
the bidders in an auction, the trade may break down for a wider range of parameters
than in a static Walrasian market. In Ho¨rner and Vieille (2009), a public oﬀer history
leads to a complete break in trade but a private oﬀer history to a delay in trade only. In
Daley and Green (2011), with a public news ﬂow, the market can freeze essentially for any
parameters; the conﬁdence is restored only with enough good news.7
Lauermann and Wolinsky (2013) analyze information aggregation in a setup where an
(informed) buyer meets a series of sellers who get private signals of the cost and the buyer
and the seller bargain over prices. While the model appears to be quite close to what
we have, the research questions are diﬀerent, the payoﬀ structure is diﬀerent, the setup is
static as it is presented, and only the buyer views the signal such that it cannot be utilized
as a private coordination device.
Kaya and Kim (2013) explore a setup where an (informed) seller meets a series of
randomly arriving buyers. The buyers make the seller a price oﬀer after receiving a
private quality signal and observing how long the asset has been for sale. They show
that that either quality could be traded faster, depending the buyers’ prior beliefs. If the
prior is high from the start, high quality is more liquid. Our comparable result arises in a
6Another closely related body of work deals with information aggregation and convergence to compet-
itive outcomes (see be Wolinsky (1990) and Blouin and Serrano (2001)). Compared to this earlier work,
our paper has a stronger emphasis on risk sharing and pooling.
7This impact of trading history on the evolution of buyers’ beliefs and current trading prospects is
analyzed also in the setups with a single seller by Taylor (1999); Bar-Isaac (2003); Kaya and Kim (2013);
Gerardi and Maestri (2013) and Kremer and Skrzypacz (2007).
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stationary equilibrium where trading history plays no role.
Last, outside of the realm of common transaction values, Lauermann (2012) studies
a model where buyers have independent private or public valuations. Comparing these
extremes of symmetric and asymmetric information, he ﬁnds that when bilateral trade is
embedded into a well functioning market, asymmetric information may improve welfare.
Without consumer privacy, the rents from price discrimination slow down trade because
the sellers’ reservation prices get higher.
The paper is organized in the following way: The setup and notation are presented in
Section 2.2. We prove the non-existence of eﬃcient equilibria in Section 2.3. In Section
2.4.1, we characterize the full set of equilibria in ”stage games” played in the bilateral
meetings and, in Section 2.4.2, some particularly interesting equilibria of the full game.
Section 2.5 oﬀers some closing remarks. We develop an existence algorithm which stops
at a seller maximal equilibrium in Appendix A. Most of the proofs are in Appendix B.
2.2 Model
We consider a large market with decentralized, uncoordinated trade. A unit mass of buyers
and sellers enters the market over discrete time t ∈ Z.8 For every point in time, the buyers
and the sellers get matched with a random trader from the other market side. As they
meet, the buyer and the seller are ﬁrst given a shared signal s ∈ [0, 1] that is informative
of the quality of the product θ = h, l the seller has. Then, the seller makes a price oﬀer,
p ∈ [0, 1], which the buyer either accepts or rejects, a(p) = 0, 1. Those who trade exit
the market but others return to the pool of buyers and sellers, and get matched with a
diﬀerent buyer or a diﬀerent seller the next time.
Note that our model comes quite close to that by Moreno and Wooders (2010), except
for the shared signals, that we have, and the order of moves that we change from buyers
move ﬁrst to sellers move ﬁrst, and certain other minor details. They make a diﬀerence,
nonetheless, as shall be shown in short.9
The sellers are endowed with products of diﬀerent unobservable qualities. Before the
shared signal is shown, information is perfectly asymmetric: the seller is fully informed
about the quality of his product but the buyer has absolutely no information. Instead,
after the signal is viewed by this pair, also the buyer has got somewhat informed. However,
as the signals are inexact, the buyer’s belief E(θ|s) is likely to be inﬂated or deﬂated, and,
as the signal is shared by the pair, the seller knows exactly what the bias E(θ|s) − θ is.
8An earlier version of the paper was in continuous time. After a suggestion from a discussant, we
decided to present the results in discrete time to get rid of a matching rate parameter and to get a more
concrete feel on the whole model; no substantial diﬀerences were involved.
9We refer to Proposition 1 (our ﬁnding that eﬃcient equilibria are non existent even when average
market quality is high) and Proposition 5 (our ﬁnding that high quality is traded faster than low quality
in a stationary Markovian equilibrium), which contrast nicely with theirs.
44 Section 2.2
This makes each match special to the involved buyer and seller for the information and
the incentives may change from a meeting to a meeting.
In consequence, the set of equilibria that might arise can also vary from a meeting to
a meeting as the buyers and the sellers are weighing against one another the gains from
trading under the current signal and those from trading under a future signal. Both of
them discount expected payoﬀs by δ ∈ (0, 1).
We next lay out some details of this game and, then, move on to the buyer’s problem
and the seller’s problem. We concentrate on stationary Markovian equilibria in pure
or randomized behavioral strategies σ = (σh, σl, σb): (i) The sellers’ (mixed) strategies
σh = ph(s), σl = pl(s) : [0, 1] → Δ [0, 1] attach a distribution of prices ph and pl to each
signal s for the high quality sellers and the low quality sellers, respectively. (i) The buyers’
(mixed) strategies σb = a(s, p) : [0, 1]
2 → Δ {0, 1} map an acceptance probability a to each
pair (s, p) consisting of a signal and a price.10
The solution concept we apply is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). It is a pair (σ, π)
that consists of a strategy proﬁle σ and a belief system π such that (i) the strategy proﬁle
σ is consistent with sequential rationality given the belief system π and (ii) the belief
system π is derived from the strategy proﬁle σ whenever possible. Recall also that we
have a game of signaling: it is the seller who oﬀers the price. All the PBE we consider
satisfy the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987).11 To capture the full set, we consider
maximal punishments oﬀ the equilibrium path.
Payoﬀs
A fraction l ∈ (0, 1) of the entering sellers has a low quality product and a fraction
h ∈ (0, 1) a high quality product, where  := (l, h) and l = 1 − h. The products are
diﬀerent but not perishable nor divisible. Each buyer wants to get one, each seller wants
to get rid of one.
The buyers and sellers have quasilinear preferences in money such that, if a buyer and
a seller trade for price p, the buyer gets uθ−p and the seller gets p− cθ. The buyer values,
ul, uh (utils), and the seller values, cl, ch (costs), depend on whether the quality θ is low,
θ = l, or high, θ = h.
Since diﬀerent qualities may not trade at equal rates, the total market surplus is likely
to depend on the relative gains from trade in high quality and in low quality. To capture
those gains by a single parameter λ, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 0 = cl < ul = λ = ch < uh = 1.
This implies that the gains from trade in high quality are 1− λ = uh− ch > 0 and the
gains from trade in low quality are λ = ul − cl > 0. Thus, the average quality is always so
10Examples of non-stationary or non-Markovian equilibria are available by request.
11Intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) is a standard reﬁnement for these games.
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high that it would be possible to sustain eﬃcient trading in a static Walrasian market:12
Eγ(u) := γul + (1− γ)uh ≥ ch, for any γ ∈ [0, 1] ,
where γ (1−γ) refers to the share of high quality sellers (low quality sellers) in the market.
Signals
To recap, the extensive structure of a meetings is:
1. A shared signal, s ∼ Fθ, is drawn and shown to the buyer and the seller.
2. The seller makes the buyer a price oﬀer, p ∈ [0, 1].
3. The buyer either accepts the oﬀer, a(p) = 1, or rejects the oﬀer, a(p) = 0.
The signals s are drawn independently across the meetings, according to continuous
distribution functions Fh(s), Fl(s) : [0, 1] → [0, 1], supported on [0, 1] = cl{s|fh(s) > 0} =
cl{s|fl(s) > 0}13, where fh and fl are densities; F := (Fh, Fl). It is assumed that a higher
signal is indicative of a higher quality and that extreme signals are perfectly revealing:
Assumption 2
∂
∂s
fh(s)
fl(s)
≥ 0
for all s.
lim
s→0
fh(s)
fl(s)
= 0,
and
lim
s→1
fh(s)
fl(s)
= ∞.
By the ﬁrst part of this assumption, the signals s satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio
property (MLRP). By the second part of this assumption and by continuity, any positive
likelihood ratio is attainable under an appropriate signal s ∈ (0, 1).14
Observe that both the shared signal about quality s and the price p may aﬀect the
buyer’s belief about the seller’s quality, E(u|s, p), and, thus, whether the price oﬀer is
12Most other papers start by the assumptions that cl < ul < ch < uh and the values of γ ∈ [0, 1] such
that Eγ(u) < ch. This implies that the static Walrasian market always fails. In this paper, we restrict our
attention to parameters for which Eγ(u) ≥ ch, for any γ ∈ [0, 1], such that the static Walrasian market
need not fail. This choice allows us to parametrize the buyers and the sellers’ values in a parsimonious way
and focus on liquidity problems arising, in particular, in dynamic markets with common values uncertainty
and bilateral communication opportunities prior to trade. Some of our results go through also with more
general payoﬀs.
13The closure of a set A contains all the points a whose every neighborhood B(a) intersects with the set
A: cl(A) = {a|∀B(a) : A ∩B(a) = ∅} where B(a) is an arbitrary open set such that a ∈ B(a).
14This implies that it is possible for both high and low quality sellers to emit also a highly misleading
signal, Eγ(u|s) ≈ ul = λ for θ = h and γ ∈ (0, 1) or Eγ(u|s) ≈ uh = 1 for θ = l and γ ∈ (0, 1).
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accepted or rejected. In eﬀect, it is possible to have quite much information revelation
prior to trade in a model like this: ﬁrst, the buyer and the seller could use the shared
signal so as to coordinate their strategies and make the play of the game conditional on
it and, second, the seller could signal his quality by his price oﬀer. Note speciﬁcally that,
as the signal is informative, the buyer cannot simply ignore it; hence, some equilibria that
used to be supportable without the signal might cease to be so.
Additionally, the high quality sellers and the low quality sellers could, with no loss
of generality, use a pooling pricing strategy for a subset of signals Sp, separating pricing
strategies for a subset of signals Ss, and mix for the others [0, 1]−Sp−Ss for Sp ∩Ss = ∅.
Given the usual ﬂexibility with the oﬀ path beliefs, this partition is totally arbitrary
because too high oﬀers could simply be rejected. Yet, the focus of the paper is mostly on
such cases where the sellers use pooling pricing strategies above a cutoﬀ s′ and separating
strategies below the cutoﬀ s′. In other words, Sp = [0, s′) and Ss = (s′, 1]. As it turns out,
this could also be defended as the seller maximal pricing pattern.
Average market quality
The price a buyer is willing to pay for a product depends on (i) the average quality in the
market, (ii) the shared signal and (iii) the information that is carried by the price oﬀer.
Without further revelation by the shared signal of the price oﬀer, the expected buyer value
of a random product equals
Eγ(u) :=
γh
γh + γl
+
γl
γh + γl
λ,
where γh is the stock of high quality products and γl is the stock of low quality products in
the market. Note that, while the entry to the market is exogenous, i.e., given by the entry
ﬂows,  = (h, l), the exit from the market is endogenous, i.e., given by the probabilities
for which diﬀerent qualities are traded in the bilateral meetings, τ = (τh, τl). Thus, in a
stationary equilbrium where the inﬂow of each quality matches the outﬂow of that quality,
the stocks are given by
γh =
h
τh
, (2.1)
γl =
l
τl
, (2.2)
By the Bayes’ law, after the shared signal is revealed, the expected buyer value of
purchasing from that particular seller is given by
Eγ(u|s) := γhfh(s)
γhfh(s) + γlfl(s)
+
γlfl(s)
γhfh(s) + γlfl(s)
λ,
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It is noteworthy that both Eγ(u|s) > Eγ(u) and Eγ(u|s) < Eγ(u) are possible for
whatever the average quality in the market.15 In other words, if the signal is low enough
(high enough), the maximum price the buyer is willing to pay, without further revelation,
could be lower (higher) than it would have been for average market quality. Nevertheless,
if average market quality is low (high), it does take a higher (lower) signal to raise the
buyer’s belief to a given level.
Value of search option
Once matched with a pair, the buyers and the sellers each solve their respective optimal
stopping problem: they could either trade with their current partner and get the related
immediate payoﬀ or search for better alternatives. The value of this search option is
denoted by Vb, for the buyers, and by Vh, Vl, for the sellers, and determined in equilibrium.
A buyer, who has been made a price oﬀer p, decides whether to accept it or reject it
as an optimal solution to
Vb(p, s) := max
a∈{0,1}
a (Eγ(u|p, s)− p) + (1− a) δVb. (2.3)
A seller, who is endowed with a product of quality θ = h, l, chooses the price oﬀer as
an optimal solution to
Vθ(s) := max
p∈[0,1]
a(p|s) (p− cθ) + (1− a(p|s)) δVθ,
or, equivalently, to
max
p∈[0,1]
a(p|s) (p− cθ − δVθ) . (2.4)
Observe that both problems condition on the shared signal because the optimal actions
can depend on what is the shared signal.
Note that the buyers are, in essence, sampling the sellers sequentially one by one.
They draw new payoﬀs, Eγ(u|p, s)− p, for each new seller. These payoﬀs are distributed
independently according to a given distribution with no recall option. It is well known
that the solution to such an optimal stopping problem is characterized by a cutoﬀ policy so
that, if the expected utility net of the price is below the cutoﬀ, the buyers accept the oﬀer
but, if the expected this is above the cutoﬀ, the buyers reject the oﬀer. At an optimum,
the cutoﬀ is equal to the buyer continuation value, Vb.
15This entails that it is possible to use the shared signal to support trade in the lemons case also.
48 Section 2.2
The seller’s problem is instead like that of a monopolist who is facing the demand
a(p|s), i.e., the probability of trade for a given price, and has the cost function as given
by cθ + Vθ, i.e., the seller reservation value plus the seller continuation value. Observe,
however, that in contrast to the standard monopoly problem, the seller’s problem is not
very well behaved in this case in which the price acts as a second signal of quality. In fact,
even a slightest deviation from the anticipated price oﬀer can make the buyer extremely
suspicious of the quality and thus reject this price oﬀer.16
Observe next that any stationary equilibrium induces the buyers and the sellers contin-
uation values. In particular, when s 
→ ph(s), s 
→ pl(s) are functions, i.e., when the sellers
do not use randomized pricing strategies (as in the semi-pooling equilibria described in Ch.
2.4.1) but, rather, a ﬁxed price for a ﬁxed signal (as in the pooling and in the separating
equilibria described in Ch. 2.4.1), market (continuation) values are given by
Vb =
γh
γh + γl
∫ 1
0
Vb(p(s), s)dFh(s) +
γl
γh + γl
∫ 1
0
Vb(p(s), s)dFl(s), (2.5)
Vh =
∫ 1
0
Vh(s)dFh(s), (2.6)
Vl =
∫ 1
0
Vl(s)dFl(s), (2.7)
and the probabilities of trade are given by
τh =
∫ 1
0
a(ph(s)|s)dFh(s),
τl =
∫ 1
0
a(pl(s)|s)dFl(s).
Equations (2.6) and (2.7) can thus be rewritten as
(1− δ(1− τh))Vh =
∫ 1
0
a(ph(s)|s)ph(s)dFh(s)− chτh,
(1− δ(1− τl))Vl =
∫ 1
0
a(pl(s)|s)pl(s)dFl(s)− clτl.
As explained, the acceptance probability, a(p|s), is pinned down by the buyers’ beliefs,
Eγ(u|p, s) − p, and by their continuation value, Vb. On the equilibrium path, the beliefs
are derived directly from the equilibrium strategies (our solution concept is PBE) but, oﬀ
16For instance, under the usual ﬂexibility with beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path in games of signaling, the
price elasticity of the demand, ∂a(p|s)
∂p
p
a(p|s) , can get inﬁnite for some p. This suggests that it is, typically,
not possible to resort to, say, basic tools of calculus to tackle the seller’s problem.
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the equilibrium path, we let the beliefs collapse to as negative as possible (to delineate the
full set of PBE); the punishments are maximal. Observe that all this is consistent with the
intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) because, usually, if the low quality sellers gain
from a deviation when taken for high quality sellers, then also the high quality sellers gain
from the deviation when taken for high quality sellers, yet, neither quality would gain from
it if taken for low quality sellers. It is, therefore, very easy to discipline any deviations
p(s) that sellers would be tempted to make by hard oﬀ path beliefs, E(u|p(s), s) = ul,
without violating the reﬁnement.
Outline of results
There exist a multiplicity of equilibria in this game. However, in Section 2.4.1, we show
that a seller never mixes between more than two prices. This implies that it is possible to
associate, with no loss of generality, for any shared signal s a vector of strategies
s
μ→ (ph, ph,2, ρh,2, pl, pl,2, ρl,2, a(ph), a(ph,2), a(pl), a(pl,2)) (s) ∈ [0, 1]10 .
where ph and ph,2 are the two prices that high quality sellers may use and pl and pl,2 are
the two prices that high quality sellers may use and (a(ph), a(ph,2), a(pl), a(pl,2)) are their
acceptance rates. When a seller is mixing, ρh,2 is the frequency of using the price ph,2 and
ρl,2 is the frequency of using the price pl,2. Note that some of these might be redundant
or irrelevant in a particular equilibrium. For example:
(i) For pooling strategies, we choose ρh,2 = ρl,2 = 0 and we need some p := ph = pl
and a(p) := a(ph) = a(pl) such that
a(p) = 1, for Eγ(u|s)− p > δVb
a(p) ∈ [0, 1] , for Eγ(u|s)− p = δVb
a(p) = 0, for Eγ(u|s)− p < δVb.
to make the buyers accept and reject in an optimal way.
(ii) For separating strategies, we choose ρh,2 = ρl,2 = 0 and we need some ph, pl and
a(ph), a(pl) for which is should hold that
ph = uh − δVb,
to keep the buyers indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the higher price, and
pl = ul − δVb, a(ph)(ph − cl − δVl) ≤ a(pl)(pl − cl − δVl), a(pl) = 1
to stop the low quality sellers from deviation to the higher price or to a lower price.
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(iii) For strategies in which a seller mixes between using a pooling pricing strategy and
separating, we may choose either ρl,2 = 0 (only the high mix) and pl = ph,1 < ph,2 and,
thus, a(pl) = a(ph,1) > a(ph,2) or ρh,2 = 0 (only the low mix) and ph = pl,1 > pl,2 and,
thus, a(ph) = a(pl,1) < a(pl,2). Also, some additional natural constraints must hold for
this particular case.
We note that, as long as no additional reﬁnements are introduced, this mapping μ
between the shared signal and the associated strategies, whether related to cases (i), (ii)
or (iii), could be chosen freely as long as everybody is given at least his or her continuation
value and the low quality sellers are never put to oﬀer a price that gives them less than a
separating price oﬀer would. Hence, there could be multiple stationary equilibria.
As our ﬁrst key contribution in Section 2.3, we ﬁnd that all equilibria are necessarily
ineﬃcient as they involve a delay in trade. This is somewhat unexpected because, for
the payoﬀs we consider, there always exist an equilibrium in a static Walrasian market in
which both high and low quality are traded for certain.17 Moreover, if we take away the
shared signal, there exists a unique equilibrium where every meeting results in trade and
where the products are, therefore, sold once they come to the market; interestingly, this
pooling equilibrium will break down by any perturbation in the continuation values.18
As the second major result, we show that two diﬀerent dynamic trading patterns might
arise: either high quality is sold faster or low quality is sold faster than the other quality.
This depends on whether the equilibrium involves separation or not. If it does, the low
quality is sold faster than high quality, if it does not, it is the other way.
The literature has so far concentrated on equilibria with separation and, thus, just
one dynamic trading pattern. Yet, in Section 2.4.2, we ﬁnd that the possibility to pool
with high quality sellers may raise the low quality sellers continuation values so much that
separation becomes infeasible, which leads to the other trading order. We can link this
ﬁnding with the relative gains from trade and show that, when the gains from trade in low
quality dominate, we can expect the low quality to be more liquid whereas, when the gains
from trade in high quality dominate, we can expect the high quality to be more liquid.
2.3 Eﬃciency
This section considers the eﬃciency of dynamic trading with a shared signal and hence
the value of this additional information for the traders. Note that, with positive but not
necessarily equal-sized gains from trade in low quality and in high quality, λ > 0 and
1− λ > 0 respectively, the total surplus depends on the length of time it takes to trade in
diﬀerent qualities. Since the traders are paired each period, the market is eﬃcient if every
17The average quality is ”high”; we have not got a lemons market for the high cost ch = λ is equal to
the low utility ul = λ.
18This result is robust to change in the order of the moves: it arises whether we have a signaling game
or a screening game.
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match results in trade; ineﬃciency is manifested in decreased liquidity. The standard
welfare measure for stationary equilibria is the weighted sum of the values to a cohort of
buyers and sellers who enters the market at any given point in time t ∈ Z19
S := Vb + hVh + lVl ≤ h(1− λ) + lλ.
Now, one of our most striking ﬁndings is the non-existence of eﬃcient equilibria that
obtains when the shared signal is added to the game form; otherwise, there does exist a
continuum of eﬃcient equilibria for the payoﬀs we consider. The reason is bifold: First,
it is not possible to trade everything at once, as required by eﬃciency, without sharing
any of the surplus with the buyers or with the high quality sellers. In dynamic markets,
one of these groups is hence bound to have a positive search option. Second, what the
buyers or what the high quality sellers thus make would have to vary according to the
shared signal; the lower the signal, the less they can expect to get. For a low enough
signal realization, they should expect to make less if they trade than if they execute their
positive search option. Consequently, there is no trade for a low enough signal. This is so
irrespective of who is making the price oﬀer as long as the buyer and the seller have this
piece of correlated information:
Proposition 1 Consider any stationary or non-stationary20 equilibrium.
1. If Vh = 0, then Vb > 0. If Vb = 0, then Vh > 0.
2. Suppose Vb > 0. Then, ∃s′ : ∀s < s′ : E(u|s)− p < δVb even for (the minimal price
the high quality sellers can sell for) p = ch and the buyers cannot trade for these
prices.
3. Suppose Vh > 0. Then, ∃s′ : ∀s < s′ : p− ch < δVh even for (the maximal price the
buyer can buy for) p = E(u|s) and the sellers of high quality cannot trade for these
prices.
Corollary 1 Any equilibrium is ineﬃcient.
Proof. Note that, after a signal s ∈ [0, 1] is viewed but without any further revelation
as that would cost, the maximal price a buyer is willing to accept is Eγ(u|s) − δVb (to
compensate the buyer for the loss of the search option) and the minimal price a seller of
high quality would be willing to oﬀer is ch + δVh (to compensate the seller for the cost
and the loss of the search option). Therefore, to guarantee that there would exist such a
price p(s) ∈ [ch + δVh, Eγ(u|s)− δVb], for almost all s, even for the case in which Eγ(u|s)
is close to ch it must be that (i) the search option for the buyers δVb = 0 and, thus,
19Note that, although it is standard and oft-used, the measure ignores the surplus related to the potential
transition period needed to reach the stationary equilibrium.
20For simplicity, we omit the time indexes.
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p(s) = Eγ(u|s), for almost all s, as the use of any price below it would raise Vb over zero
and (ii) the search option for the high quality sellers δVh = 0 and, thus, p(s) = ch, for
almost all s, as the use of any price above it would raise Vh over zero. But (i) and (ii) are
clearly incompatible because ch < Eγ(u|s) for all s ∈ (0, 1). Observe also that, if we are
to trade all goods in the ﬁrst match, we cannot change the buyers’ beliefs by signaling or
screening from where they are taken by the signal, Eγ(u|s), because that would necessarily
create some waste and delay in trade. Hence, there exists no equilibrium where everything
is traded in the ﬁrst match. Any equilibrium is ineﬃcient. 
Since it is impossible to trade all goods in the ﬁrst match without giving a fraction
of the rents to the buyers or to the high quality sellers, it is also impossible to trade all
goods for the lowest signals, which would give them almost no rents. With a positive
search option, it is better to wait for higher signals than to trade for the lowest signals.
Someone always becomes too picky to trade for whatever the signal. Thus, some rationing
must occur for the lowest signals. We do not even have to specify which party becomes
too picky to trade; that is likely to depend on the particularities of the game form. It
suﬃces to know that it is impossible to maintain mutually beneﬁcial trade for all the
signals over time. Some rents must to be payed in terms of delay in trade to shroud the
signal information when it is unfavorable. This is noteworthy as the primitives of this
game are such that all qualities could be traded eﬃciently in a static Walrasian market;
it would not be a lemons market:
Remark 1 Consider a static Walrasian market in which the fraction γ of the sellers
has a high quality good and the fraction 1− γ of the sellers has a low quality good. Then,
there exist a continuum of eﬃcient Walrasian equilibria p ∈ [λ,Eγ(u)] where every buyer
and every seller trades instantaneously. The buyer value is Vb = Eγ(u)− p and the seller
values are Vh = p− λ and Vl = p.21
Also, with either fully asymmetric or fully symmetric information, all the gains could
be realized:
Lemma 1 Consider a market as described in Section 2.2 but where the shared signal is
white noise. Then, there exist a continuum of eﬃcient equilibria p ∈ [λ,Eγ(u)] in which
everything is traded in the ﬁrst match. The buyer value is Vb = Eγ(u) − p ≥ 0 and the
seller values are Vh = p− λ ≥ 0 and Vl = p > 0.
Lemma 2 Consider a market as described in Section 2.2 but where the shared signal is
perfectly revealing. Then, there exist a unique of eﬃcient equilibrium ph = 1 and pl = λ
in which everything is traded in the ﬁrst match. The buyer value is Vb = 0 and the seller
21To specify, any price below the average quality could be the Walrasian equilibrium, the prices above
high cost sustain only low quality trade, the prices below high cost sustain trade in both low and high
quality. In other words, there would exist a continuum of eﬃcient Walrasian equilibria and a continuum
of ineﬃcient Walrasian equilibria.
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values are Vh = 1− λ and Vl = λ.
Corollary 2 A shared signal can be welfare-reducing.
2.4 Equilibria
2.4.1 Equilibria in ”stage games”
In this section we characterize the full set of equilibria which arise in the ”stage games” to
be played in the bilateral meetings. This is basically a static problem because the search
options depend on what is done in the continuation equilibrium, which is ﬁxed when the
actions are made,22 but not on what is done in the bilateral meetings, that have a zero
size. Hence, we can take the average market quality, γ := γhγh+γl ∈ (0, 1), the value of the
search option, V := (Vb, Vh, Vl) ∈ (0, 1)3, and the signal, s ∈ (0, 1), as our data and study
what kinds of equilibria are sustainable with this data.23
Deﬁnition 1 A meeting-speciﬁc equilibrium is deﬁned by data d = (V, γ, s), where s
is the shared signal that has been observed, V = (Vb, Vh, Vl) are the values of the search
option induced by the full game and γ is the share of high quality sellers in the market.
These meeting-speciﬁc equilibria come here in three diﬀerent types: pooling, separat-
ing, and semi-pooling in which a seller is mixing between pooling and separting. Withing
each type, there usually exists a continuum of equilibria that are consistent with the intu-
itive criterion. Most deviations can be attributed to low quality sellers as, when the sellers
of high quality would beneﬁt from a deviation, then the sellers of low quality would also
beneﬁt from it. We later on suggest a way to reﬁne the equilibrium set based on how the
sellers would prefer to coordinate their strategies.24
To be clear about the use of words, we add the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2 Consider a meeting-speciﬁc equilibrium with data d = (V, γ, s).
1. A proﬁle of pricing strategies ph(s), pl(s) ∈ Δ [0, 1] is pooling if both sellers only
make pooling oﬀers, i.e., if supp(ph(s)) = supp(pl(s)).
2. A proﬁle of pricing strategies ph(s), pl(s) ∈ Δ [0, 1] is separating if both sellers only
make separating oﬀers, i.e., if supp(ph(s)) ∩ supp(pl(s)) = ∅.
Otherwise, this proﬁle is semi-pooling.
22This continuation equilibrium could be stationary or non-stationary. For simplicity, we omit the time
indexes.
23Note that, while some of the pricing patterns may not be possible in a stationary equilibrium, they
could arise more generally in a non-stationary equilibrium.
24See also the ideas presented by No¨ldeke and Samuelson (1997) as we apparently end focusing on
mixtures of what they call Riley equilibria and Hellwig equilibria.
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Note that data and the shared signal, in particular, determines which meeting-speciﬁc
equilibria are supportable:
Proposition 2 Consider a meeting-speciﬁc equilibrium with data d = (V, γ, s).
1. There exists a pooling equilibrium iﬀ E(u|s)− δVb ≥ ch + δVh (IR− b, IR− h) and
E(u|s)−δVb ≥ cl+δVl (IR−b, IR−l). The price oﬀer p is betweenmax {cl + δVl, ch + δVh}
and E(u|s)− δVb. If p < E(u|s)− δVb and the acceptance probability is given by
a(p) = 1 for p < E(u|s)− δVb, a(p) ∈ [0, 1] for p = E(u|s)− δVb.
2. There exists a separating equilibrium iﬀ ul − δVb ≥ ch + δVh (IR − b, IR − h) and
ul − δVb ≥ cl + δVl (IR − b, IR − l). The price oﬀers are ph = uh − δVb, for the
high quality seller, and pl = ul − δVb, for the low quality seller, and the acceptance
probabilities are given by (IC − l)
a(ph) ∈
[
0,
pl − (cl + δVl)
ph − (cl + δVl)
]
and a(pl) = 1.
3. In a semi-separating equilibrium, there would be at maximum one pooling price p in
use and at maximum one separating price pl or ph in use: If the high quality seller
is mixing between p and ph > p the low quality seller only using p whereas if the low
quality seller is mixing between p and pl < p, the low quality seller is only using p.
In a pooling equilibrium, both low quality sellers and high quality sellers use the same
price. If the price leaves the buyer positive surplus, it is accepted for probability one;
otherwise, the buyer can also mix between accepting and rejecting the price. The best
(seller maximal) of pooling equilibria combines the best of both worlds as the price keeps
the buyers at their outside options, yet, is accepted for probability one.
In a separating equilibrium, both sellers are oﬀering a revealing price, a low price for
the low quality sellers and a high price for the high quality sellers. The former is accepted
for certain but has to be accepted for a probability less than one to stop the low quality
sellers from mimicking the high quality sellers.25 Both prices must keep the buyers at
their outside options to honor the buyers and sellers’ optimality conditions.
Note also that, the low quality sellers can separate whenever they want by oﬀering
a price below the high cost; the high quality sellers cannot due to the adverse oﬀ the
equilibrium path beliefs that would arise. Furthermore, if a seller would rather to resume
his search to get a better signal, there is always the option to quit and pass an opportunity
of trading by making the buyer some unacceptable price oﬀer, like p = 1.
25Observe that in most applications there exist many natural ways to interpret or purify the randomized
strategies, for example, by perturbing the players’ payoﬀs a` la Harsanyi (1973).
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In a semi-pooling equilibrium, either the low quality sellers mix between a low and a
high price while the high quality sellers only use the high price or the high quality sellers
mix between a low and a high price while the low quality sellers only use the low price. To
stop the low quality sellers from mimicking the high price must be accepted less often than
the low price. To keep the buyers mixing in accepting and rejecting it, they must be kept at
their outside options. That is, several ﬁxed point conditions, i.e., the revenue equivalence
condition for the mixing buyer and the mixing seller, plus, the incentive condition for the
low quality seller, have to hold at once.
Note that any meeting-speciﬁc equilibrium is consistent with the full one – trivially,
due to its negligible size. However, what we work towards is indeed an equilibrium that
is constructed out of the meeting-speciﬁc equilibria with certain desired properties.
We are interested in particular in meeting-speciﬁc equilibria that the sellers would
prefer to play for the data they have. We ﬁnd that if the signal is high, they rely on the
costless signal but, if the signal is low, they sometimes opt for the costly signaling.26
Deﬁnition 3 Consider a meeting-speciﬁc equilibrium with data d = (V, γ, s). The
equilibrium (with data d) is seller maximal if there exist no other equilibrium (with data
d) that both the high quality sellers and the low quality sellers would strictly (weakly) prefer.
Otherwise, the former equilibrium is strictly (weakly) defeated by the latter equilibrium.
Crucially, we ﬁnd that, in search for seller maximal equilibria, it is possible to ignore
as defeated the semi-pooling equilibria and zoom in on the best pooling equilibrium and
the best separating equilibrium. This result arises as the seller who is mixing has to be
indiﬀerent between playing the high price or the low price, yet, the other seller is going to
be better oﬀ if the ratio in which the ﬁrst seller mixes is degenerate; the seller maximal
equilibrium is, therefore, either fully pooling or fully separating.
Proposition 3 Consider a meeting-speciﬁc equilibrium with data d = (V, γ, s).
1. Any pooling equilibrium is defeated by the best pooling equilibrium where the price
oﬀer is p = E(u|s)− δVb and the acceptance probability is a(p) = 1.
2. Any separating equilibrium is defeated by the best separating equilibrium where the
acceptance probabilities are
a¯ := a(ph) =
pl − (cl + δVl)
ph − (cl + δVl) and a(pl) = 1.
3. Any semi-pooling equilibrium is defeated by the best pooling equilibrium or by the best
separating equilibrium.
26The deﬁnition has a ﬂavor or the one shot deviation property, which is a necessary condition of an
equilibrium, yet, we are now comparing an equilibrium to an equilibrium. Heuristically, one could think of a
situation in which all the sellers who have got a signal s contact one another to decide what meeting-speciﬁc
equilibrium to play, the old one or a new, and then communicate that information to the buyers.
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4. The best separating equilibrium is defeated by the best pooling equilibrium as long as
E(u|p)− δVb ≥ a(ph) (uh − ch) + (1− a(ph)) δVh.
5. The best pooling equilibrium is not defeated by the best separating equilibrium.
Corollary 3 In a seller maximal equilibrium, the sellers always play either the seller
maximal pooling equilibrium, the seller maximal separating equilibrium, or just quit by
making some unacceptable price oﬀer.
As the sellers make the price oﬀers and play the equilibrium that serves them the best,
it comes as no surprise that the Diamond (1971) result arises and the buyer value is zero.27
Also, what the low quality sellers get from pooling (with the high) cannot exceed what
the high quality sellers get from pooling (with the low).
Remark 2 Consider the full game. In a seller maximal equilibrium, the opportunity cost
of trading is higher for high quality sellers than for low quality sellers, ch+ δVh > cl + δVl
for all t; the buyer value is zero, Vb = 0.
The following lemma presents the basic structure of seller maximal equilibria: the
sellers pool for higher signals, [s′, 1], and separate or quit for lower signals, [0, s′].
Lemma 3 Consider the full game.
1. On existence of a cutoﬀ signal and its characterization:
In a seller maximal equilibrium, there exist a cutoﬀ s′ such that, (i) if the signal is
above the cutoﬀ, i.e., for s ≥ s′, the sellers make the best pooling oﬀer and, (ii) if the
signal is below the cutoﬀ and separation is feasible, i.e., for s < s′ and λ−δVb ≥ δVl,
the sellers make the best separating oﬀer but, (iii) if the signal is below the cutoﬀ
and separation is infeasible, i.e. for s < s′ and λ− δVb < δVl, the sellers just resume
their search.
2. On uniqueness of the cutoﬀ or multiplicity of cutoﬀs:
In a seller maximal equilibrium, if pl ≥ δVl (when separation is feasible), the cutoﬀ
is between sl and sh, where p(sl) := Eγ(u|sl) − δVb = ch + δVh (high quality sellers
are indiﬀerent between pooling and quitting) and p(sh) := Eγ(u|sl) − δVb = ch +
a(ph) (ph − ch) + (1− a(ph))δVh (high quality sellers are indiﬀerent between pooling
and separating). Otherwise, if pl < δVl (when separation is infeasible), the cutoﬀ
equals sl.
Note that the existence of a pooling equilibrium depends on buyers’ beliefs and, thus,
the shared signal (it is possible for the highest signals but not for the lowest signals) but
27As speciﬁed elsewhere in this paper, there can exist pooling and semi-pooling equilibria, where buyers
extract positive surplus; in purely separating equilibria where the buyers have to keep randomizing between
accepting and rejecting the high oﬀer, the buyers get no surplus, though.
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the existence of a separating equilibrium depends on the value of the search option to the
low quality sellers (it is either feasible for all signals or infeasible for all signals).
If the signal is high and, thus, the maximal price the buyer is willing to pay without
additional costly revelation is high, both high quality and low quality sellers are better
oﬀ if they play the best pooling equilibrium and not the best separating equilibrium. For
such s ∈ [sh, 1], any seller maximal equilibrium features pooling. Yet, for intermediate
signal realizations, the high quality sellers are better oﬀ separating, whenever it is feasible,
but the low quality sellers are better oﬀ pooling. For such s ∈ [sl, sh], a seller maximal
equilibrium could either be the pooling one or the separating one as a gain in one seller’s
surplus is a loss in the other seller’s surplus.
For very low signals s ∈ [0, sl], individual rationality constrains, p(s) > cθ + δVθ, for
θ = h, l, start binding, however. As the high quality sellers are worse oﬀ if they pool to a
low price that corresponds with a low signal than if they resume their search, there exist
no pooling equilibria and, whenever it is the case that low quality sellers rather quit than
reveal their quality, there exist no separating equilibria, either. The possibility to shop
for the highest signals makes the sellers too picky to oﬀer the lowest prices. As a result,
if the signal is too low to sustain pooling, the sellers either resort to costly separation or,
when they cannot, quit to get another try.28
The cutoﬀ is unique when separation is infeasible but, when that is not the case, we
have some leeway as high quality sellers prefer a higher cutoﬀ but low quality sellers a
lower cutoﬀ. We concentrate on seller maximal equilibria where the cutoﬀ is as long as is
feasible, sl.29 They come in three diﬀerent types:
Corollary 4 In a seller maximal equilibrium, the sellers are either (i) pooling for high
signals and separating for low signals (if pl > δVl + cl), (ii) pooling for high signals and
and quitting for low signals (if pl < δVl + cl), or (iii) pooling for high signals and mixing
between quitting and separating for low signals (if pl = δVl + cl).
2.4.2 Equilibria in the full game
We ﬁnd that seller maximal equilibria can feature two diﬀerent trading patterns:
Proposition 4 For any (δ, ,F), there exists a minimal cutoﬀ λ ∈ (0, 1) for the gains
from trade λ such that, for λ > λ, high quality is traded slower than low quality in a seller
maximal equilibrium.
Proposition 5 For any (δ, ,F), there exists a maximal cutoﬀ λ ∈ (0, 1) for the gains
from trade λ such that, for λ < λ, high quality is traded faster than low quality in a seller
28As a side-remark, observe that decentralized trade accompanied with variability in signals is a natural
way to get variability in prices across homogenous goods, something that has been observed in data.
29These equilibria could hence be describe as featuring maximal risk sharing or pooling.
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maximal equilibrium.
Proposition 6 For any (δ, ,F) and λ, there exists a seller maximal, stationary Marko-
vian equilibrium: λ ≤ λ.
Proofs. See Appendix A and B. 
In other words, for the gains from trade in high quality low enough, there exists a
seller maximal equilibrium where the low quality is more liquid and, for the gains from
trade in high quality high enough, there exists a seller maximal equilibrium where the
high quality is more liquid. Thus, either of these trading patterns could arise. Note that,
in the former case, the average market quality is better (in FOSD sense) than the entering
quality whereas, in the latter case, the average market quality is worse (in FOSD sense).
2.5 Closing remarks
We provide an example of a market in which the opportunity to get additional information
in the bilateral meetings, through which trading occurs, causes a reduction in liquidity
in a setup where the static Walrasian market could remain perfectly eﬃcient. Indeed, all
goods could be traded in the ﬁrst match if the shared signals were removed.
This outcome arises because the possibility to wait for higher signals and better prices
makes either the buyers or the high quality sellers too picky to trade for the lowest signals.
This eﬀect works through an increase in their search option; it does not depend, for
example, whether we have a signaling game as we do or a screening game.
Hence, we obtain the classic trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and rent extraction, of a sort.
Note that it does not seem to be the case that the ineﬃciencies would be caused by the
failure of information aggregation by price as, although imperfect revelation is essential
for the ﬁndings, also the eﬃcient equilibria without the signals are pooling. Instead, the
availability of the shared signal makes it possible for the sellers to pool to a diﬀerent
price for a diﬀerent shared signal; this is a costless sorting mechanism and, thus, improves
welfare relative to the cases where the sellers use a costly separation mechanism only.
We characterize the full set of equilibria that can be played in the bilateral stage games
between a seller and a buyer and zoom in on seller maximal, stationary Markovian equilib-
ria, which always exist. If the gains from trade in high quality are large in comparison to
the gains from trade in low quality, high quality can be traded faster; if it is the opposite,
low quality is more liquid. This suggests that the availability of correlated information
can let the market to endogenously adjust to trade faster the most valuable qualities.
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Appendix A
Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987)
Deﬁnition 4 Consider an equilibrium belief system π. Denote by Θ(p′) ⊂ {h, l} the
subset of sellers who prefer the disequilibrium price p′ to the equilibrium price p when
considered high quality sellers. The equilibrium fails the intuitive criterion if there is some
seller θ′ ∈ Θ(p′) who prefers p′ to p for whatever the buyers’ belief, as long as the buyer
takes him for some seller θ ∈ Θ(p′).
Here, the belief system fails the intuitive criterion if (a) π(p′) = E(u|p′) > ul but the
high quality seller would always lose by the deviation to p′ whereas the low quality seller
would gain from it even if known to be low or (b) π(p′) = E(u|p′) < uh but the low quality
seller would always lose by the deviation to p′ whereas the high quality seller would gain
from it even if known to be high.
Existence algorithm to ﬁnd a seller maximal equilibrium
In this part, we juxtapose two diﬀerent ways of dynamic trading with a shared signal: one
is based on costly signaling (where the sellers separate as often as possible) and the other
one is based on the costless signal (where they pool as often as possible). For concreteness,
we present an algorithm by which we can move from the signaling based equilibrium to the
seller maximal equilibrium that is also the maximal pooling equilibrium. We show that
at least initially the sellers’ proﬁts get higher as we decrease the use of costly signaling
and increase the use of costless signal. As a by-product of the process, we ﬁnd that there
always exists a equilibrium not only of the former type and but also of the latter type.
To run the algorithm, we consider diﬀerent equilibria associated with a cutoﬀ s ∈ [0, 1]
such that, for signals above the cutoﬀ, i.e., for s > s′, the sellers play the maximal pooling
equilibrium and, for signals below the cutoﬀ, i.e., for s < s′, the sellers play the maximal
separating equilibrium, or quit once they cannot. We start by the cutoﬀ s′ = 1, that
corresponds with the separation based equilibrium, and lower or alter it in a speciﬁed way
until we know we have discovered a seller maximal equilibrium.
As we proceed along, any cutoﬀ deﬁnes a stationary Markovian equilibrium, which
is initially a non seller maximal one but ultimately a seller maximal one. Depending on
which one binds sooner and when, a high quality seller’s participation constraint that
makes pooling impossible below the cutoﬀ or a low quality seller’s participation constraint
that makes separation impossible below the cutoﬀ, we can get either the standard trading
pattern, where the low quality is more liquid, or the reversed one.
We present this process by a progression of propositions. As we move on, we pass
continuously30 from an equilibrium to an equilibrium until we stop by one that is maximal
30The strategies are continuous and the seller values are continuous as we go on.
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for the sellers. We set out from s′ = 1:31
Proposition 7 There exists a unique separation based equilibrium where the sellers
play the seller maximal separating equilibrium as deﬁned by Propositions 2.2 and 3.2, with
some a¯(1), for any s ∈ [0, 1]. The probability of trade is τh = a¯(1) for the high quality
sellers and τl = 1 for the low quality sellers. Thus, the low quality is more liquid than the
high quality. The seller values are
Vh =
(1− λ)a¯(1)
1− δ(1− a¯(1)) and Vl = λ
We then consider smaller cutoﬀs s′ < 1 and, ﬁrst, the associated non seller maximal
equilibria:
Lemma 4 There exist a cutoﬀ s′ < 1, and a unique equilibrium where the sellers
play the seller maximal pooling equilibrium as deﬁned by Propositions 2.1 and 3.1 for any
s ∈ [s′, 1] and the seller maximal separating equilibrium, with some a¯(s′) > 0, for any
s ∈ [0, s′).
This requires that the high quality seller’s participation constraint holds so that they
are willing to pool for any s ∈ [s′, 1], i.e., that
p(s′) = E(u|s′) ≥ Vh(s′) + ch, IR-h,
and, additionally, that the low quality seller’s participation constraint holds so that they
are willing to separate for any s ∈ [0, s′), i.e., that
pl = ul ≥ Vh(s′) + cl, IR-l.
A seller maximal equilibrium is an equilibrium for which IR-h binds; it is always found
before s′ = 0. This comes from continuity and the fact that, as s′ → 0, the price goes down
to high cost, p(s′) → ch, but the high quality sellers continue to have a positive search
option, Vh(s
′) > 0. Yet, what exactly happens as we move down the cutoﬀ, depends on
the eﬀects on the seller values, which may not be monotone all the way until IR-h or IR-l
binds; the sellers are not only shifting away from separation but also changing the market
and the prices. Still, at least a ﬁrst, all sellers are better oﬀ in an equilibrium where the
cutoﬀ is lower:
Lemma 5 As the cutoﬀ is reduced, the seller values initially increase: dVh :=
∂Vh
∂s′ +
∂Vh
∂a¯
∂a¯
∂s′ < 0 and dVl :=
∂Vl
∂s′ +
∂Vl
∂a¯
∂a¯
∂s′ < 0 for all s
′ > so with some so ∈ (0, 1); they could
later again decrease and increase and so on.
31Note that not all the results depend on the particular parameter structure uh − ch = 1 − λ and
ul − cl = λ. We use uh, ch and ul when we are not evoking the additional restriction ch = ul = λ.
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Lemma 6 When IR-h and IR-l not yet bind, there exists a unique acceptance probability
a¯(s′) for any cutoﬀ s′ ∈ [0, 1]; a¯(s′) is continuous and increasing in the cutoﬀ s′ so long
as dVl < 0. The cutoﬀ and the acceptance probability have the similar eﬀects on the low
quality seller values, ∂Vl∂s′
(
∂Vl
∂a¯
∂a¯
∂s′
)
> 0.
To ﬁnd a seller maximal equilibrium, we reduce the cutoﬀ s′ < 1 until either IR-h or
IR-l binds:
Proposition 8 Suppose IR-h binds above IR-l, at s′ = sh. Then, there exists a seller
maximal equilibrium with a cutoﬀ s′ = sh ∈ (0, 1) where the sellers pool for s ∈ [s′, 1] and
separate for s ∈ [0, s′) with some a¯(s′) > 0. The probability of trade is τh = Fh(s′)a¯(s′) +
(1− Fh(s′)) for the high quality sellers and τl = 1 for the low quality sellers. Thus, the
low quality is more liquid than the high quality.
Thus, if IR-h binds ﬁrst, we could stop at once because we would have found a seller
maximal equilibrium but, if IR-l binds ﬁrst, we continue by adjusting the quit rate from
zero to one and simultaneously moving the cutoﬀ such that the IR-l still binds; if the
quit rate reaches one, we just keep decreasing the cutoﬀ further until IR-h binds. This is
necessary for the algorithm to work well. It allows us to adjust continuously the average
market quality as we move from equilibria where high quality is traded less often to
equilibria where low quality is traded less often and, hence, to go through all the possible
seller maximal equilibria.
Lemma 7 Suppose IR-l binds above IR-h, at s′ = sl. Then, there exist a quit rate
q > 0, a cutoﬀ s′(q) < sl, and an equilibrium where the sellers play the seller maximal
pooling equilibrium for any s ∈ [s′(q), 1]. For s ∈ [0, s′(q)), the high quality sellers quit
for probability one; the low quality sellers quit for probability q and separate for probability
1− q.
This requires that the high quality seller’s participation constraint holds so that they
are willing to pool for any s ∈ [s′(q), 1], i.e., that
p(s′(q)) = E(u|s′(q)) ≥ Vh(s′(q)) + ch, IR-h,
and, additionally, that the low quality seller’s participation constraint holds so that they
are willing to randomize for any s ∈ [0, s′(q)), i.e., that
pl = ul = Vh(s
′(q)) + cl, IR-l’.
Lemma 8 As long as IR-h and IR-l’ are satisﬁed, there exists a unique cutoﬀ s′(q) for
any quit rate q ∈ [0, 1]; s′(q) is continuous and increasing in the quit rate q so long as
∂Vl
∂s′ < 0. The quit rate and the cutoﬀ have the opposite eﬀects on the low quality seller
values, ∂Vl∂q
(
∂Vl
∂s′
∂s′
∂q
)
< 0.
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Lemma 9 As the quit rate q is elevated and the cutoﬀ s′(q) is adjusted such that the low
quality seller values are constant, the high quality seller values could increase or decrease.
After the cutoﬀ s′ is reduced from the point s′(1) where the quit rate is one, the seller
values are increasing: dVh :=
∂Vh
∂s′ < 0 and dVl :=
∂Vl
∂s′ < 0 for all s
′ < s′(1).
We continue like this by keeping IR-l binding, adjusting the cutoﬀ and increasing the
quit rate up to one and, from that point on, just continue by reducing the cutoﬀ. We stop
once IR-h binds:
Proposition 9 Suppose IR-l binds above IR-h, at s′ = sl. Then, there exists a seller
maximal equilibrium with a quit rate q > 0 and a cutoﬀ s′ = sh ∈ (0, 1) where the sellers
pool for s ∈ [s′, 1]. For s ∈ [0, s′), the high quality sellers quit for probability one; the low
quality sellers quit for probability q and separate for probability 1 − q. The probability of
trade is τh = (1− Fh(s′)) for the high quality sellers and τl = Fh(s′)(1− q) + (1− Fh(s′))
for the low quality sellers. Thus, the low quality is more liquid than the high quality for a
high quit rate.
Note that, before IR-l binds, a reduction in the cutoﬀ increases the quality in the
market as the high quality is traded more often in absolute terms but, after IR-l binds
and the quit rate it suﬃciently high, a reduction in the cutoﬀ decreases the quality in
the market as the high quality is traded less often in relative terms. In particular, as
we are elevating the quit rate, we at some point come to a quit rate q′ after which the
entry distribution of qualities ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the market distribution
of qualities, which indicates that high quality is traded faster than low quality:
Remark 3 There exists a cutoﬀ q′ ∈ (0, 1) for the quit rate q such that
h =
γh(q
′, s′(q′))
γh(q′, s′(q′)) + γl(q′, s′(q′))
and l =
γl(q
′, s′(q′))
γh(q′, s′(q′)) + γl(q′, s′(q′))
.
If IR-h binds below IR-l and s(q′), the high quality is more liquid than the low quality
but, otherwise, the low quality is more liquid than the high quality.
Remark 4 If the quit rate is degenerate q = 0, 1, equilibria where the high quality is
less liquid are based on mixed pricing strategies whereas equilibria where the high quality
is more liquid are based on pure pricing strategies.
Proofs for the existence algorithm
Proof of Proposition 7. By Propositions 2.2 and 3.2, the prices are ph = 1 and ph = λ.
The former is accepted for probability one, the latter for a probability less than one, a¯.
As the seller values are
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Vh = (uh − ch)(a¯+ δ(1− a¯) + δ2(1− a¯)2 + ...) = (uh − ch)a¯
1− δ(1− a¯) and Vl = ul − cl,
the acceptance probability is given by
a¯ =
ul − cl − δ(ul − cl)
uh − cl − δ(ul − cl) . 
Proof of Lemma 4. When the seller play the seller maximal pooling equilibrium above
a cutoﬀ s′ ∈ (0, 1) and a seller maximal separating equilibrium below the cutoﬀ s′ ∈ (0, 1),
the seller values are
Vh = Fh(s
′)(a¯(s′)(uh − ch) + (1− a¯(s′))δVh) +
∫ 1
s′
(p(s)− ch)dFh(s),
Vl = Fl(s
′)(ul − cl) +
∫ 1
s′
(p(s)− cl)dFh(s).
where under pooling, by the Bayes’ law, the price oﬀer is
p(s) = E(u|s) = γhfh(s)uh + γlfl(s)ul
γhfh(s) + γlfl(s)
,
γh =
h
τh
=
h
a¯(s′)F (s′) + (1− F (s′)) ,
γl =
l
τl
= l.
When the cutoﬀ is almost one, the seller values are almost as in Proposition 7. Thus,
it is easy to see that this equilibrium indeed exists as it only requires that the incentive
conditions hold both for the high quality sellers (IR-h),
p(s′) ≈ uh > δVh + ch ≈ δ (uh − ch)a¯
1− δ(1− a¯) + ch,
and for the low quality sellers (IR-l),
pl = ul > Vl + cl ≈ δ(ul − cl) + cl. 
Proof of Lemma 5. First, the price can be written as
p(s, s′, a¯) =
uh + g
2(s, s′, a¯)ul
1 + g2(s, s′, a¯)
,
where
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g2(s, s′, a¯) :=
γlfl(s)
γhfh(s)
=
τhlfl(s)
τlhfh(s)
.
The eﬀect of the cutoﬀ on the price level is diﬀerent before IR-l binds and separation is
feasible and after IR-l binds and separation is not feasible. In the former case, the prices
are higher when the cutoﬀ is higher; the higher the cutoﬀ the larger the eﬀect. This is
because the high quality sellers trade less often both in absolute terms and in relative
terms if the cutoﬀ is higher. The market gets better and the price level increases. In the
latter case, the prices are lower when the cutoﬀ is higher. While both the high and the
low quality sellers trade less often in absolute terms, the high quality sellers trade more
often in relative terms when the cutoﬀ is higher. The market gets worse and the price
level decreases. To show this, consider the partials
∂p(s, s′, a¯)
∂s′
= − uh − ul
(1 + g2(s, s′, a¯))2
lfl(s)
hfh(s)
∂
∂s′
τh
τl
(s′),
∂2p(s, s′, a¯)
∂s′2
= 2
uh − ul
(1 + g2(s, s′, a¯))3
(
lfl(s)
hfh(s)
∂
∂s′
τh
τl
(s′)
)2
− uh − ul
(1 + g2(s, s′, a¯))2
lfl(s)
hfh(s)
∂2
∂s′2
τh
τl
(s′) < 0.
First, when IR-l is satisﬁed, the rates of trade are
τh
τl
=
Fh(s
′)a¯+ (1− Fh(s′))
1
.
Later, when IR-l is not satisﬁed, the probabilities are
τh
τl
=
(1− Fh(s′))
(1− Fl(s′)) .
In between, we also deal with the probabilities
τh
τl
=
(1− Fh(s′))
Fl(s′)(1− q) + (1− Fl(s′)) .
When IR-l holds, the eﬀect of the cutoﬀ is given by
∂
∂s′
τh
τl
(s′) = −(1− a¯)fh(s′) < 0, ∂
2
∂s′2
τh
τl
(s′) = −(1− a¯)f ′h(s′) < 0.
Thus, the price level is increasing in the cutoﬀ:
∂p(s, s′, a¯)
∂s′
= − uh − ul
(1 + g2(s, s′, a¯))2
lfl(s)
hfh(s)
(−1)(1− a¯)fh(s′) > 0,
and
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∂2p(s, s′, a¯)
∂s′2
= 2
uh − ul
(1 + g2(s, s′, a¯))3
(
lfl(s)
hfh(s)
(−1)(1− a¯)fh(s′)
)2
− uh − ul
(1 + g2(s, s′, a¯))2
lfl(s)
hfh(s)
(−1)(1− a¯)f ′h(s′)
When IR-l does not hold, the eﬀect of the cutoﬀ is given by
∂
∂s′
τh
τl
(s′) =
−fh(s′) (1− Fl(s′)) + fl(s′) (1− Fh(s′))
(1− Fl(s′))2
.
which is positive for any s′ as the numerator is positive whenever fh(s
′)
fl(s′)
≤ 1−Fh(s′)1−Fl(s′) , that is
a direct result of MLRP. Hence, the price level is decreasing in the cutoﬀ:
∂p(s, s′, a¯)
∂s′
= − uh − ul
(1 + g2(s, s′, a¯))2
lfl(s)
hfh(s)
−fh(s′) (1− Fl(s′)) + fl(s′) (1− Fh(s′))
(1− Fl(s′))2
< 0.
For the last case with q ∈ [0, 1], the outcome is in between the earlier extrema: the
direct eﬀect of an increase in the cutoﬀ is negative for low q and and positive for high q;
it becomes more positive or less negative for a lower s′
∂p(s, s′, a¯)
∂s′
=
fl(s
′)q(1− Fh(s′))− fh(s′)(1− Fl(s′))
(1− Fl(s′)q)2
.
We can also see to the eﬀect of an increase in the quit rate, though it is needed only
later
∂p(s, s′, a¯)
∂q
=
Fl(s
′)(1− Fh(s′))
(1− Fl(s′)q)2
> 0.
Next, consider the direct eﬀect of the cutoﬀ on low quality seller values. When sepa-
ration is feasible, the low quality seller value is
Vl = Fl(s
′) (ul − cl) +
∫ 1
s′
(
p(s, s′, a¯)− cl
)
dFl
and, thus, the direct eﬀect of the cutoﬀ is
∂Vl
∂s′
= fl(s
′) (ul − cl)− fl(s′)
(
p(s′, s′, a¯)− cl
)
+
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s, s′, a¯)
∂s′
dFl
= fl(s
′)
(
ul − p(s′, s′, a¯)
)
+
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s, s′, a¯)
∂s′
dFl
which is negative for large s′ and positive for small s′.
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∂2Vl
∂s′2
= f ′l (s
′)
(
ul − p(s′, s′, a¯)
)− 2fl(s′)∂p(s, s′, a¯)
∂s′
+
∫ 1
s′
∂2p(s, s′, a¯)
∂s′2
dFl
which is negative for large s′ and positive for small s′. Instead, when separation is infea-
sible, the low quality seller value is
Vl =
∫ 1
s′
(
p(s, s′, a¯)− cl
)
dFl
and, thus, the direct eﬀect of the cutoﬀ is
∂Vl
∂s′
= −fl(s′)
(
p(s′, s′, a¯)− cl
)
+
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s, s′, a¯)
∂s′
dFl
= fl(s
′)
(
cl − p(s′, s′, a¯)
)
+
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s, s′, a¯)
∂s′
dFl
which is negative for any s′.
We show soon that the eﬀect on the acceptance probability can be written as
∂a¯
∂s′
=
−(1− a¯)δ ∂Vl∂s′
uh − cl − δVl + (1− a¯)δ ∂Vl∂a¯
= −(1− a¯)δ (ul − p(s
′))fl(s′) +
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂s′ dFl(s)
uh − cl − δVl + (1− a¯)δ
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂a¯ dFl(s)
,
where
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂s′ dFl(s) > 0 and
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂a¯ dFl(s)¡0. We also proof that
∂Vl
∂s′
(
∂Vl
∂a¯
∂a¯
∂s′
)
> 0 such
that, ∂Vl∂s′ > 0 implies
∂Vl
∂a¯
∂a¯
∂s′ > 0 and, consequently, dVl > 0 like we had to show.
We turn next to the high quality seller values. When IR-h and IR-l are satisﬁed the
values are
Vh = Fh(s
′)a¯(uh − ch) + Fh(1− a¯)δVh +
∫ 1
s′
(
p(s, s′, a¯)− ch
)
dFh(s).
By diﬀerentiating totally we end up with
dVh = fh(s
′)a¯(uh − ch) + Fh(uh − ch) ∂a¯
∂s′︸ ︷︷ ︸
the change in the value under separation
−(p(s′)− cl)fh(s′) +
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂s′
dFh(s) +
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂a¯
dFh(s)
∂a¯
∂s′︸ ︷︷ ︸
the change in the value under pooling
+fh(s
′)(1− a¯)δVh − Fh(s′)δVh ∂a¯
∂s′
+ Fh(s
′)(1− a¯)δdVh︸ ︷︷ ︸
the change in the search value
.
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As we consider small deviation from the highest cutoﬀ s′ = 1, the two integrals are
negligible. Thus, the change in the seller values is negative as long as, for some tiny ε > 0
and the cutoﬀ s′ = 1− ε
fh(s
′)
(
a¯(uh − ch) + (1− a¯)δVh − (p(s′)− cl)
)
+ Fh(s
′) (uh − ch − δVh) ∂a¯
∂s′
< 0.
By continuity, if the cutoﬀ is almost one, ε → 1, the change in the seller values is negative
whenever
fh(1)
(
a¯(1)(uh − ch) + (1− a¯(1))δVh − (uh − cl)
)− δ(1− a¯(1)) ul − cl − δVh
uh − ch − δVh fl(1) < 0
⇐⇒(
a¯(1)(uh − ch) + (1− a¯(1))δVh − (uh − cl)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− δ(1− a¯(1)) ul − cl − δVh
uh − ch − δVh︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
fl(1)
fh(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0+
< 0,
which is holds true for sure. 
Proof of Lemma 6. This is a continuity based proof. In this equilibrium type, for any
cutoﬀ s′, the acceptance probability a¯ has to be the root of the following auxiliary function
g1(s′, a¯) := a¯
(
uh − cl − δVl(s′, a¯)
)− (ul − cl − δVl(s′, a¯)) = 0.
We demonstrate next that, for any cutoﬀ s′, (i) g1 is continuous in a¯, (ii) g1(s′, 0) < 0
and g1(s′, 1) > 0 as long as IR-h and IR-l continue to hold true and (ii) g1 is convex in
a¯. This implies that, indeed, there exists a unique a¯(s′) such that g1(s′, a¯(s′)) = 0. We
proceed step by step: First, note that the function g1 = g1(s′, a¯) is continuous as so are
the functions p(s, s′, a¯), Vh(s′, a¯) and Vl(s′, a¯). Second, for any s′ such that IR-h and IR-l
hold true, the bounds are
g1(s′, 0) = 0
(
uh − cl − δVl(s′, 0)
)− (ul − cl − δVl(s′, 0)) < 0,
g1(s′, 1) = 1
(
uh − cl − δVl(s′, 1)
)− (ul − cl − δVl(s′, 1)) > 0.
Third, to show that g1 is convex in a¯, we diﬀerentiate it ﬁrst twice:
∂g1(s′, a¯)
∂a¯
= uh − cl − δVl(s′, a¯) + (1− a¯) δ ∂Vl(s
′, a¯)
∂a¯
,
and
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∂2g1(s′, a¯)
∂a¯2
= −2δ ∂
∂a¯
Vl(s
′, a¯) + (1− a¯) δ ∂
2
∂a¯2
Vl(s
′, a¯),
and then proof that the second partial is negative:
∂Vl(s
′, a¯)
∂a¯
=
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s, s′, a¯)
∂a¯
dFl(s) < 0,
and
∂2Vl(s
′, a¯)
∂a¯2
=
∫ 1
s′
∂2p(s, s′, a¯)
∂a¯2
dFl(s) > 0,
for any interior a¯ ∈ (0, 1), which seems natural as a higher a¯ means that high qualities are
traded more often. That generates a worse market and lowers the prices, yet, the eﬀect
would ﬂatten out ﬁnally. More precisely, the price can be written as
p(s, s′, a¯) =
uh + g
2(s, s′, a¯)ul
1 + g2(s, s′, a¯)
,
where
g2(s, s′, a¯) :=
γlfl(s)
γhfh(s)
=
τhlfl(s)
τlhfh(s)
= (a¯Fh(s
′) + 1− Fh(s′)) lfl(s)
hfh(s)
.
By diﬀerentiating the price oﬀer, we get
∂p(s, s′, a¯)
∂a¯
= − uh − ul
(1 + g2(s, s′, a¯))2
lfl(s)
hfh(s)
Fh(s
′) < 0
and
∂2p(s, s′, a¯)
∂a¯2
= 2
uh − ul
(1 + g2(s, s′, a¯))3
(
lfl(s)
hfh(s)
Fh(s
′)
)2
> 0.
Altogether, this implies that ∂Vl(s
′,a¯)
∂a¯ < 0,
∂2Vl(s
′,a¯)
∂a¯2
> 0 and, thus, that ∂
2
∂a¯2
g1(s′, a¯) > 0
for all a¯ ∈ (0, 1). As a result, since g1(s′, 0) < 0 and g1(s′, 1) > 0, the continuity and
the convexity of g1 in a¯ imply that for any s′ there exists a unique root a¯ of g1 such that
g1(s′, a¯) = 0 as long as IR-h and IR-l are remain to be satisﬁed. It is also clear that a¯(s′)
is continuous in s′ as so are the primitives.
To know when a¯ is increasing in s′, we diﬀerentiate totally the function g1 so as to get
∂a¯
∂s′
=
−(1− a¯)δ ∂Vl∂s′
uh − cl − δVl + (1− a¯)δ ∂Vl∂a¯
= −(1− a¯)δ (ul − p(s
′))fl(s′) +
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂s′ dFl(s)
uh − cl − δVl + (1− a¯)δ
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂a¯ dFl(s)
=: −(1− a¯)δD
N
(2.8)
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where ∂Vl∂s′ = (ul−p(s′))fl(s′)+
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂s′ dFl(s) is negative for large s
′ and positive for small
s′; uh−cl−δVl is positive and ∂Vl∂a¯ =
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂a¯ dFl(s) is negative as long as IR-h and IR-l are
satisﬁed. The symbols D and N stand for the numerator and the denominator, respectively.
For the cutoﬀ high enough, the ﬁnal terms
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂s′ dFl(s) in N and
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂a¯ dFl(s) in D are
negligible and the acceptance probability goes down as the cutoﬀ is reduced, ∂a¯∂s′ > 0.
Note generally that the total eﬀect of a change in the cutoﬀ in the low quality seller
value is
dVl =
∂Vl
∂s′
+
∂Vl
∂a¯
∂a¯
∂s′
.
If the total eﬀect is negative, the eﬀect of a cutoﬀ on the acceptance probability is positive
∂a¯
∂s′
=
−(1− a¯)δdVl
uh − cl − δVl .
Next, take a look at the eﬀects on D of (2.8),
−δ
(
dVl +
∂Vl
∂a¯
∂a¯
∂s′
− (1− a¯)
(
∂2Vl
∂a¯2
∂a¯
∂s′
+
∂2Vl
∂a¯∂s′
))
.
Note that
∂Vl
∂a¯
= −
∫ 1
s′
[
∂p(s, s′, a¯)
∂a¯
]
dFl = −
∫ 1
s′
[
uh − ul
(1 + g2(s, s′, a¯))2
lfl(s)
hfh(s)
Fh(s
′)
]
dFl < 0,
∂2Vl
∂a¯2
=
∫ 1
s′
[
∂2p(s, s′, a¯)
∂a¯2
]
dFl =
∫ 1
s′
[
2
uh − ul
(1 + g2)3
(
lfl(s
′)
hfh(s′)
Fh(s
′)
)2]
dFl > 0,
∂2Vl
∂a¯∂s′
=
∫ 1
s′
[
∂2p(s, s′, a¯)
∂a¯∂s′
]
dFl
=
∫ 1
s′
[
− uh − ul
(1 + g2)2
lfl(s
′)
hfh(s′)
fh(s
′)− 2 uh − ul
(1 + g2)3
(
lfl(s
′)
hfh(s′)
)2
(1− a¯)fh(s′)Fh(s′)
]
dFl,
∂2Vl
∂s′2
= −∂p(s, s
′, a¯)
∂a¯
fl(s
′) +
∫ 1
s′
[
∂2p(s, s′, a¯)
∂a¯s¯′
]
dFl
= −∂p(s, s
′, a¯)
∂a¯
fl(s
′)
+
∫ 1
s′
[
uh − ul
(1 + g2)2
lfl(s
′)
hfh(s′)
(1− a¯)f ′h(s′) + 2
uh − ul
(1 + g2)3
(
lfl(s
′)
h(1− a¯)fh(s′)fh(s
′)
)2]
dFl.
We next show that, if N and D of (2.8) are positive, dVl > 0 and uh − cl − δVl + (1−
a¯)δ
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂a¯ dFl(s) > 0, such that
∂a¯
∂s′ < 0, D is bounded away from zero. The proof is by
contradiction. Thereby, assume that for some cutoﬀ so,
uh − cl − δVl + (1− a¯)δ
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂a¯
dFl(s) → 0 + as s′ → so + .
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Obviously, this implies that D is increasing in (so, so + ζ), for some tiny ζ > 0,
−δ
(
dVl +
∂Vl
∂a¯
∂a¯
∂s′
− (1− a¯)
(
∂2Vl
∂a¯2
∂a¯
∂s′
+
∂2Vl
∂a¯∂s′
))
> 0.
But now, since everything is continuous, ∂
2Vl
∂a¯∂s′ is bounded in (s
o, so + η). As N and D are
positive and, thus, dVl > 0 and
∂a¯
∂s′ < 0 and it holds true that
∂Vl
∂a¯ < 0 and
∂2Vl
∂a¯2
> 0, there
would always be such a tiny ξ that, for all (so, so + ξ),
−δ
(
dVl +
∂Vl
∂a¯
∂a¯
∂s′
− (1− a¯)
(
∂2Vl
∂a¯2
∂a¯
∂s′
+
∂2Vl
∂a¯∂s′
))
< 0.
This demonstrates that D is bounded away from zero for N and D positive.
By a very similar argument we can show that if N < 0 and D > 0 such that ∂a¯∂s′ > 0,
if D → 0 that would take place because IR-l is starting to bind and not just because
it should happen that −δVl + (1 − a¯)δ
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂a¯ dFl(s) → −(uh − cl) for some other cause
whereas IR-l remains lax.
In conclusion, the relevant cases for us are those in which D > 0 such that the sign of
∂a¯
∂s′ is determined by N . This means that, if
∂Vl
∂s′ > 0, then
∂a¯
∂s′ < 0 and, if
∂Vl
∂s′ > 0, then
∂a¯
∂s′ > 0. Thereby, the cutoﬀ and the acceptance probability have similar eﬀects on low
quality seller values:⎛
⎜⎜⎝∂Vl∂s′ + ∂Vl∂a¯︸︷︷︸
<0
∂a¯
∂s′
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ ∂a¯∂s′ < 0 and ∂Vl∂s′
(
∂Vl
∂a¯
∂a¯
∂s′
)
> 0 
Proof of Proposition 8. This holds true by the construction. See the algorithm pre-
sented. 
Proof of Lemma 8. Take a look at the constraint IR-l’ and deﬁne a new function g3:
g3(s′, q) = ul − cl − δVl(s′, q),
such that g3 = 0 if IR-l’ is satisﬁed. Next, diﬀerentiate this function totally to obtain
∂Vl
∂q
+
∂Vl
∂s′
∂s′
∂q
= 0 
Proof of Lemma 7. The proof of Lemma 7 is similar to the proof of Lemma 4. 
Proof of Lemma 9. Before the quit rate is one the change in high quality seller values
is given by
dVh =
(
−(p(s′)− ch)fh(s′) +
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂s′
dFh(s)
)
∂s′
∂q
+
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂q
dFh(s).
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By construction, the low quality seller values are constant
dVl =
(
(1− q)(ul − cl)fl(s′)− (p(s′)− cl)fl(s′) +
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂s′
dFl(s)
)
∂s′
∂q
+
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂q
dFl(s)− (ul − cl)Fl(s′) = 0.
After the quit rate is one the changes in both low and high quality seller values are
given by
dVθ = −(p(s′)− cθ)fθ(s′) +
∫ 1
s′
∂p(s)
∂s′
dFθ(s) < 0,
since p(s′) > ch > cl and it has been proofed earlier that
∂p(s)
∂s′ < 0 after q = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 9. This holds true by the construction. See the algorithm pre-
sented. 
Appendix B
Proofs for Subsection 2.3
Proofs of Lemmata 1 and 2. Due to the discounting, it is better to trade at once than
wait for the repetition of this stationary equilibrium. In Lemma 1, the seller is willing
to oﬀer p provided that any other price oﬀer is rejected for the low oﬀ path beliefs that
would arise. In Lemma 2, such adverse beliefs present no threat as both parties know the
quality and the sellers can use ph = uh and pl = ul to extract full surplus. 
Proofs for Subsection 2.4.1
Pooling equilibria in meetings
As both sellers oﬀer the price p for the associated signal realization, s, its use prompts
no updating of buyers’ beliefs, Eγ(u|s, p) = Eγ(u|s). Consequently, to make the buyers
accept a pooling price p(s), it is necessary that p ≤ Eγ(u|s)− δVb and, to make both low
and high quality sellers oﬀer the pooling price, that p ≥ max {δVl, ch + δVh}. Otherwise,
any price would do as deviations can be kept at bay by attributing them to low quality
sellers. If p < Eγ(u|s)− δVb, the buyers must accept the pooling price for probability one
but, if p = Eγ(u|s) − δVb, they can also randomize between accepting and rejecting the
pooling price. 
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Separating equilibria in meetings
As diﬀerent sellers use diﬀerent prices, pl for the low and ph for the high, in a separating
equilibrium given the signal, s, the buyers’ beliefs become degenerate after the price oﬀer
has been made, Eγ(u|s, pl) = ul and Eγ(u|s, ph) = uh. Thus, to make the buyers accept
the price, it must be so that pl ∈ [cl, ul] and ph ∈ [ch, uh], and to keep the low quality
sellers from mimicking the high quality sellers that
a(pl)pl + (1− a(pl)) δVl ≥ a(ph)ph + (1− a(ph)) δVl.
This implies that, ﬁrst, pl ≥ δVl (the low price must be above the quality sellers’ outside
options to make it worthwhile to oﬀer it) and, second, given that is must hold that pl < ph,
also a(pl) > a(ph) must hold (the low price must be accepted more frequently than the
high price to satisfy the incentive condition for the low). As a result, to make the buyers
randomize between accepting and rejecting the high price, it is necessary that the high
price keeps the buyers at their continuation values, ph = Eγ(u|ph, s)− δVb. Obviously, the
high quality sellers have no incentive to mimic the low quality sellers as the low price pl
is below the high cost ch.
Observe also that the low price must keep the buyers at their continuation values,
ph = Eγ(u|ph, s) − δVb, but they do have to accept it for probability one, a(pl) = 1.
Namely, if the former requirement would not hold, there would be a proﬁtable deviation
from pl to pl−η to make the buyer accept the price for certain and, if the latter would not
hold, there would be a proﬁtable deviation from pl to pl + η to keep the acceptance rate
the same but to increase the price oﬀer, for some η > 0. As buyers’ beliefs are already the
harshest possible for pl it is impossible to discipline such deviations by out of equilibrium
path beliefs, which could not get worse still. 
Semi-pooling equilibria in meetings
To the contrary, suppose the sellers mix between two pooling prices, p1 and p2 such that
a1 := a(p1) and a2 := a(p2). With no loss of generality, p1 < p2 such that a1 > a2. Note
that, by individual rationality, pi − cθ ≥ δVθ if price pi is to be used by sellers of quality
θ = h, l. Now, to keep the high quality sellers mixing between p1 and p2, it must hold that
a1
(
p1 − λ)+ (1− a1) δVh = a2 (p2 − λ)+ (1− a2) δVh
a1p1 =
(
a1 − a2) (δVh + λ) + a2p2
and, to keep the low quality sellers mixing between p1 and p2, it must hold that
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a1p1 +
(
1− a1) δVl = a2p2 + (1− a2) δVl
a1p1 =
(
a1 − a2) δVl + a2p2.
Clearly, both cannot hold simultaneously so long as δVh+λ = δVl. Rather, for δVh+λ >
δVl, if the high quality mixes between p
1 and p2, then the low quality prefers to use p1
only and, if the low quality mixes between p1 and p2, then the high quality prefers to use
p2 only. In the former case, p2 is a separating price and p1 is a pooling price; in the latter
case, it is the other way. We show later that, indeed, δVh + λ > δVl for any t.
Note that separating prices are perfectly revealing such that E(u|s, pl) = λ and
E(u|s, ph) = 1 for any s. This implies that pl ∈ [0, λ] and ph ∈ [1− λ, 1] for the sell-
ers to oﬀer them and for the buyers to accept them. The pooling price has to lie within
[1− λ, 1]. Furthermore, we can show that the separating prices are unique for both low
and high quality sellers: (i) By the intuitive criterion, pl = λ − δVb (otherwise, there is
a proﬁtable deviation to pl +  for a higher price) and a(pl) = 1 (otherwise, there is a
proﬁtable deviation to pl −  for a higher acceptance rate) since any price deviations in
below λ must be attributed to low quality sellers. (ii) To stop the low quality sellers from
mimicking the high quality sellers, it must be that a(ph) ≤ pl−δVlph−δVl and, thus, to keep the
buyers mixing, it must be that ph = 1− δVb such that the buyers are indiﬀerent between
accepting and rejecting ph. As a result, pl = λ− δVb and ph = 1− δVb.
We show next that δVh + λ > δVl. This ﬁnding follows as the proﬁt of the low quality
sellers cannot exceed the proﬁt of the high quality sellers by more than λ whether the
sellers pool, semi-pool or separate. For any shared signals s for which the sellers pool or
semi-pool, the high quality sellers get p(s) − λ (a(p(s) − λ)) and the low quality sellers
get p(s) (a(p(s))) and, for any shared signals s for which the sellers separate, the high
quality sellers may receive no payoﬀs but the the low quality sellers do not get more than
λ, either. 
Proof of Proposition 3.3. As we are looking for a seller maximal equilibrium, to simplify
the notation, it is without loss to assume already that Vb = 0. Otherwise, we ought to
scale down each price p by subtracting from them Vb. To satisfy the individual rationality
constraints, the prices must also be such that p− cθ ≥ δVθ.
Case 1 : Suppose both sellers use a pooling price p and the low quality sellers mix be-
tween the pooling price p and a separating price pl. The maximal pooling price E(u|s, p) ∈
[E(u|s), 1] clearly depends on the ratio β = Pr(p|l) in which the low quality sellers mix.
To keep the low quality sellers indiﬀerent between oﬀering the pooling price and the sep-
arating price, as pl = λ and a(pl) = 1, the acceptance probability of the higher price oﬀer
p must be equal to a(p) = λ−δVlp−δVl .
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Observe that, for any suitable γ, s, and Vt+dt(σt+dt), there can exist many such equi-
libria with diﬀerent β and, hence, p. As low quality sellers are mixing between pl, that is
accepted for sure, and p, what they get, Vl, is constant over all such equilibria. However,
as high quality sellers are pooling to p, what they expect to obtain equals
Vh(s) =
λ− δVl
p− δVl (p− λ− δVh) + δVh,
which is maximized by the highest feasible price p = 1 (β = 0), whenever p−λ−δVhp−δVl < 1,
and by the lowest feasible price p = E(u|s) (β = 1), whenever p−λ−δVhp−δVl > 1. That is,
any semi pooling equilibrium of this type would be defeated by either the best separating
equilibrium with p = 1 or by the best pooling equilibrium with p = E(u|s) and a(p) = 1.
As Vh + ch > Vl, it is rather the former than the latter.
Case 2 : Suppose both sellers use a pooling price p and the high quality sellers mix
between the pooling price p and a separating price ph. The maximal pooling price
E(u|s, p) ∈ [λ,E(u|s)] clearly depends on the ratio β = Pr(p|h) in which the high qual-
ity sellers mix. To keep the high quality sellers indiﬀerent between oﬀering the pool-
ing price and the separating price, as ph = 1, the acceptance probability of the higher
price oﬀer ph must be equal to a(ph) (1− ch − δVh) = a(p) (p− ch − δVh). Note also
that, if a(ph) (1− ch − δVh) = a(p) (p− ch − δVh) is satisﬁed, then a(ph) (1− δVl) ≤
a(p) (p− δVl) is satisﬁed, by δVh + ch > δVl, such that the low quality seller have no
incentive to mimic the high quality sellers.
Observe that, for any suitable γ, s, and V , there can exist many such equilibria with
diﬀerent β and, hence, p. As high quality sellers are mixing between pl and p and low
quality sellers are pooling to p, what they expect to obtain equals
Vl(s) = a(p)p+ (1− a(p)) δVl,
Vh(s) = a(p) (p− λ) + (1− a(p)) δVh,
which are maximized by the highest feasible price p = E(u|s) (β = 1) and the highest
feasible acceptance probability a(p) = 1. That is, any semi pooling equilibrium of this
type would be defeated by the best pooling equilibrium with p = E(u|s) and a(p) = 1.
As semi-pooling equilibria are either as in Case 1 or as in Case 2, any semi pooling
equilibrium is defeated by either the best pooling equilibrium or by the best separating
equlibrium, or the sellers’ individual rationality constraints hold and those sellers prefer
to resume their search. 
Proof of Lemma 3. As p = E(u|s) > pl, the low quality sellers are always better
oﬀ if they they play the best pooling equilibrium than if they play the best separating
equilibrium. This is not the case for high quality sellers, however. Denote by sh ∈ (0, 1)
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the signal that solves p(s) − λ = a(ph) (ph − λ) + (1− a(ph)) δVh and by sl ∈ (0, 1) the
signal that solves p(s) − λ = δVh. Thus, for s ≥ sh, the high quality sellers are better
oﬀ if they they play the best pooling equilibrium than if they play the best separating
equilibrium, for s < sh but for s ≥ sl, it is the opposite. Notice the individual rationality
constraint, for the low quality sellers or for the high quality sellers, will always bind for
suﬃciently low signal values. If p(s) − λ < δVh, pooling is not feasible and, pl < δVl,
separation is impossible. In the former case the high quality sellers would rather quit than
pool, in the latter case the low quality sellers would rather quit than separate. 
Proofs for Subsection 2.4.2
Proof of Proposition 4. We have already proofed that for any cutoﬀ there exists a unique
acceptance probability a(s′) and it deﬁnes a function s′ 
→ a(s′) that is continuous in s′.
Now, we show that, ﬁrst, there is always a cutoﬀ s′ such that IR-h binds and then that,
for λ, IR-l does not bind for this cutoﬀ s′. This proofs the result.
To proceed, consider a mapping g4
g4(s′) = p(s′, s′, a(s′))− λ− δVh(s′, a(s′)).
Clearly, IR-h is satisﬁed iﬀ g4 ≥ 0 and binding iﬀ g4 = 0. As g4 is continuous in s′ and
g4(0) < 0 and g4(1) > 0, is must have a root at some s′ ∈ (0, 1).
To be more speciﬁc, we calculate the bound values as to see that one is positive and
the other one is negative to show that the ﬁxed point is in between
g4(0) = p(0, 0, a(0))− ch − δ
[∫ 1
0
(p(s, 0, a(0))− ch) fh(s)ds
]
= −δ
[∫ 1
0
(p(s, 0, a(0))− ch) fh(s)ds
]
< 0
and
g4(1) = p(1, 1, a(1))− ch − a(1)
1− (1− a(1)δ)(uh − cl)
= uh − ch − a(1)
1− (1− a(1)δ)(uh − ch) > 0.
Now, what remains is to show that, for suﬃciently large gains from trade in the low
quality, λ = ch = ul, where uh = 1 and cl = 0, there exists a cutoﬀ s
′ for which IR-h binds
and IR-l does not bind. This is very simple. If λ = ul − cl > δ it is impossible to raise the
value δVl ≤ δ(uh − cl) = δ above ul − cl no matter what is played; the low quality sellers
are always better of by separating than by returning to the market for search.
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Note that this equilibrium type can only exist if there are gains from trade in low
quality, i.e., λ > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider a situation where the sellers are forced to pool for
signals above a cutoﬀ s′ and quit for signals below a cutoﬀ s′. At the beginning, we do
not pay attention to the fact that the sellers may not have no incentive to do so but,
ultimately, we are interested to ﬁnd a pair (λ, s′(λ)) of exogenous λ and endogenous s′ for
which this would be a seller maximal equilibrium such that IR-h would be satisﬁed as an
equality at s′
p(s′, s′)− ch = δVh =
δ
∫ 1
s′ (p(s
′, s)− ch) dFh(s)
1− δFh(s′)
⇐⇒
p(s′, s′)− λ = δVh =
δ
∫ 1
s′ (p(s
′, s)− λ) dFh(s)
1− δFh(s′) (2.9)
and IR-l for separation would not be satisﬁed at s′
ul − cl < δVl =
δ
∫ 1
s′ (p(s
′, s)− cl) dFl(s)
1− δFl(s′) ⇐⇒ λ <
δVl = δ
∫ 1
s′ (p(s
′, s)) dFl(s)
1− δFh(s′) . (2.10)
We refer to equation 2.9 as IR-h’ and to equation 2.10 as IR-l”.
For later use, note that IR-h’ can be rewritten as
p(s′, s′)− 1− δ
1− δFh(s′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=M(s′)>1
λ =
δ
∫ 1
s′ p(s
′, s)dFh(s)
1− δFh(s′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:δWl(s′)
.
This is applied to show the monotonicity of s and s.
We consider also function g5
g5(s′) = p(s′, s′)− λ− δVh(s′).
Note that, for any λ ∈ [0, λ] such that λ ∈ (0, 1), g5 is continuous in s′, positive for
s′ = 1 as
g5(1) = 1− λ− δ Vh(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
and negative for s′ = 0 as
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g5(0) = 0− λ− δ Vh(0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
This implies that for any λ ∈ [0, λ] there always exists a ﬁxed point s′(λ) ∈ (0, 1) such
that IR-h’ holds. We have not got a proof showing that the ﬁxed point is unique but it
appears safe to assume that the number or roots is ﬁnite such that a maximal one and a
minimal one exist. They are denoted by s(λ) and s(λ), respectively. Observe that both
s(λ) ∈ (0, 1) and s(λ) ∈ (0, 1) are increasing in λ:
g5(s(λ), λ) = p(s(λ)), s(λ))−M(s(λ))λ− δWh(s(λ)) = 0
=⇒g5(s(λ), λ+ ε) = p(s(λ), s(λ))−M(s(λ))(λ+ ε)− δWh(s(λ)) < 0
but as g5(1, λ+ ε) > 0 the largest root for λ+ ε must lie between s(λ) and 1,
s(λ) < s(λ+ ε),
and
g5(s(λ), λ) = p(s(λ), s(λ))−M(s(λ))λ− δWh(s(λ)) = 0
=⇒g5(s(λ), λ− ε) = p(s(λ), s(λ))−M(s(λ))(λ− ε)− δWh(s(λ)) > 0
but as g5(0, λ− ε) < 0 the smallest root for λ− ε must lie between 0 and s(λ),
s(λ) > s(λ− ε).
This implies that all those pairs (λ, s′) that we take interest in are in
[
0, λ
]×[s(0), s(λ)].
Next, we deﬁne two sets for each arbitrary λ ∈ (0, 1) and point out that one is included
in the other one
S(λ) =
{
(λ, s′)|λ ∈ [0, λ] , s′ = s′(λ)} ⊂ S(λ) = {(λ, s′)|(λ, s′) ∈ [0, λ]× [s(0), s(λ)]} .
Then, we consider the two related minimization problems where the value of the latter is
bounded by the value of the former as
min
(λ,s′)∈S(λ)
Vl(λ, s
′) ≥ min
(λ,s′)∈S(λ)
Vl(λ, s
′) =: V l.
Last, we note that the value V l is well-deﬁned as the function Vl is continuous in (λ, s
′)
and the set S(λ) is compact. The value V l is also positive as Vl(λ, s
′) is positive for any
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pair (λ, s′) ∈ S(λ). As a result, we have a positive minimum for low quality seller values
in this equilibrium type; in particular, the low quality seller values do not get smaller and
smaller as λ does. This permits us to conclude that both IR-h’ and IR-l” are satisﬁed for
λ < δV l.
Note that this equilibrium type can only exist if there are gains from trade in high
quality, i.e., λ < 1. 
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Chapter 3
Obfuscation by substitutes:
Shopping frictions and
equilibrium price dispersion
within stores
83
List of symbols
B = [0, 1] the set of buyers
t ∈ [0, 1] time index
i ∈ {1, 2} seller/store index
ni ∈ {1, 2} the number of items in store i
n ∈ {1, 2} index of items available in a store
k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} index of items observed by a buyer
θ ∈ (0,∞) the Poisson arrival/ﬁnding rate of the prices in a store
σ(n) ∈ (0,∞) the multiplier of θ for n (for economies of scale in search)
F i ∈ Δ [0, 1] the joint price distribution in store i
F in ∈ Δ [0, 1] the marginal price distribution of item n in store i
pin ∈ [0, 1] (realized) price of item n in store i
E(p|F in) ∈ [0, 1] expected price of item n in store i
ω buyer’s search outcome
ω0 ’no price from store 1 nor from store 2’
ωim ’a monopoly price from store i, no price from store -i’
ω1,2m ’a monopoly price from store 1 and from store 2’
ωid ’a discounted price from store i, no price or a higher price from store -i’
ω1,2d ’a discounted price from store 1 and from store 2’
ω1,2A ’all prices from store 1 and from store 2’
E(p|ω) expected price given outcome ω
P =
{
pin
}
the set of prices in the market
BK ∈ [0, 1] the mass of buyers who end with prices K ⊂ P
Bk ∈ [0, 1] the mass of buyers who end with k ∈ N prices
Bi ∈ [0, 1] the mass of buyers who end with seller i’s price
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Obfuscation by substitutes:
Shopping frictions and
equilibrium price dispersion
within stores
Abstract
We provide a novel search model that features in-store frictions and equilibrium
price dispersion both within and across stores. The frictions originate from the
gradual arrival of price information within stores and the existence of deadlines
for buyers. We show that sellers have an incentive carry several similar items
and generate price variation among these items to amplify the existing search
frictions and create barriers to switching in an environment where none exist
initially. It also helps them to discriminate better between buyers, who end
with diverse degrees of price information. As the number of items in stock
expands, sellers can extract more proﬁts.
Keywords: Obfuscation; Substitutes; Search frictions in-store; Price vari-
ation in-store; Deadlines. JEL-codes: D43, D83.
85
86 Section 3.1
3.1 Introduction
The Internet is full of diﬀerent online stores and almost all oﬀer a lot of alternatives for
exploration. Click on one of these, and be ﬂooded by a visual stream of endless products
where a lower price or a better matched product is always, seemingly, just a click away.
Indeed, there could be so much to see at a single seller nowadays that, once you are done,
there is not much time left for shopping in any other store. De´ja` vu?
We show in this paper that such variability of alternatives can be applied to amplify the
existing search frictions and create new barriers to switching in an environment where none
exist initially. This works even for simple price search; it is not necessary to introduce
product diﬀerentiation or any kind of ex ante consumer heterogeneity in the model to
tackle the research question.1 We ﬁnd that sellers have an incentive to generate price
variation across identical products in their store to keep buyers searching longer in there;
this leaves the buyers with less time for shopping in the other competing store. To put the
idea bluntly, the sellers gain if they all add to their original stock more items, of the same
kind they already have but with higher prices, and then spread them around to let the
buyers ﬁnd then one-by-one. The underlying assumptions are that the buyers search under
time-pressure and the items available in a given store are found randomly and gradually.
Our paper hence contributes to literature analyzing retailer strategies to lock-in con-
sumers (e.g., Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) on price obfuscation and Klemperer (1987) on
switching costs) and to literature trying to explain price dispersion among homogenous
items (see Baye et al. (2006), Burdett and Judd (1983) and Butters (1977)). Yet, while
the latter strand of literature has concentrated on price dispersion across stores we ﬁnd it
also within stores.
We consider a duopoly with two similar sellers and a unit mass of buyers. All items are
of the same given type but a seller could carry them in multiple replicas and tag a diﬀerent
price quote on each. In the base line case, both sellers have exactly two items in stock.
This number is common knowledge but the prices are the sellers’ private information until
the buyers ﬁnd them.
We use a new dynamic model which abstracts from the hold-up problem present in
many optimal stopping problems with endogenous price distribution (Diamond, 1971).
Instead, we build on two novel features. First, the buyers search with a deadline: their
search costs jump from zero to inﬁnity at the deadline. Second, the prices in the stores
are not found immediately once a buyer enters a store but gradually one-by-one, after a
1Obviously, this is not to say that product diﬀerentiation would not matter in search. Our aim is rather
to point out more elementary search eﬃciency related mechanisms, which maybe arise as a positive side
product of other beneﬁts of deepening variety provision but can aﬀect search, prices and proﬁt all the
same. It is to this aim that we assume a more abstract simpler approach where the items in stock are
homogeneous. To transfer this idea back to practice of retailing, there could naturally be various superﬁcial
diﬀerences between the products as long as most buyers regard them as perfect substitutes essentially.
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random wait time.
The buyers can switch the stores freely as long as they have time. There is no explicit
switching cost. However, when there are diﬀerent prices available in a store, we ﬁnd that
the buyers optimally switch the stores only when they have discovered the lowest one.
We concentrate on a set of collusive equilibria where the sellers ﬁx one of the two prices
at a higher monopoly level but, for a probability strictly between zero and one, let their
other price be a lower discount price. Since the buyers know this, if they ﬁrst spot a
monopoly price, they have an incentive to keep on searching in their start store in hope
of ﬁnding another price at a discount. This lock-in eﬀect, that postpones the consumer’s
switching time away from the start store, reduces the sellers’ incentive to undercut each
other’s prices compared to the setup in which both sellers have one item; for that case,
there exists a unique mixed equilibrium a` la Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989) where stores
almost never use the monopoly price.
The generated price variation helps the sellers also to discriminate better between
buyers with more and less price information. While the buyers are similar ex ante, their
search outcomes diﬀer ex post due to the random arrival of price information. The sellers
can extract more proﬁts with an additional price instrument: they can use the monopoly
price to tax some of the least informed buyers and the discount price to compete for the
more informed ones.
Interestingly, we also prove that, as the number of these similar items in stock expands,
the sellers can extract more and more surplus. They can then use a combination of a
single discount price and a larger number of monopoly prices. In an extension, we allow
for economies of scale in search (faster or slower information arrival rate with a larger
number of items) and ﬁnd that our results remain robust at least to moderate positive
economies of scale.
Surprisingly, although the buyers search dynamically rationally – they always go for
the store where they are most likely to ﬁnd the best prices – and take no interest in any
other characteristics but prices, we thus show that the stores can drastically reduce search
eﬃciency by colluding, not in higher prices directly but, indirectly, in a higher number of
expensive items in stock.
A store’s equilibrium pricing pattern could be very rich. Generally, there are three
diﬀerent regimes even for two prices in a store: in the most typical case, the store has
a monopoly price and a slightly discounted price (in the hi-lo regime). Yet, in some
cases, both prices are monopoly prices (in the hi-hi regime), or both prices are strongly
discounted prices (in the lo-lo regime). The buyers switch the seller later when it is in the
hi-hi regime than when it is in the hi-lo regime or in the lo-lo regime. As a result, the
sellers are best sheltered from competition when they have worst prices.
Note that, if the sellers tag similar items in stock with diﬀerent prices, they implicitly
also commit to improving their best oﬀer to a buyer as time goes on. This resembles a
88 Section 3.1
bit the eﬀect of hiring sales people who lower the price for the consumers little by little to
lock them in. However, when items have diﬀerent ﬁxed prices, this can be implemented
in an entirely passive way from the part of the seller. No sales people are needed in the
bargaining and the commitment issues as for when to give the promised discount – now,
later or never – can be totally avoided. It is the buyer doing all the work.
Our model is inspired by the observed inventory expansion in retail sector. Nowadays,
wherever one does his or her shopping there is usually just a huge number of diﬀerent items
available. For instance, in UK the average number of items in stock that a supermarket
carries was 38 718 in 2010 and 42 686 in 2012 (Food Marketing Institute, 2014). Clearly,
a bulk of this is related to product diﬀerentiation, inventory competition, and vertical
relations.2 Anyhow, a typical store has also got a number of products the buyers probably
regard as nearly perfect substitutes.3,4,5 Of course, that would not matter for search
if the buyers entering the stores had an ability to somehow instantaneously scan in all
the information about the items in the store and then head for the best ones right on.
Unfortunately, that is not so. There exist frictions.
To give an example, Reutskaja et al. (2011) used an experimental setup to mimic
consumers’ experience in a supermarket under heavy time pressure. They recorded the
subjects eye ﬁxations as they sampled through diﬀerent alternatives that were presented
to them to see how people actually search. They found that the subjects were good at
optimizing within the set of products they had time to see but not otherwise. It always
took some time to ﬁxate on an alternative.6 For another example, Pinna and Seiler (2013)
estimated from consumers’ walk path data that shopping in a grocery store takes on
average ten minutes and an additional search minute lowers the expenditures by $1.5, per
category per consumer. This suggests the presence of quite heavy in-store frictions and
price variation across easily substitutable items.
As our sellers use additional inventories to delay search within stores and, thereby,
switching from store to store, our paper is quite closely related to the expanding obfusca-
tion literature, which focuses on sellers’ incentives for increasing the time cost of search.
2See, for example, the seminal papers by Wolinsky (1987) and Klemperer and Padilla (1997), Mahajan
and Van Ryzin (2001), and Avenel and Caprice (2006).
3Auchan in France oﬀers, for instance, just ordinary milk, “lait demi-e´cre´me´ ste´rilise´ UHT, 1 l”, at
least, under names “GrandLait”,“la Vache au bon lait”, “J′♥ le lait d’ici”, and its own basic brand, placed
seemingly scattered such that, even when there is no congestion, the time cost of comparing the prices
would be counted in minutes (see Dreze et al. (1995)).
4Anupindi et al. (1998) ﬁnd that consumers often switch brands if their favorite brand is unavailable
on a vending machine.
5See Reutskaja et al. (2011) on the buying process in a modern supermarket under an overﬂow of
alternatives and binding time budgets, and Huberman et al. (1998) on the browsing process on the internet
and the problems of slow access rate and inability to ﬁnd relevant information, or literature on retailing,
say, Donovan et al. (1994); Puccinelli et al. (2009).
6This suggests that there is a natural upper bound on the potential economies of scale in search (for a
larger number of items) given by this minimal ﬁxation time. In other words, additions to available items
might slow down search even when the products are put side by side and there is no need to do more
clicking on walking to read the next price quote.
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The seminal papers by Ellison and Ellison (2009), Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) and Wil-
son (2010) provide both anecdotal and empirical evidence on obfuscation in retailing and
e-retailing and propose several mechanisms to rationalize this obfuscation.7 Other related
papers include Ireland (2007), Petrikaite (2014) and Armstrong and Zhou (2011). The
articles by Ireland (2007) and Petrikaite (2014) are quite close to ours, speciﬁcally.
Ireland (2007) allows the stores to quote multiple prices in order to reduce the ef-
fectiveness of search engine search. The buyers get a sample of prices, one or two each,
but cannot see if the prices come from a single seller or from two diﬀerent, competing
sellers. In equilibrium, every store sends out two perfectly correlated duplicate prices, two
to frustrate or obfuscate the consumers who get this ﬁxed number of prices and perfectly
correlated to avoid undercutting their own price. Instead, we ﬁnd that, if buyers search
under a deadline and there are frictions within stores, the sellers use a high-price-low-price
strategy even when the buyers are well aware of where each price is originating from.
Petrikaite (2014) considers a monopoly with several diﬀerentiated products. The mo-
nopolist has an incentive to raise search costs of some varieties to control their search
order. This will help to reveal information about match values for the earlier sampled va-
rieties and, thus, allow the store to cash on the externalizes that the abundance of varieties
yields to buyers. As buyers search less, from a consumers’s standpoint, just like in our
case, the model has a sense of redundancy in the seemingly rich variety present in-store.
Apart from this, she and our models are quite diﬀerent overall although both deal with
the case of explicit frictions within a store; usually a store is treated as a black box.
Related problems are addressed also in the papers by Eliaz and Spiegler (2011b) and
Hagiu and Jullien (2014), looking at markets with intermediaries and their incentives to
divert the demand, and by the behavioral approaches, for example, in the papers Ellison
(2005); Gabaix and Laibson (2006); Eliaz and Spiegler (2011a).
In their seminal article on inventory expansion under diﬀerentiation, Klemperer and
Padilla (1997) note that stores have an incentive to provide excessive variety in order
to steal more buyers from the competitors if the consumers appreciate more choice, yet,
prefer to patronize same providers. In another classic paper, Wolinsky (1987) establishes
the possibility that a store can price discriminate by the selective use of diﬀerentiating
brand labels put side by side with unlabeled products. The motive to increase the inventory
is present also in the ”newsboy problem” and the related inventory competition literature
7Note that alike what we have, the model of costly obfuscation by Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) begins
from the idea that it is impossible or not worthwhile for the buyers to continue searching ad inﬁnitum:
In their model, this is made operational by postulating that search costs c are unbounded, increasing and
convex in accrued search time t, i.e. c(t) → ∞ as t → ∞, c′ ≥ 0 and c′′ ≥ 0. In our model, this happens
instead because the ﬁnite search horizon generates a form of extreme convexity of search costs c in search
time t, as buyers do not mind shopping before deadlines t = 1, i.e. c(t) = 0, for t < 1, but could not search
any longer, i.e. c(t) = ∞, for t ≥ 1. As another important modeling diﬀerence, Ellison and Wolitzky
(2012) look at buyers’ stopping rule. We make stopping decisions trivial and look at buyers’ switching
rule.
90 Section 3.2
(see, e.g., Mahajan and Van Ryzin (2001)). Our results in this paper work through
diﬀerent channels but, in a broad sense, generalize this inventory expansion incentive to
homogenous commodities.
Given that stores choose the joint price distribution for the items they carry in stock,
our paper comes also quite near to some papers that concentrate explicitly on multiproduct
retailing in which, as the key distinction, buyers search for a bundle of items and not
a single item like here. In one of the ﬁrst papers to analyze rigorously multiproduct
equilibrium price dispersion, McAfee (1995) characterizes the joint price distributions for
two classes of equilibria in symmetric pricing strategies, constant proﬁt equilibria and
frontier equilibria. Shelegia (2012) derives the optimal pricing strategy for two items
which are interdependent and typically purchased together. He observes a negative price
correlation for complements, their total is kept constant, but no correlation or a positive
price correlation for substitutes.
In an independent study, Menzio and Trachter (2015) develop another elegant price
search model that generates price dispersion within and across stores. In contrast to our
model where the buyers diﬀer only ex post, they have buyers who diﬀer ex ante in their
ability to shop around, at diﬀerent stores and at diﬀerent times. As is the case also here,
they ﬁnd that price dispersion helps the sellers to better discriminate between diﬀerent
buyers. Otherwise, their setup is diﬀerent and they do not consider the delaying lock-in
eﬀect that availability of multiple diﬀerent prices has on consumers during a single search
spell. In their paper, a pre-requisite for price dispersion within stores is a particular
correlation structure between diﬀerent buyer groups: the buyers who are able to shop at
uncomfortable times should also be more likely to shop both nearby and further.
The paper is structured in the following way. The setup is shown in Section 2. Section
3 analyzes mainly symmetric equilibria, starting from the one item case and some trivial
multi-price equilibria and thereby working towards the collusive equilibria that are the
main interest in this paper. We ﬁrst give a good treatment of the two item case (in
Section 3.3) and then move on to the general k item case (in Section 4.1). In Section 4.2
we consider an extension for economies of scale in search. Section 5 oﬀers some closing
remarks. A more complex variant of the equilibrium is derived in Appendix A. Our proofs
are mainly in Appendix B, and tables are in Appendix C.
3.2 Model
We consider a model of duopolistic price competition in a market that features shopping
frictions in-store. There are two stores i = 1, 2 and a unit mass of buyers B = [0, 1], each
buyer with a unit of time t ∈ [0, 1].8 Every seller could carry a number ni ∈ N of perfectly
8Note that it does not really matter for the results whether this deadline d = 1 is ﬁve seconds or ﬁve
decades. Note additionally that, instead of the unit mass of buyers we could have just one representative
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substitutable products or ”items in stock” each tagged with its own individual price quote
pin, n ≤ ni.9
Every buyer is interested in purchasing any one unit of these items, for as low a price
as it is possible to ﬁnd in the limited search horizon. The sellers have unlimited capacities
in each item they carry; it does not cost to stock additional items or units or, if it does,
it is assumed this cost is sunk.
The payoﬀs are linear in prices. If a seller trades a unit of an item for price pin with
every buyer in the market, the payoﬀ to a buyer is given by 1− pin and the payoﬀ to the
seller by pin. In other words, the buyer value of a product is normalized to one and a
seller’s reservation value to zero.
The numbers of items in stock, ni, are ﬁxed and common knowledge across everybody.
Our main results concern the case where each seller has two items in stock and, thus, the
possibility to have two diﬀerent prices within its store. Extensions to a larger (symmetric)
number of items in stock ni are analyzed in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.4.1.
For every point in time t ∈ [0, 1], the buyers choose afresh whether to search at seller
i = 1 or at seller i = 2. They incur no costs of search during this time, that they are
prepared to devote to shopping. They can also switch the seller free of cost, as often as
they want.10,11,12
To put it another way, the buyers search under a deadline. Their search costs jump
from zero to inﬁnity at the deadline. They have no switching costs.
Search is a random gradual process taking place inside the stores. The items in stock
are found one-by-one,13 not immediately once a buyer enters a store.
buyer.
9To underline here that nothing depends on diﬀerentiation, it can be assumed that the items in stock
are homogeneous or of observable quality classes q. In the former case, the buyer value for a product
can be normalized to one and the sellers’ marginal cost to zero. In the latter case, the buyer value for a
product can be normalized to 1 + q and the sellers’ marginal cost to q. In either of these cases, if a seller
and a mass Bi of buyers trades for the price pi, each buyer gets 1− pi = (1 + q − (pi + q)) and the seller
makes Bipi = Bi((pi+ q)− q), supposing any increment q > 1 is oﬀset by a higher price pi(q) = pi+ q. To
justify the existence of multiple diﬀerent price quotations, the stores can have an incentive to introduce
some diﬀerentiation but, for the described mechanism to work, this need not be more than superﬁcial: the
diﬀerences can be only mildly payoﬀ relevant or, say, of lexicographically lower order than the price. For
example, if the buyers are mostly color-blind, there could be very similar-looking armchairs in several color
variants.
10As a result, they can also recall any of the products they have seen without a further cost. Observe
that most of this holds true, for search spells on the Internet, that people do partly out of curiosity and
enjoyment and partly for the gain.
11Given the ﬂat search cost, we have been advised that our model could be interpreted not only as a
sequential search model but also as a non-sequential search model. Notice, however, that here the buyers’
search choices are sequentially rational.
12We could of course modify the approach by assuming discounting which would make some consumers
stop before the end, but that would just render the analysis more complex without adding much insight.
Our modeling approach makes it possible to have diverse search outcomes and, yet, keep away from the
Bertrand paradox in a new way: without the deadline all buyers would ﬁnd all prices which would drive
the prices to zero, yet, with a deadline, some buyers ﬁnd no price, some ﬁnd one price, some two prices
etc.
13By clicking (this wording seems more appropriate when the time horizon is quite long – say, 1 - 2 hours
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We use the continuous time Poisson process to model these in-store frictions and cap-
ture them in reduced from. When a buyer is in a store, the items in stock are reveled to
her at rate θ ∈ (0,∞). Thus, as long as the buyer has not found all the available items, in
any tiny (inﬁnitesimal) time interval, dt := t2 − t1 > 0, for t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1], her probability
of discovering a new price quote is θdt; her probability of discovering more than one new
price quote at a time is an event of order (θdt)2 or smaller – negligible. During this search,
the available items are drawn in random order without replacement until the buyer has
exhausted the inventory in the given store. In other words, when the seller i has two
items in stock, a buyer who starts to search in the store ﬁnds the ﬁrst one at rate θ. For
probability 1/2 it is price pi1 and for probability 1/2 it is price p
i
1. Thereafter, if the buyer
continues searching with this same seller, the remaining price quote is found at rate θ as
well. If the buyer ﬁrst found pi1, the second one is p
i
2 – or the other way. After the second
price is found, the buyer cannot ﬁnd anything new in the store.
In the base line model, this rate θ at which buyers learn new price information is
independent of the number of items in stock n. In an extension presented in Section 3.4.2,
we allow for the possibility that search becomes easier (harder) with a larger number or
items in stock and let θ be an increasing (decreasing) function of n.
This game has the following sequential structure:
1. The stores i = 1, 2 set the prices, pin, for each item they have in stock. The prices
are unobservable to the other store and also to the buyers before they ﬁnd them.
2. The buyers search, for every point in time t ∈ [0, 1], either at store i = 1 or at store
i = 2 and, when no time is left at t = 1, buy for the lowest price they have found.
To determine how the buyers behave when they are indiﬀerent, we add the following
assumption:
Assumption 3 (i) If the buyers are indiﬀerent between the sellers at t = 0, half of
them go to seller i = 1 and half of them go to seller i = 2. (ii) If the buyers are indiﬀerent
between the two sellers at t > 0, they stay with their current store. (iii) If the buyers
are indiﬀerent between stopping the searching and continuing, they stop. (iv) If a buyer’s
lowest price from store one equals the buyer’s lowest price from store two, she purchases
half the times from store one and half the times from store two.
We analyze subgame perfect equilibria of this game.14 We begin with some general
remarks on them. To facilitate the exposition, we ﬁrst introduce some helpful notation:
– and the buyers search oﬄine) or walking and looking around within the store (this wording seems more
appropriate when the time horizon is quite long – say, 1 - 2 hours – and the buyers search oﬄine) to spot
them and to take in the related information content.
14Unless it is speciﬁed otherwise, it is assumed that beliefs are passive: they are the same on the
equilibrium path and oﬀ the equilibrium path.
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In the most general case conceivable, there could be any ﬁnite number of sellers i ∈ N
in the market, each carrying some ﬁnite number of items in stock is ni ∈ N. We denote
by F = (F i, F−i) their expected prices and by P = (P i, P−i) their realized prices, where
F i gives the distribution of prices at seller i (a marginal of F ) and P i the realization of
prices at seller i (a subset of P ). The family of all subsets A of P is denoted by 2P , the
minimum of A ∈ 2P is denoted by pminA, and its distribution function by FminA.
General analysis: ﬁxed point
In this paper we determine three equilibria for the case where a seller has more than
one product: two trivial multi-price equilibria, the Diamond equilibrium and the Ireland
equilibrium, and a class of equilibria that we call hi-lo equilibria because they involve price
variation within each store: higher prices (for hi) and lower prices (for lo). We do not try
to characterize the equilibrium set in full. However, to give some idea of how the model
works in general, we next take a look at the underlying ﬁxed point conditions.
Buyer’s problem
The buyers search optimally. They know the numbers of the items in stock n =
(
ni, n−i
)
and have some expectations F =
(
F i, F−i
)
about their prices. In an equilibrium, it
is required that the buyers’ beliefs are correct. Since the items are sampled without
replacement, the buyers update their expectations about the remaining, unsampled prices
each time a new price is found.
As a result, which seller they select at a given point in time t ∈ [0, 1] can depend both
on the expected prices F and on the realized prices P =
(
P i, P−i
)
they have seen. We
denote by p(t) = (p1, ..., pk) ∈ P =
(
P i, P−i
)
the vector of prices that a buyer has found
by time t. The buyer’s problem can thus be described by the following Bellman equation
where the state variable is p = p(t):
V (p(t)) = maxiV
i(p(t)) := maxi
(
θdtEp′(V
i(p′(t+ dt))) + (1− θdt)V (p(t+ dt))) (3.1)
with the terminal condition
V (p(1)) = 1 + ‖−p(1)‖∞ , for p(0) = p(1),
V (p(1)) = 0 , for p(0) = p(1),
where ‖p‖∞ = max (p) is the (element-by-element) maximum-norm of p.
By the principle of optimality, the buyer’s problem has a solution for any n, F , and P as
long as the induced probability distribution F (p) is deﬁned in an appropriate measurable
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space for any p. For simplicity of exposition, we assume for now this is so.15,16
Therefore, any n, F , and P uniquely partition the set of buyers as
B(n, F, P ) =
∑
A∈2P
BA(n, F, P ),
where BA ⊂ B denotes the buyers who end with prices A ⊂ P .
If F is continuous, the seller’s proﬁts can now be decomposed as
Πi(n, P, F ) =
∑
A∈2P
BA(n, P, F ) (1− FminA−i(pminAi)) pminAi ,
where it is assumed that pminA = ∞ and FminA ≡ 0 if A = ∅.17 The buyers BA who have
seen prices A buy for minA. In other words, they purchase from seller i if seller i’s best
price in set A is lower than seller −i’s best price in set A, pminAi ≤ pminA−i .
Seller’s problem
Therefore, to constitute an equilibrium, for any prices the seller is using P i ∈ supp(F i) ∈
[0, 1]n
i
and for any prices the seller could be using P ′i ∈ [0, 1]ni , it must hold that the
proﬁt to the seller is not higher, in expectation, with the latter prices than with the former
EP−i
(
Πi(n, F, P i, P−i)
) ≥ EP−i (Πi(n, F, P ′i, P−i)) .
Otherwise, the seller has a proﬁtable deviation from P i ∈ supp(F i) ∈ [0, 1]ni to P ′i ∈
[0, 1]n
i
. Seller i’ pricing strategy P i ∈ supp(F i) has to be the best response to seller −i’
pricing strategy, F−i, and buyers search, (BA(n, F, P ))A∈2P , for P
i, F i and P−i ∼ F−i.
Note especially that, instead of the standard exogenous partition of the set of buyers
into the ”informed consumers” and the ”uninformed consumers” like in Varian (1980) or
”shoppers” (no search costs) and ”searchers” (search costs) like in Stahl (1989), in this
case the buyers are partitioned endogenously into several subsets, some with more price
information than others. Moreover, the way the buyers search and what they ﬁnd depends
15This is more than we need, of course, since this only has to hold for the on the equilibrium path and
oﬀ the equilibrium path beliefs that we have speciﬁed.
16As the set of prices is ﬁnite and the prices are bounded from above and from below, there should not
be any measurability problems with a well deﬁned prior.
17If F is not continuous, we have to be more speciﬁc about how ties are broken. When ties are broken
in random, the proﬁts to the sellers can be expressed as
Πi(n, P, F ) =
∑
A∈2P
BA(n, P, F ) (1− FminA−i(pminAi)) pminAi
+
∑
A∈2P
BA(n, P, F )Pr (pminAi = pminA−i)
pminAi
2
. (3.2)
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on the number of items in stock and both the expected and realized prices. Some of the
usual properties of equilibrium price distributions still hold, though in a weak form:18
Lemma 10 1. If the buyers search with non zero probability, all sellers mix in one
price at least, over the same support S := supp(F i) = cl
{
p|f i(p) > 0} ⊂ [0, 1].
2. There are no atoms in the interior of S nor at the lower bound of S.
3. If a buyer’s probability of switching away from store i after discovering price pi is
decreasing in pi, (i) there are no gaps in S and (ii) one is the upper bound of S.
Proof. In Appendix B. 
Therefore, as long as the buyers search, we ﬁnd that any equilibrium features random-
ized pricing strategies. Moreover, assuming that buyers are more likely to switch the seller
if they ﬁnd a lower price than a higher price, the prices are mixed over an interval support[
p, 1
]
for some p ∈ (0, 1). This seems like a natural assumption because, the lower the
price, the more convinced the buyers should be that it is the best price in that store. This
entails that, as is standard in previous work related to Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989), a
seller’s proﬁt is given by its ”captive buyers”, to whom it sells even for price one.
3.3 Equilibria
3.3.1 Benchmark: equilibrium for one price
For a benchmark, we next go through the case where both sellers have one item. The
solution is symmetric and unique. The equilibrium boils down to the well known case
developed by V arian (1980) and Stahl (1989).
As the sellers have the same number of items in stock, the buyers ﬁrst approach the
seller who has a lower expected price or, by Assumption 3, pick a random seller for the
case of ties. This rules out the possibility of asymmetric pricing strategies. If one seller
had a lower price than the other one, it would attract more captive buyers. But this entails
that the seller has a higher price because prices are higher for a larger number of captive
buyers: a contradiction.
Instead, if the sellers use symmetric pricing strategies, the buyers approach the sellers
in random. They search in one store til they ﬁnd its price and thereafter in the other store
18So far we have not been able to get stronger general results for any ﬁnite number of stores and for any
ﬁnite number of items in stock. Standard thinking may not always go though. This is because a store’s
prices can have a diﬀerent role each: some of them could be used mainly to encourage the buyers to search
for the other available prices, which could then be used for the purpose of selling. A deviation in such an
environment can prompt a harsh punishment. For example, the buyers who observe the deviation could
immediately switch the seller and never come back.
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til they ﬁnd its price – or until no time is left.19
This implies that, when it is time to stop,
B1 := B{p1} =
θe−θ
2
buyers have found only price p1 of seller i = 1,
B2 := B{p2} =
θe−θ
2
buyers have found only price p2 of seller i = 2, and
B∅ = e−θ
buyers have found neither price. The residual
B1,2 := B{p1,p2} = 1−B∅ −B1 −B2
of the buyers has found both of them.
In other words, the buyers are partitioned into uninformed consumers and informed
consumers as in V arian (1980) or into shoppers and searchers as in Stahl (1989) –
plus some buyers who fail to ﬁnd anything, who did not feature in V arian (1980) nor
Stahl (1989). The main diﬀerence here is that our partition is parametrized by the Pois-
son process that governs the arrival rate of price information. The stronger the frictions,
the larger the fraction of uninformed consumers to informed consumers B
i
B1,2
and the larger
the number of frustrated consumers B∅ who do not discover anything. As anticipated, in
this standard case where there is one price in one store, the equilibrium is thus essentially
equivalent with that in V arian (1980) and Stahl (1989) except for the scaling that we
need to account for the buyers who fail to ﬁnd a price, B∅.
Proposition 10 (Varian, 1980; Stahl, 1989) If each sellers has one item, there exists
a unique equilibrium price distribution:
F i :
[
Bi
Bi +B1,2
, 1
]
→ [0, 1],
F i(p) =
Bi +B1,2
B1,2
− B
i
B1,2
1
p
.
A seller’s proﬁt Πi(1) = Bi = θe
−θ
2 equals the number of buyers, ”captive buyers”, who
buy for pi even when it is one.
19Note that with passive beliefs oﬀ the path and one price per one store, what matters for search is
expected prices not realized prices. The discovery of the ﬁrst price does not give any additional information
on the remaining price in the competing store – their strategies are independent in (Nash) equilibrium.
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Proof. Just like in V arian (1980) and Stahl (1989) once we replace the shoppers (or
the informed consumers) by B1,2 and the searchers (or the uninformed consumers) by
B1 +B2 and note that the sum B1,2 +B1 +B2 is not equal to one. 
3.3.2 Trivial multi-price equilibria
Note that existence is generally never an issue with this model. As pointed out earlier,
there exists a unique equilibrium with one item in stock but, with more than one in stock,
a multitude of equilibria.
Remark 5 (Diamond, 1971) For any n ≥ 1, there exists a trivial stay-home equilibrium,
where the sellers use only the monopoly price, pin = 1 for all n ≤ ni, and the buyers do
not search at all.
This is the Diamond (1971) equilibrium essentially, the famous result that proves the
non-existence of an equilibrium with both costly search and endogenous price dispersion.
If additional price information is costly and the goods alike, the sellers have an incentive
to exploit the buyers’ hold-up problem by raising their price over their competitor’s price.
Hence, the monopoly price is the unique equilibrium price irrespective of the number of
sellers in the market. The buyers thus refuse to search.
Since the buyers’ hold-up problem appears here in a weak form only, the existence
of this type of equilibrium hinges solely on Assumption 3 (iii): If the sellers charge the
monopoly price, the buyers have no incentive to search and, if the buyers do not search,
the sellers have no incentive to charge a discount price.
Remark 6 (Ireland, 2007) For any n ≥ 1, there exists a trivial many-item equilibrium,
where the sellers use only identical prices, pin = p
i
m for all n,m ≤ ni, and the buyers
search for one price for one store.
This equilibrium is reminiscent of the one described by Ireland (2007) where the buyers
obtain a sample of prices via a price search engine but do not distinguish if the prices in
the sample come from several sellers or a single seller. Like in here, the sellers can oﬀer the
same good for a number of prices. However, as a buyer might sample two prices from one
seller, the sellers have an incentive to avoid price variation as they would risk undercutting
their own price. Instead, they send out two identical random prices.
The existence of this equilibrium is can be proved most easily by reference to Assump-
tion 3 (iii): Clearly, no buyer has an incentive to stay to ﬁnd another item in a given store
if the items have the same price. Moreover, no seller has an incentive to charge diﬀerent
prices for two items if the buyers search for one item per one store.
Remarks 5 and 6 show that, while the focus of this paper lies on equilibrium price
dispersion within and across the stores, it is possible to maintain also (i) a multi-price
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equilibrium with no price variation (Remark 5) and (ii) a multi-price equilibrium with
price variation across stores but not within stores (Remark 6). We refer to these equilibria
as trivial multi-price equilibria. Although the sellers have several items which could in
principle have each a diﬀerent price, there is just one price in one store at any given point
in time.
3.3.3 Simple hi-lo equilibrium for two prices
We now turn to our main contribution in this paper. We show that there exists a hi-lo
equilibrium, where the sellers have sometimes two monopoly prices and, at other times,
one monopoly price and one discount price. The size of this discount is random. In the
ﬁrst case, we say the seller is in the hi-hi regime and, in the second case, we say the seller
is in the hi-lo regime. Even more complex patterns are possible, though. We develop an
example of that in Appendix A.
An interesting implication of this hi-lo pricing pattern is that the buyers switch the
stores after they have found a discount price or after they have found all. In other words,
if the buyer ﬁrst ﬁnds a seller’s monopoly price, she optimally continues with her start
store in order to ﬁnd also the seller’s discount price. This makes using a monopoly price
valuable to a store. It helps to delay switching. The sellers have thus an incentive to
sometimes use two monopoly prices (in hi-hi regime) instead of one monopoly price and
one discount price (in hi-lo regime).
Speciﬁcally, denoting by a the probability that a seller is in the hi-hi regime and by
b = 1−a the probability a seller is in the hi-lo regime, the chances that a buyer will switch
the store after ﬁnding one price are less than half, b/2 < 1/2. The chances that a buyer
will switch the store after ﬁnding two prices are larger, 1− b/2 > 1/2. As shown in Figure
3.1, the expected switching time could thus be signiﬁcantly delayed compared to the case
of one price for one store. This demonstrates that price variation within stores acts here
as an implicit switching barrier.
After the buyer has switched, the process of ﬁnding another competing discount price
is also postponed. The probability that a buyer has found two discount prices by time t
is given by
b2
(
1
2
)2 (θt)2
2!
e−(θt) + b2
((
1
2
)2
+ 2
(
1
2
)2) (θt)3
3!
e−(θt) + b2
∞∑
k=4
(θt)k
k!
e−(θt)
compered to 1−e−(θt)−(θt)e−(θt) for the case in which there is just one price for one store.
This consequence of the lock-in or delay eﬀect of playing hi-lo equilibrium is illustrated
by Figure 3.1.
Furthermore, additional prices enable the sellers also to discriminate better between
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buyers, who end with diverse degrees of price information. The expected prices that are
paid by buyers who ﬁnd one, two, three or four prices, respectively, are juxtaposed in
Figure 3.2. it shows a clearly decreasing pattern, which testiﬁes to the fact that the sellers
charge diﬀerent buyers diﬀerent prices. From ex ante perspective, the lowest price the
average buyer has so far discovered, −‖−p(t)‖∞, is decreasing in time t ∈ (0, 1). This
phenomenon is visible in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.1: Expected switching time as a function of θ for n = 1, 2 (left), the likelihood of
having observed two discount prices as a function of t for n = 1, 2 and θ = 3 (right).
Figure 3.2: The lowest price the average buyer has found as a function of k = 1, 2, 3, 4
(left), the lowest price the average buyer has found as a function of t (right); θ = 2.
Our main contribution is the following:
Proposition 11 If each sellers has two items and θ ≤ θo ≈ 713, there exists a simple
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hi-lo equilibrium. The equilibrium price distribution is given by:
F i1(p) = 0, for p < 1,
F i1(p) = 1, for p = 1,
F i2 :
[
Πi(1, 1)−Ai1
(1− a)A1,22 +Ai2
, 1
]
→ [0, 1],
F i2(p) =
Ai2 + (1− a)A1,22
A1,22
− Π
i(1, 1)−Ai1
A1,22
1
p
.
where
Ai1 := 1/4B1 + a/8B3,
Ai2 := 1/4 (B1 +B2) + (1− a)/8 (B2 +B3) + a/4 (B2 + 3B3 + 4B4) ,
A1,22 := 1/4 (B2 + 3B3 + 4B4) ,
and where the atom size is
a = Pr(pi2 = 1) =
B2
B2 + 3B3 + 4B4
.
A seller’s proﬁt is given by the expected number of ”captive buyers”, who are willing to
buy for pi1 or p
i
2 even when both are one,
Πi(1, 1) = 1/2
B2
B2 + 3B3 + 4B4
(B1 +B2 +B3 +B4)
+ 1/2
3B3 + 4B4
B2 + 3B3 + 4B4
(B1 +B2 + 1/4B3) ,
where
B1 = θe
−θ, B1 = θe−θ, B2 =
θ2
2
e−θ, B4 =
∞∑
k=4
θk
k!
e−θ.
Notice in particular that, due to the lock-in or delay eﬀect, a seller’s proﬁt is larger
here than with just one price (see Figure 3.3).
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Figure 3.3: A seller’s proﬁt for n = 1, 2.
Proof: We proceed through 8 steps.
Step 1: Noting that the joint price distribution of (pi1, p
i
2) can be obtained by ﬁrst
deriving the marginal distribution of the lower price pi2 and then deriving the conditional
distribution of the higher price pi1 given the lower price p
i
2. Listing what we need for the
proof.
It is clearly without loss of generality to assume that price pi1 is weakly larger than
price pi2, p
i
1 ≥ pi2. Thus, in this equilibrium we have to construct, pi1 ≡ 1 and F i2(p →
1−) = b = 1 − a ∈ (0, 1). By Lemma 10, we know that the marginal distribution F i2 has
an interval support supp(F i2) =
[
p, 1
]
with the lower bound p ∈ (0, 1).
To show that Proposition 11 holds, we also have to determine a seller’s proﬁt Πi and
the marginal distribution for the lower price F i2, with b = 1 − a and p, such that there
exist no proﬁtable deviations in the lower price pi2 to p
′
2 ∈
[
0, p
)
for pi1 ≡ 1.
To end our proof, we also have to need sure there exist no proﬁtable deviations in
the higher price pi1 to p
′
1 ∈
[
pi2, 1
)
for any pi2 ∈
[
p, 1
]
. When this holds, there clearly
exist no proﬁtable joint deviations in the lower price and the higher price (pi1, p
i
2) to
(p′1, p′2) ∈
[
0, p
)2
since those deviations are dominated by the one to (p, p).
Step 2: Proving that the buyers switch the store after they have discovered their ﬁrst
price if and only if it is lower than unity. Otherwise, the buyers switch the store only after
they discover both of the two prices available in their start store.
Suppose a buyer has found a price from a store at time t. Now, the buyer can either
switch the seller immediately or postpone switching until she has found both prices from
the start store.
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If the price is lower than unity, the buyer will switch the stores. The probability of
ﬁnding a discount price in the start store is zero but the probability of ﬁnding a discount
price in the other store is positive.
Instead, if the price is unity, for probability (θ(1 − t))e−(θ(1−t)), the buyer ﬁnds one
more price in the time that remains. In that case, the probability of ﬁnding a discount
price in the start store is 1/2b1/2b+a whereas the probability of ﬁnding a discount price in the
other store is 1/2b. The former is clearly larger than the latter.
For probability (θ(1−t))
2
2 e
−(θ(1−t)), the buyer ﬁnds two more prices. Then, if the buyer
will switch the store after the ﬁrst price, her chances of ﬁnding one discount price and two
discount price are, respectively,
(1/2b)
a
1/2b+ a
(1/2b+ a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ﬁrst p−i2 < 1, then p
i = 1
+ 1/2b︸︷︷︸
ﬁrst p−i1 = 1, then p
−i
2 < 1
and 1/2b
1/2b
1/2b+ a
and, if the buyer postpones switching, her chances of ﬁnding one discount price and two
discount price are, respectively,
1/2b
1/2b+ a
(1/2b+ a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ﬁrst pi2 < 1, then p
−i = 1
+
a
1/2b+ a
(1/2b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ﬁrst pi = 1, then p−i2 < 1
and
1/2b
1/2b+ a
1/2b.
These are equal. It is also immediate that, if the buyer ﬁnds zero or three additional
prices, it does not matter for her payoﬀs at which point she switches. In conclusion, if the
buyer ﬁnds a discount price ﬁrst, she will switch the stores immediately but, if the buyer
ﬁnds a monopoly price ﬁrst, she will postpone switching.
Step 3: Deriving a seller’s proﬁts on the equilibrium path (both in the hi-hi regime and
in the hi-lo regime).
Since (1, 1) ∈ supp(F ), seller i’s proﬁt can be determined from that case. The seller’s
proﬁt depends on whether the other seller has two monopoly prices p−i1 = p
−i
2 = 1 or
a monopoly price p−i1 = 1 and a discount price p
−i
2 < 1. The former case occurs with
probability a and the latter case with probability b = 1− a.
If both sellers have two monopoly prices pi1 = p
i
2 = p
−i
1 = p
−i
2 = 1, the sellers clearly
share the market. Both thus make 1/2 (B1 +B2 +B3 +B4).
Instead, if seller i has two monopoly prices pi1 = p
i
2 = 1 but seller −i has a monopoly
price p−i1 = 1 and a discount price p
−i
2 < 1, we also have to take into account how the
buyers optimally search in that case.
Half the buyers start from store i and the rest start from store −i. The buyers who
start from store −i ﬁnd p−i2 < 1 before they switch to store i. Hence, they have no
incentive to buy for pi1 = 1 nor p
i
2 = 1.
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Instead, the buyers who start from store i switch to store −i only after they have found
both pi1 and p
i
2 = 1. Thus, if they only ﬁnd one or two prices in total, they buy for p
i
1 = 1
or pi2 = 1. Otherwise, if they discover three prices in total, there is half the chance those
prices are pi1 = 1, p
i
2 = 1 and p
−i
1 = 1 and half the chance the prices are p
i
1 = 1, p
i
2 = 1
and p−i2 < 1. In the former case, the buyers select the seller in random. In the latter case,
they buy for p−i2 < 1. Clearly, if they ﬁnd all the prices, they also buy for p
−i
2 < 1. As a
result, the proﬁt to store i is given by 1/2 (B1 +B2 + 1/4B3).
Altogether, this shows that the proﬁt to seller i in the hi-hi regime is (see Appendix
B and Appendix C Tables 3.1 and 3.2)
Πi(1, 1) = a/2 (B1 +B2 +B3 +B4) + (1− a)/2 (B1 +B2 + 1/4B3) .
To get the marginal for the lower price F i2, we also need to determine seller i’s proﬁt in
the hi-lo regime where the seller has a monopoly price pi1 = 1 and a discount price p
i
2 < 1.
In this other case, the seller’s proﬁt is given by (see Appendix B and Appendix C
Tables 3.2 and 3.4 for the distribution of expected search outcomes in this case)20
Πi(1, pi2) = 1/4B1 + a/8B3 + 1/4 (B1 +B2) p
i
2 + (1− a)/8 (B2 +B3) pi2
+ a/4 (B2 + 3B3 + 4B4) p
i
2 + (1− a)/4 (B2 + 3B3 + 4B4)
(
1− a− F i2(pi2)
1− a
)
pi2
=: Ai1 +A
i
2p
i
2 +A
1,2
2
(
1− a− F i2(pi2)
)
pi2. (3.3)
Note that, to avoid dealing with overly long expressions for the seller’s proﬁt, we have
deﬁned some new auxiliary constants above, Ai1, A
i
2 and A
1,2
2 .
Ai1 := 1/4B1 + a/8B3,
There are 1/4B1 buyers who start from store i and ﬁnd only p
i
1 = 1 and a/8B3 buyers
who start from store −i and ﬁnd only pi1 = p−i1 = p−i2 =1.
20Of course, the seller’s equilibrium proﬁt must be the same in both regimes.
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Ai2 := 1/4 (B1 +B2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start from store i, ﬁnd only pi2 < 1
+ (1− a)/8 (B2 +B3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start from store i, ﬁnd pi2 < 1 and p
i
1 = 1
+ a/4 (B2 + 3B3 + 4B4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ﬁnd pi2 < 1, and p
i
1 = 1 or p
i
2 = 1
and
A1,22 := 1/4 (B2 + 3B3 + 4B4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ﬁnd pi2 < 1 and p
i
2 < 1
.
Here our notation attempts to parallel the case with one price per one store, replacing
B’s by A’s. Ai1’s refer to seller i’s captive buyers who pay the monopoly price, A
i
2’s refer
to seller i’s captive buyers who pay a discount price, and A1,22 refers to buyers who ﬁnd
two discount prices. They buy for the lower one.
Step 4: Showing that, if the buyers use the above given switching rule, the sellers have
an incentive to set two monopoly prices with a probability larger than zero. Determining
this atom a > 0 and, thus, the probability that a store gives a discount b > 0.
In equilibrium, a seller’s proﬁt must be the same both in the hi-hi regime and the hi-lo
regime. In particular, the proﬁt to the seller must be the same when it has prices (1, 1)
and prices (1, 1− ε) for any small ε > 0. Taking the limit ε → 0+, yields
a/2 (B1 +B2 +B3 +B4) + (1− a)/2 (B1 +B2 + 1/4B3)
=1/4B1 + a/8B3 + 1/4 (B1 +B2) + (1− a)/8 (B2 +B3) + a/4 (B2 + 3B3 + 4B4)
We can now solve this equality for the atom a = Pr(pi2 = 1)
a =
B2
B2 + 3B3 + 4B4
,
which is strictly between zero and one for θ ∈ (0,∞).
Basically, this means that there exist no equilibrium where the sellers have always one
monopoly price pi1 = 1 and one discount price p
i
2 < 1. The sellers would then have a
proﬁtable deviation to two monopoly prices pi1 = p
i
2 = 1 because the buyers switch the
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store if they ﬁnd a discount price ﬁrst but continue with their start store if they ﬁnd a
monopoly price ﬁrst.
In consequence, to compensate for the loss of captive buyers when the lower price is
reduced from unity just slightly below, the sellers’ chances of attracting the buyers who
ﬁnd prices from both stores must slump down at unity. This is exactly what happens if
the competitor has two monopoly prices for a non zero probability. The two regimes are
both necessary here.
Step 5: Deriving the marginal distribution for the lower price F i2 and the lower bound
of the support p.
As all the price pairs (pi1, p
i
2) ∈ supp(F ) must generate an equally much proﬁt to the
seller, we can use this proﬁt equivalence condition to derive the marginal distribution for
the lower price F i2.
Πi(1, 1) = Ai1 +A
i
2p
i
2 +A
1,2
2
(
1− a− F i2(pi2)
)
pi2 (3.4)
implies
F i2(p
i
2) =
Ai2 + (1− a)A1,22
A1,22
− Π
i(1, 1)−Ai1
A1,22
1
pi2
.
The lower bound p is given by the price where the marginal F i2 vanishes
F i2(p) =
Ai2 + (1− a)A1,22
A1,22
− Π
i(1, 1)−Ai1
A1,22
1
p
= 0,
yielding
p =
Πi(1, 1)−Ai1
(1− a)A1,22 +Ai2
.
Quoting any lower price p′2 < p yields less proﬁt: the number of buyers who buy for
p′2 equals to number of buyers who buy for p but, since p′2 is smaller than p, the seller’s
proﬁt is reduced.
Step 6: Deriving a seller’s proﬁts oﬀ the equilibrium path (in a lo-lo regime).
Suppose a seller deviates to some pi1 ∈
[
pi2, 1
)
for pi2 ∈
[
p, 1
)
. Then, the seller’s proﬁts
are given by (see Appendix B and Appendix C Tables 3.3 and 3.5 for the diﬀusion of
information to consumers in this case)
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Π′ = 1/2
(
1/2B1p
i
1 + a/2 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4) p
i
1 + b/4B2p
i
1
+ 1/2 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4)
(
1− a− F i2(pi1)
)
pi1
+ 1/2
(
1/2B1p
i
2 + a/2 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4) p
i
2 + b/4B2p
i
2
+ 1/2 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4)
(
1− a− F i2(pi2)
)
pi2
=: C1p
i
1 +D1
(
1− a− F i2(pi1)
)
pi1 + C2p
i
2 +D2
(
1− a− F i2(pi2)
)
pi2, (3.5)
where the auxiliary constants C1, C2, D1 and D2 are deﬁned to abbreviate the exposition.
Thus, we can solve for (1− a− F (p)) from (3.3) and plug it into (3.5) to obtain an
expression for a deviating seller’s proﬁt
Π′ = C1pi1 +D1
Πi(1, 1)−Ai1
A1,22
+D1
Ai2
A1,22
pi1 + C2p
i
2 +D2
Πi(1, 1)−Ai1
A1,22
+D2
Ai2
A1,22
pi2. (3.6)
Step 7: Observing that the proﬁt to the seller who deviates by lowering the higher price
from pi1 = 1 to p
i
1 ∈
[
pi2, 1
)
is linear in the deviation: the extremes pi1 = p
i
2 and p
i
1 = 1− ε,
for ε > 0 small, are the best or worst. Showing the absence of a proﬁtable deviation to(
1− ε, p) or (1− ε, 1− ε) for ε → 0+.
It is thus clear from (3.6) that, by the linearity of seller’s proﬁt Π′ in
(
pi1, p
i
2
)
, the
proﬁt to the seller who deviates to some
(
pi1, p
i
2
) ∈ [p, 1)2 is the largest for extreme price
choices. The maximum or supremum of the deviating seller’s proﬁt Π′ can hence be found
by considering the limit where the higher price is either (right below) unity or equal to
the lower price and the lower price is either (right below) unity of equal to the lower
bound:
(
pi1, p
i
2
)
= (1− , 1− ), (pi1, pi2) = (1− , p) or (pi1, pi2) = (p, p) for some tiny
 > 0. We start by checking when it is the case that the seller has a proﬁtable deviation
to (1− , 1− ) or (1− , p). To make comparisons easy, we place on-the-path proﬁt on
the left hand side (lhs) and oﬀ-the-path proﬁt on the right hand side (rhs):
Case 1: A deviation to (1− , 1− ), where  → 0+, is not worthwhile if
1/2 (B1 +B2) + a/2 (B3 +B4) + b/8B3 ≥ 1/2B1 + a/2 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4) + b/4B2
B2 + 1/2B3
B2 + 5/2B3 + 2B4
≥ B2
B2 + 3B3 + 4B4
.
This is obviously a tautology.
Case 2: A deviation to
(
1− , p), where  → 0+, is not worthwhile if
Essays on Market Dynamics and Frictions 107
1/4B1 + a/8B3
+(1/4B1 + 1/4B2 + a/4 (B2 + 3B3 + 4B4) + b/8 (B2 +B3)) p
+1/4 (B2 + 3B3 + 4B4)
(
1− a− F (p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−a=b
p
≥1/4B1 + a/4 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4) + b/8B2
+(1/4B1 + a/4 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4) + b/8B2) p
+1/4 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4)
(
1− a− F (p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−a=b
p.
This inequality is equivalent to
a/8B3 + 1/4 (3/4B2 + 5/4B3 + 2B4) p ≥ a/4 (3/4B2 + 9/4B3 + 2B4) p,
which is a necessary condition for
B2 + 5/3B3 + 8/3B4
B2 + 3B3 + 8/3B4
≥ B2
B2 + 3B3 + 4B4
,
This is also a tautology.
Case 3: Last, there a proﬁtable deviation to
(
p, p
)
if:
1
2
(B1 +B2) +
a
2
(B3 +B4) +
b
8
B3
< (1/2B1 + a/2 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4) + b/4B2) p+ 1/2 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4)
(
1− a− F (p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−a=b
p
=(1/2B1 + b/4B2 + 1/2 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4)) p.
This inequality is equivalent with
1/2 (B1 +B2)
(
1− p)+ (B3 +B4) (a/2− p)+ b/4B3 (1/2− p) < 0.
Step 8: Conﬁrming numerically the absence of a proﬁtable deviation to
(
p, p
)
for strong
enough search frictions, θ ≤ θo ≈ 713.
Our results are documented in Table 3.7. 
Note that, even when the simple hi-lo equilibrium fails to exist because the sellers have
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a proﬁtable deviation to two discount prices, there may exist a more complex variant of
a hi-lo equilibrium, where this would not be a deviation. There could be three regimes
instead of two: hi-hi regime and hi-lo regime like here and additionally a lo-lo regime
where the sellers indeed use two discount prices. This equilibrium is constructed and the
conditions for its existence are determined in Appendix A. Our simple hi-lo equilibrium
is a special case of this more complex hi-lo equilibrium; the latter nests the former.
3.4 Extensions
3.4.1 Simple hi-lo equilibrium for n prices
We analyze here a more general variant of a simple hi-lo equilibrium where there are
n > 1 prices in every store. In the hi-hi regime, the sellers have n monopoly prices,
pi1 = ... = p
i
n−1 = 1, and, in the hi-lo regime, n− 1 monopoly prices and just one discount
price, pin < 1.
As before, in this kind of an equilibrium where a store has never more than one discount
price, a buyer has an incentive to switch the seller immediately after she ﬁnds one. The
buyer’s search problem is non-trivial only if that has not occurred yet. We only need to
cover that case.
To simplify notation, we denote the buyers’ possible search outcomes at t = 1 by:
ω0 = ’no price from store 1 nor from store 2’
ωim = ’a monopoly price from store i, no price from store -i’
ω1,2m = ’a monopoly price from store 1 and from store 2’
ωid = ’a discount price from store i, no price or a higher price from store -i’
ω1,2d = ’a discount price from store 1 and from store 2’
ω1,2A = ’all prices from store 1 and from store 2’
Note that, if a seller is in the hi-lo regime, the probability that a buyer who ﬁnds p < n
prices at this seller does not ﬁnd a single discount price is n−pn . If a seller is in the hi-hi
regime, it is one. Thus, when n − p prices remain in the start store and n in the other
store, the probability of next ﬁnding a discount price is 1n−p in the start store and
1
n in
the other store if the stores are in the hi-lo regime. It is zero if the store is in the hi-hi
regime. Therefore, assuming the buyer has so far found a total of p monopoly prices in
her start store but none from the other store, the expected gain of ﬁnding one more price
in the start store is
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n−p
n b
a+ n−pn b
1
n− p(1− E(p|ω
i
d))
and the expected gain of ﬁnding one more price in the other store is
b
1
n
(1− E(p|ωid)).
Obviously, the former exceeds the latter. The buyer is closer to ﬁnding a discount price
is she remains in her start store than if she changes to the other store. By an inductive
argument, it can be shown that it is this diﬀerence in the expected gain from the next
price that drives the buyers’ search incentives. Therefore, the buyers switch the seller only
when they ﬁnd a discount price or nothing remains.
The seller’s proﬁt is an immediate extension of the two-items-per-one-store case. To
construct a tentative equilibrium, we have to derive the proﬁt in four cases on the path
(two regimes for two sellers) and in two cases oﬀ the path (the other store could be in either
regime) since, as we have seen, the sellers might prefer to have more than one discount
price. Generically, the sellers’ proﬁt is given by
Πi = Pr(ωim) + Pr(ω
i
d)p
i
n + Pr(ω
1,2
m )1/2 + Pr(ω
1,2
d )
(
1− F in(pin)
)
pin,
If the best prices the buyers ﬁnd are seller i’s monopoly price or seller i’s discount price,
they pay them. Instead, if the buyers ﬁnd some monopoly prices from seller i and some
monopoly prices from seller −i, they purchase from a random seller. If they ﬁnd two
discount prices, they buy for the lower one.
If neither of the two sellers has a discount price, the proﬁt to seller i is
Πi = Pr(ωim) + Pr(ω
1,2
m )1/2
= 1/2
n∑
i=1
Bi +
n∑
i=1
Bn+i1/2.
If only seller i has a discount price, the proﬁt to seller i is
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Πi = Pr(ωim) + Pr(ω
i
d)p+ Pr(ω
1,2
m )1/2
= 1/2
n∑
i=1
Bi
n− i
n
+ 1/2
2n∑
i=1
Bimin
{
i
n
, 1
}
pin
+ 1/2
n∑
i=1
Bn+i
i
n
pin
+ 1/2
n∑
i=1
Bn+i
n− i
n
1/2.
If i prices are found, n−in =
n−1
n
n−2
n−1 · · · n−in−(i−1) is the probability of not ﬁnding a discount
and in =
1
n +
n−1
n
1
n−1 + · · ·+ n−(i−1)n 1n−(i−1) is thus that of ﬁnding a discount.
If only seller −i has a discount price, the proﬁt to seller i is
Πi = Pr(ωim) + Pr(ω
1,2
m )1/2
= 1/2
n∑
i=1
Bi + 1/2
n∑
i=1
Bn+i
n− i
n
1/2.
If both of the two sellers have a discount price, the proﬁt to seller i is
Πi = Pr(ωim) + Pr(ω
i
d)p
i
n + Pr(ω
1,2
d )
(
1− F in(pin)
)
pin
= 1/2
n∑
i=1
Bi
n− i
n
+ 1/2
2n∑
i=1
Bi
min{i,n}∑
p=1
1
n
max
{
n− (i− p)
n
, 0
}
pin
+
2n∑
i=1
Bi
min{i,n}∑
p=1
1
n
min
{
i− p
n
, 1
}(
1− F in(pin)
)
pin
where n−(p−1)n
1
n−(p−1) is the probability of ﬁnding a discount on the p’th draw. If altogether
i prices are found, the likelihood of not ﬁnding a discount at the second seller is n−(i−p)n
or zero (for i large) whereas the likelihood of ﬁnding a discount at the second seller is i−pn
or one (for i large).
Instead, the seller’s proﬁt after a deviation to two identical discount prices is given by
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Πi = Pr(ωim) + Pr(ω
i
d)p
i
n + Pr(ω
1,2
m )1/2
= 1/2
2n∑
i=1
Bimax
{
(n− i)(n− 1− i)
n(n− 1) , 0
}
+ 1/2
2n∑
i=1
Bimin
{
1− (n− i)(n− 1− i)
n(n− 1) , 1
}
pin
+ 1/2
n∑
i=1
Bn+imin
{
1− (n− i)(n− 1− i)
n(n− 1) , 1
}
pin
+ 1/2
n∑
i=1
Bn+imax
{
(n− i)(n− 1− i)
n(n− 1) , 0
}
1/2
if the other seller does not have a discount price and
Πi = Pr(ωim) + Pr(ω
i
d)p+ Pr(ω
1,2
d )
(
1− F in(pin)
)
pin
= 1/2
2n∑
i=1
Bimax
{
(n− i)(n− 1− i)
n(n− 1) , 0
}
+ 1/2
2n∑
i=1
Bi
min{i,n−1}∑
p=1
2(n− p)
n(n− 1) max
{
n− (i− p)
n
, 0
}
pin
+ 1/2
2n∑
i=1
Bi
min{i,n−1}∑
p=1
2(n− p)
n(n− 1) min
{
i− p
n
, 1
}(
1− F in(pin)
)
pin
+ 1/2
2n∑
i=1
Bi
min{i,n}∑
p=1
1
n
min
{
1− (n− (i− p))(n− 1− (i− p))
n(n− 1) , 1
}(
1− F in(pin)
)
pin
if the other seller does have a discount price.21
If a store has two discount prices, (n−i)(n−i−1)n(n−1) =
n−2
n
n−3
n−1 · · · n−(i−1)−2n−(i−1) is the probability
of not ﬁnding a discount from that store when i prices are found (for i ≤ n) and 2(n−p)n(n−1) =
(n−(p−1))(n−(p−1)−1)
n(n−1)
2
n−(p−1) is thus the probability of ﬁnding a discount from that store
on the p’th draw (for p ≤ n). A sum over the p’s, from the 1’st draw to the i’th draw, is
2n−i−1
n(n−1) when the (deviating) store has two discount prices and
1
n when the (non-deviating)
store has one discount price.
It is now straightforward to conﬁrm that this formulation is equivalent to the one
derived earlier for n = 2. When each seller has two items, we know that the simple hi-
lo equilibrium is sustained for θ < θo(2) ≈ 713. To see what is the eﬀect of additional
items in stock beyond two, we determine this boundary also for n = 3. When sellers
21Clearly, if a one-price deviation is not proﬁtable, a two-price deviation is not proﬁtable.
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have three items, we ﬁnd numerically that the simple hi-lo equilibrium is sustained for,
θ < θo(3) ≈ 719. This is more relaxed.
Proposition 12 If each sellers has three items and θ ≤ θo ≈ 719, there exists a simple
hi-lo equilibrium.
Interestingly, if the sellers have two items in stock, a seller’s proﬁt is
Πi(1, 1) = a(2)/2 (B1 +B2 +B3 +B4) + (1− a(2))/2 (B1 +B2 + 1/4B3) > 1/2 (B1 +B2)
where
a(2) =
B2
B2 + 3B3 + 4B4
whereas if the sellers have three items in stock, the proﬁt to a seller is
Πi(1, 1, 1) = a(3)/2 (B1 +B2 +B3 +B4 +B5 +B6)
+ (1− a(3))/2 (B1 +B2 +B3 + 2/3B4 + 1/3B5) > 1/2 (B1 +B2 +B3)
where
a(3) =
B2 + 3B3 + 3B4 + 2B5
B2 + 3B3 + 9B4 + 19/3B5 + 9B6
.
In words, the seller’s proﬁt is larger for n = 3, where it has two monopoly prices and
one discount, than for n = 2, where it has one monopoly price and one discount. When
there is one price in one store, the seller’s proﬁt is B1.
Although we are not sure what happens for n > 3 exactly, this suggests that inventory
expansion and in-store price variation might represent an avenue for the sellers to raise
the expected price towards the monopoly price, as in the Diamond (1971) outcome, yet
give the buyers a reason to search. The ﬁniteness of items in stock can help the sellers
to commit to tremble away from the monopoly price level so that the stay-home outcome
can be avoided.
However, especially for comparisons with a larger number of items in stock, we think it
is important to take into account the possibility that additional items in stock can increase
or decrease search eﬃciency. We consider that next.
3.4.2 Economies of scale in search
Here we analyze the idea that search could become either easier of more diﬃcult with
additional items in stock. To capture this idea in our model, we suppose an increase in
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the number of items in stock ni modiﬁes the base line search frictions θ by a multiplier
σ(ni) that could be either above one (for positive economies of scale) or below one (for
negative economies of scale). To facilitate the exposition, we normalize σ(1) = 1 and
introduce the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 5 (A) There are positive economies of scale in search if σ(2) > 1 (or,
generally, if σ(ni + 1) ≥ σ(ni) ≥ 1 for all ni ∈ N and σ(ni + 1) > σ(ni) for some
ni ∈ N), i.e., if the search cost goes down with more items in stock. (B) There are
negative economies of scale in search if σ(2) < 1 (or, generally, if σ(ni + 1) ≤ σ(ni) ≤ 1
for all ni ∈ N and σ(ni + 1) < σ(ni) for some ni ∈ N), i.e., if the search cost goes up
with more items in stock.
Note that it is not immediate from the outset whether search should have positive or
negative economies of scale: it can be easier to ﬁnd an item, when there are more of them,
but the buyers can also get overwhelmed by the larger number of items in stock. Still,
the range for σ(2) that we ﬁnd the most reasonable is [1, 2], the one that lies between
no economies of scale and moderate positive economies of scale. To narrow down to this
range, suppose for a moment that each item is associated with a rate φ, for which it is
found on a page or in a room (representing a store). This rate is speciﬁc to this particular
item and, thus, independent of the other items’ rates. Then, (i) if we model a two-item
store as one page or one room with two items on it, then the ﬁrst is found at rate 2φ and
the second at rate φ, but, (ii) if we model a two-item store as two pages or two rooms with
one item on each, then both are found at rate φ. Thus, the average ﬁnding rate should be
within φ and 2φ.22,23,24
With this new notation, the proﬁt to the seller with one price is given by
Πi(1) = Bi =
θe−θ
2
.
The proﬁt to the seller in the hi-lo equilibrium with two prices is
Πi(1, 1) = a(2)/2 (B1 +B2 +B3 +B4) + (1− a(2))/2 (B1 +B2 + 1/4B3)
where
22At an extreme, we could think of maintaining the ﬁnding rate constant for a larger number of items
in stock by replacing the old store with one item in by multiple replicas with one item in each. This idea
is a modiﬁcation of the standard replica argument for constant returns to scale.
23Note that it is a reasonable assumption that diﬀerent prices are found in random order because the
seller would prefer one ﬁnding order (high ﬁrst) and the buyer another ﬁnding order (low ﬁrst). This thus
gives the seller an incentive to introduce randomness in its product placing strategy.
24We consider only constant ﬁnding rates σ(ni) because it is neither clear whether the ﬁrst items are
easier or harder to ﬁnd that the last ones: The ﬁrst ones could be harder to ﬁnd in search where a buyer is
checking the possible spots one by one in a systematic way (the location of the item gets narrowed down
as fewer spots remain). The last ones could be harder to ﬁnd in search where a buyer is starting from the
most promising spots (the most prominent items are found the ﬁrst, the most remote spot is left for last).
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a(2) =
B2
B2 + 3B3 + 4B4
and
Bk =
(σ(2)θ)k
k!
e−(σ(2)θ) for k < 4 and B4 =
∞∑
k=4
(σ(2)θ)k
k!
e−(σ(2)θ).
The proﬁt to the seller in the hi-lo equilibrium with three prices is
Πi(1, 1, 1) = a(3)/2 (B1 +B2 +B3 +B4 +B5 +B6)
+ (1− a(3))/2 (B1 +B2 +B3 + 2/3B4 + 1/3B5)
where
a(3) =
B2 + 3B3 + 3B4 + 2B5
B2 + 3B3 + 9B4 + 19/3B5 + 9B6
and
Bk =
(σ(3)θ)k
k!
e−(σ(3)θ) for k < 6 and B6 =
∞∑
k=6
(σ(3)θ)k
k!
e−(σ(3)θ).
It is now clear based on the previous analysis that, as long as the economies of scale
in search σ(2) and σ(3) are not too large, the seller’s proﬁts are larger for more items in
stock: Πi(1) < Πi(1, 1) < Πi(1, 1, 1). Our ﬁndings about the sellers’ incentive to generate
price dispersion among similar items thus continue to hold true. Additionally, we think it
might be possible to establish the following even stronger claim:
Claim 1 For any θ and for any sequence (σ(n))n that is bounded from upwards, there
exists n′ ∈ N such that, a simple hi-lo equilibrium can be supported for all n > n′. As the
number of items in stock is increased, this will eventually lead to full extraction: Πin →
1−B∅
2 as n → ∞.
This claim or hypothesis boldly states that as long as the economies of scale in search
are bounded from upwards, the sellers can divide the market peacefully and extract full
surplus when the number of items in stock explodes. Claim 3.4.2 rests on the observation
that the only motive for the seller to reduce its numerous monopoly prices is to try to
attract earlier the buyers who come from the other store. It seems clear that, when the
number of items in stock is increased, n → ∞, the mass of this buyer group diminishes.
Search in the start store is thus consuming more and more time because it is more and
more diﬃcult to ﬁnd the one and only discount price among the n − 1 monopoly prices.
Ultimately so few of the buyers actually switch the seller that the motive to randomize in
prices completely disappears. The buyers who start the search from the seller itself, from
their part, never switch the seller before they ﬁnd the discount price such that there is no
motive to please those buyers by oﬀering a reduction in any of the monopoly prices – this
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would only make them switch sooner. Thus, wherever the consumers are shopping, they
almost always pay the monopoly price.
3.5 Closing remarks
We develop a novel obfuscation model that features search frictions within stores and, thus,
equilibrium price variation both within and across stores. Everything is homogeneous ex
ante. The search frictions originate from the gradual arrival of price information within
stores and the existence of deadlines for buyers. This is all we need.
We ﬁnd that stores can have an incentive to generate price variation across identical
products to make search for better prices less eﬀective to consumers. The general problem
on the part of the buyers is that they cannot commit to shop around to play the stores
against one another but, instead, tend to grow a stronger and stronger preference for their
start store as time goes on.
To put it diﬀerently, our model shows a new way in which the retailers can use inventory
expansion to generate barriers to switching even in an environment where switching is
basically free of cost, like with online search. For this to work, it is important that it
is focal in the economy that usually a seller indeed oﬀers a discount price. This might
give one explanation to why sellers often picture themselves in adverts as having discount
prices everyday.
Interestingly, the eﬀects on search and surplus sharing can be achieved totally passively
from an individual seller’s viewpoint, who can just ﬁx the prices and wait for the buyers
to search in the optimal way. The seller’s best price oﬀer to the buyer gets ”bargained”
down over time as the buyer keeps ﬁnding lower and lower prices; no sales men are needed
to make it happen.
While this paper concentrates on lock-in eﬀects arising from inventory expansion in a
simple price search model, similar eﬀects are likely to arise under diﬀerentiation as well;
modeling this is a straightforward research question for the future.25
Obviously, additional alternatives are just one way to readjust search frictions within
stores. To analyze the seller’s incentives more directly and generally, in a companion paper
Ha¨ma¨la¨inen (2015), we let the sellers choose the θi’s entirely freely.26
As for a simple concrete policy recommendation, one way to diminish the frictions
within stores is to put all the prices of closely related items side by side in order to allow
for immediate comparison at a glimpse. The number of steps or clicks or just, more
25One interesting way to try would be to let the sellers to choose the average match quality as in Bar-
Isaac et al. (2010) when the consumers sample the match values one by one for some cost or with some
time pressure. Also, the use of Bandit models (see Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2006) for a concise review)
could be one natural way to proceed, to let the consumers learn about the frictions within the stores during
their search.
26The model is similar to what we have here but there is just one item in every store.
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generally, the ”distance” between diﬀerent products, as measured in time to switch from
one to the next, may not be irrelevant or innocuous. In fact, people have been shown to be
quite sensitive to even apparently small time costs (see Dreze et al. (1995) and Huberman
et al. (1998)).
There could exist quite subtle frictions related to, for instance, what the consumers ﬁx
their eyes on along their search paths (see Reutskaja et al. (2011) and Pinna and Seiler
(2013)). Hence, since there is apparently a limit to how eﬃciently the sellers can put
the products on display and how eﬃciently the buyers can eye through these products,
any dramatic enough increase in the number of items in stock is likely to generate some
frictions of its own an thus pave the way for the kinds of obfuscation strategies we have
described here.
Appendix A
Complex hi-lo equilibrium for two prices
We next show in detail how to construct a more complex variant of the hi-lo equilibrium. It
exists in a positive interval of parameters where the simplex variant of the hi-lo equilibrium
fails to exist. It is of interest also on its own also because it shows that quite rich pricing
patters are possible even when sellers have only two prices. The exposition here is self
contained and demonstrates how the simple hi-lo equilibrium arises as a natural special
case of the complex hi-lo equilibrium. In the complex variant of the hi-lo equilibrium, the
sellers have once again sometimes two monopoly prices and, at other times, a monopoly
price and a discount price. As a novelty, however, here they sometimes have also two
discount prices. Indeed, there is a cutoﬀ such that, if the random discount price is above
it, the other price is the monopoly price but, if the random discount price is below it, the
two prices are identical.
To distinguish between these three regimes, we denote the probability that a sellers
has just high monopoly prices by
a := Pr(A = ’hi-hi ’) = Pr
(
pi1 = 1, p
i
2 = 1
)
= Pr
(
p−i1 = 1, p
−i
2 = 1
)
,
the probability that the sellers have a high monopoly price and a low discount price by
b := Pr(B = ’hi-lo’) = Pr
(
pi1 = 1, p
i
2 < 1
)
= Pr
(
p−i1 = 1, p
−i
2 < 1
)
,
and the probability that the sellers have just low discount prices by
c := Pr(C = ’lo-lo’) = Pr
(
pi1 < 1, p
i
2 < 1
)
= Pr
(
p−i1 < 1, p
−i
2 < 1
)
.
We assume further, with no loss of generality, that price one is larger than price two in
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every store, pi1 ≥ pi2.
Speciﬁcally, we focus on joint price distributions F (p1, p2), which could be analyzed
by deriving, ﬁrst, the marginal for the lower price F (p2) and, then, the conditional for the
higher price F (p1|p2). Heuristically, the seller who ﬁxes the prices can ﬁrst draw the lower
price and then the higher price. In the equilibrium we now concentrate on, after the lower
price pi2 is drawn, the higher price p
i
1 is obtained in the following way:
1. If pi2 = 1, then p
i
1 = 1. This is the hi-hi regime.
2. If pi2 ∈ (p′, 1), then pi1 = 1. This is the hi-lo regime.
3. If pi2 ∈
[
p, p′
]
, then pi1 = p
i
2. This is the lo-lo regime.
In other words, if the lower price is the monopoly price, the higher price is the monopoly
price, obviously. If the lower price is a discount price, the higher price is the monopoly
price for the other price is above a threshold and a discount price if the other price is
below the threshold. The threshold price p′ ∈ [p, 1] that distinguishes a slight discount,
p ∈ (p′, 1), from a strong discount, p′ ∈ [p′, 1], is determined in equilibrium.
Pay attention also to the fact that, while is is without loss to assume that the sellers
use only high prices for probability a ≥ 0, a high price and a low price for probability
b ≥ 0 and only low prices for probability c ≥ 0, assuming a threshold of the kind that we
have in p′ places already rather a lot of structure on equilibria. We later show that this is
indeed the only symmetric candidate for a hi-lo equilibrium for two prices.
Next, note that as the sellers have the same number of items in stock, two, the positive
economies of scale or the negative economies of scale, σ, aﬀect the stores identically. Thus,
the number of buyers, Bk :=
(σθ)ke−σθ
k! , who ﬁnd a particular number of items by the end,
k = 0, ..., 4, is essentially independent of search; by Assumption 3, the buyers do stop
when have a reason to believe that they cannot ﬁnd better prices anywhere, yet, their
equilibrium buying choices would have been the same had they continued until the very
end. Quite conveniently, this implies that it is easiest to conduct the analysis by tracking
how each set of buyers Bk, who ﬁnds a given number of items k = 0, ..., 4, is divided
between the two sellers in the end or what are the lowest prices they ﬁnd from each store.
We denote the possible search outcomes by
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ω0 = ’no price from store 1 nor from store 2’
ωim = ’a monopoly price from store i, no price from store -i’
ω1,2m = ’a monopoly price from store 1 and from store 2
ωid = ’a discounted price from store i, no price or a higher price from store -i’
ω1,2d = ’a discounted price from store 1 and from store 2
ω1,2A = ’all prices from store 1 and from store 2
In some of the cases we also need to distinguish between
ωis = ’a slightly discounted price from store i, no price or some higher price from store -i’
ω1,2s = ’a slightly discounted price from store 1 and from store 2
ωiS = ’a strongly discounted price from store i, no price or some higher price from store -i’
ω1,2S = ’a strongly discounted price from store 1 and from store 2
The search outcomes are ordered: a buyer is better oﬀ in the latter cases than in the
former cases. Also, there is price competition and some uncertainty about the purchase
decision just for the cases ω1,2m and ω
1,2
l ; otherwise, it is clear for which price the buyers are
buying the product. With no loss of generality, the expected price given a search outcome
is denoted by
1 = p0 = E(p|ω0)
1 = pm = p
i
m = E(p|ωim)
1 = p1,2m = E(p|ω1,2m )
≥ ps = pis = E(p|ωis)
≥ p1,2s = E(p|ω1,2s )
≥ pS = piS = E(p|ωiS)
≥ p1,2S = E(p|ω1,2S )
(3.7)
Furthermore, to make it easier to track the ﬂow of buyers from one store to the other,
we introduce the following auxiliary notation to denote the residual set of buyers Rk who
ﬁnd more than a given number k of items in stock.
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Rk =
4∑
j=k+1
Bj such that, say, R
1 = B2 +B3 +B4 and R
2 = B3 +B4.
This notation is helpful to shorten the otherwise lengthy expressions and to highlight
how some pricing policies postpone the switch of the stores and, thus, expose the sellers
earlier to price competition, while others would not.
We ﬁrst start with the buyer’s problem and then move on to the seller’s problem.
Buyer’s problem
In the equilibrium we are constructing, buyers choose a random seller and search there
until the ﬁrst price is discovered. Then, if the ﬁrst price is a discount price, they switch
the store after the discovery but, if it is the monopoly price, they should keep looking for
the other price because that should most likely be a discount price.
This kind of search behavior places, clearly, some restrictions on pricing policies. As
the sellers are using symmetric strategies, it is natural that buyers select the start store
in random. It is also clear that the buyers must switch the seller at latest when they have
found two price from the start store, as no more are to be found.
However, it is crucially important for the existence of this equilibrium that the buyers
update their beliefs about the remaining price upward when they ﬁnd the monopoly price
and downward when they ﬁnd a discount price. This implies that the hi-lo regime should
dominate the hi-hi and lo-lo regimes in the sense that it is focal in the economy that most
sellers are oﬀering both a monopoly price and a discount price. In other words, for the
equilibrium to work, the buyers should, ﬁrst, not be too dismayed when they ﬁnd that
both prices are not strongly discounted and, second, remain conﬁdent enough that the
monopoly price they have just found is coupled by a slightly discounted price they should
now search for. To see when this is the case, if the ﬁrst price is one, we have to compare
the value to the buyer who stays in the start store and the value to the buyer who does
not. Observe that this might vary a bit depending on how ties are broken. Assumption 3
states that if a buyer’s lowest price from store one is the same as the buyer’s lowest price
from store two, she purchases from both equally often.
The value of sticking to the start store i for the second price can be written as (given
that one item has been found at t)27
27Here, Pr(k = p + 1) is an abbreviation for Pr(k1 = p + 1|kt = 1), where kt denotes the number of
items found by t. To keep the notation as short as possible we suppress this.
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V it = Prt(k = 1)V
i
t (ω
i
1) + Prt(k = 2)
(
a
a+ b/2
0 +
b/2
a+ b/2
(1− pis)
)
+ Prt(k = 3)×
( a
a+ b/2
(
a0 + b/20 + 1/2(1− pis)
)
+
b/2
a+ b/2
(
a(1− pis) + b/2(1− pis) + b/2(1− p1,2s )
) )
+ Prt(k = 3)c(1− p−iS ) + Pr(k = 4)V it (ω1,2A ) (3.8)
The value of switching to the other store −i for the second price can be written as
(given that one item has been found at t)
V −it = Prt(k = 1)V
i
t (ω
i
1) + Prt(k = 2)
(
a0 + b/20 + b/2(1− p−is ) + c(1− p−iS )
)
+ Prt(k = 3)×
(
a0 + b/2(1− p−is ) + b/2
(
a
a+ b/2
(1− p−is ) +
b/2
a+ b/2
(1− p1,2s )
))
+ Prt(k = 3)c(1− p−iS ) + Prt(k = 4)V it (ω1,2A ) (3.9)
Note ﬁrst that the buyer could ﬁnd either zero, one, two, or three additional prices
for probabilities Prt(k = 1 + 0), Prt(k = 1 + 1), Prt(k = 1 + 2) and Prt(k = 1 + 3),
respectively. If she ﬁnds none of the remaining prices or all of the remaining prices, the
outcome of search is clearly just the same for whichever the chosen search order: in the
ﬁrst case the buyer value is V it (ω
i
1) = V
−i
t (ω
i
1) = 0 and in the second case the buyer value
is V it (ω
1,2
A ) = V
i
t (ω
1,2
A ) = 1−min
{
pi2, p
−i
2
}
.
Interestingly, the buyer value is the same also conditional on the case that she ﬁnds
two additional prices, independent of whether she goes for store i or for store −i. To
see why, notice that these extra prices could be two monopoly prices, which occurs for
probability a or
a
a+ b/2
(a+ b/2) = (a+ b/2)
a
a+ b/2
in both cases, one slightly discounted price and a higher price, which occurs for probability
a
a+ b/2
b/2 +
b/2
a+ b/2
(a+ b/2) = b/2 + b/2
a
a+ b/2
in both cases, two slightly discounted prices, which occurs for probability
b/2
a+ b/2
b/2 = b/2
b/2
a+ b/2
in both cases, or one strongly discounted price and a higher price, which occurs for prob-
ability c in both cases. Above, the lhs denotes the probability when the buyer would stick
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to seller i and the rhs denotes the probability when the buyer would switch to seller −i.
Note speciﬁcally that, after the buyer has found the monopoly price from store i, she
updates her beliefs about the remaining price in store i. Her prior was that store is in the
hi-hi regime for probability a, in the hi-lo regime for probability b, and in the lo-lo regime
for probability c but now that she has observed the monopoly price she can be sure that
the store is not in the lo-lo regime and her posterior for the hi-hi regime is aa+b/2 and for
the hi-lo regime is b/2a+b/2 .
Therefore, to guarantee that the buyers prefer to switch the stores if they ﬁnd a
discount price but not if they ﬁnd the monopoly price, as required, it is suﬃcient that the
expected buyer value is higher if the buyer goes for store i than if the buyer goes for store
−i, conditional on the case that she ﬁnds one additional price:
Lemma 11 The buyers’ switching strategies are consistent with the hi-lo equilibrium if
1/2b
a+ 1/2b
(1− ps) ≥ 1/2b(1− ps) + c(1− pS).
Proof. A sketch of the proof is above. 
This holds true if c = 0 or, otherwise, if b is ”high” in comparison to a and c. Observe
also that this is a condition for the variables a, b and c, which are endogenous; it is
something we have to check once we have derived them. Basically, it states that the
buyers have an incentive to search and switch as required as long as, either, the lo-lo
regime is not at use, or, the hi-lo regime is the dominant one. This appears very natural
as the motive to continue with the same seller after one price is found stems from the very
expectation that most sellers keep available a mix of diﬀerent prices, higher and lower.
Seller’s problem
We now move from the buyer’s problem to the seller’s problem. Remember that the key
contribution of our paper is to show that the sellers can use a combination of two price
instruments in stead of one price instrument to aﬀect the search for identical products.
This entails that the buyers must change the way they search in reaction to the prices
they ﬁnd; some prices make them stay while other prices make them go.
It is foreseeable although unavoidable that a problem like this results in quite heavy
combinatorics as we have to keep track of where the buyer starts and in which order she
ﬁnds the prices, the higher ﬁrst or the lower ﬁrst, because that aﬀects the point at which
she wants to switch the stores. To derive the equilibrium pricing strategies, we also have
to go through all the combinations of the pricing regimes, altogether 3× 3.
Basically, a seller’s proﬁt is still quite simple and mechanical to calculate. We only
have to recall that half the buyers start from each seller, sample the two available prices
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randomly one by one, and switch the seller if they ﬁnd a discount price, p < 1, but stick
to their start store if they ﬁnd a monopoly price, p = 1. Then we just count how many
of each buyer group B1, B2, B3 and B4 purchase from each seller in each case. To recall
how this model works, consider how the buyers would search if they were able to search
as long as they wanted. In that case, their search paths would be described for essential
parts as follows:
(A) Inside the start store
1. If the start store is in the hi-hi regime, the buyers switch the seller after the second
price is found and they all walk out of the store with a monopoly price pm = 1.
2. If the start store is in the hi-lo regime, half the buyers switch the seller after the ﬁrst
price is found and half the buyers switch the seller after the second price is found
and they all walk out of the store with a slightly discounted price ps ∈ (p′, 1).
3. If the start store is in the lo-lo regime, the buyers switch the seller after the ﬁrst
price is found and they all walk out of the store with a strongly discounted price
pS ∈
[
p, p′
]
.
(B) After the switch of stores
1. If the other store is in the hi-hi regime, there is no price competition from the second
seller (there are only monopoly prices).
2. If the other store is in the hi-lo regime, price competition from the second seller can
set in once the buyers have found the slightly discounted price (there is one such
price).
3. If the other store is in the lo-lo regime, price competition from the second seller can
set in once the buyers have found a strongly discounted price (there are two such
prices).
Recall also that, if the start store is in the hi-hi regime, the stores divide equally the
buyers who have only found a monopoly prices from both; otherwise, the start store gets
them all. All in all, the distribution of consumer search outcomes is represented most
conveniently by Tables 1 - 6 for all the six possible cases, respectively: (i) both sellers in
the hi-hi regime (Table 1), (ii) one seller in the hi-hi regime and one seller in the hi-lo
regime (Table 2), (iii) one seller in the hi-hi regime and one seller in the lo-lo regime (Table
3), (iv) both sellers in the hi-lo regime (Table 4), (v) one seller in the hi-lo regime and
one seller in the lo-lo regime (Table 5) and (vi) both sellers in the lo-lo regime (Table 6).
To emphasize, notice that this information in Tables 1 - 6 is both necessary and suﬃcient
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to determine the seller’s proﬁt in each of these three regimes. To support mixed pricing
strategies, the seller’s proﬁt should of course be the same over all the regimes.
In the hi-hi regime, the seller has only monopoly prices, pi2 = p
i
1 = 1. The proﬁt is
given by (see Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 in Appendix C)
Πtwo =
1
2
(B1 +B2) +
a
2
(B3 +B4) +
b
8
B3. (3.10)
In the hi-lo regime, the seller has the monopoly price, pi1 = 1, and a discount price,
pi2 ∈ (p′, 1). The seller’s proﬁt is (see Tables 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 in Appendix C)
Πtwo = 1/4B1 + a/8B3 + b/8 (B2 +B3) p
i
2 + 1/4B1p
i
2 + 1/4B2p
i
2
+ a/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)
pi2 + b/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
) (
1− F (pi2|b)
)
pi2
=: db + ebp
i
2 + sb
(
1− a− F (pi2)
)
pi2. (3.11)
In the lo-lo regime, the seller has only discount prices, pi2 = p
i
1 ∈
[
p, p′
]
. The proﬁt is
given by (see Tables 3.3, 3.5 and 3.6 in Appendix C)
Πtwo = 1/2B1p
i
2 + b/4B2p
i
2 + (a+ b)/2
(
R1 +R2
)
pi2 + cR
1
(
1− F (pi2|c)
)
pi2
=: ecp
i
2 + sc
(
1− a− b− F (pi2)
)
pi2. (3.12)
Note that, to avoid overly long expression for the seller’s proﬁt, we have deﬁned some
new constants, db, eb, sb, ec, sc, where d’s refer to captive buyers who pay the monopoly
price, e’s refer to captives who pay a discount price and s’s refer to shoppers; the subindex
refers to regime, b stands for hi-lo and c stands for lo-lo. Also, as the marginal for the
lower price pi2 is denoted by F , 1 − F (pi2|b) = 1−a−F (p
i
2)
b and 1 − F (pi2|c) =
1−a−b−F (pi2)
c
stand, respectively, for the conditionals of undercutting the other store’s discount price
when it plays the hi-lo regime or the lo-lo regime.28,29
It is clear from these expressions for a seller’s proﬁt that the generated price varia-
tion keeps the buyers searching longer in every store. Since the buyers have little time,
the sellers with higher prices (in the hi-hi and hi-lo regime) may clearly gain from this.
However, as a backstop to the surplus extraction process, oﬀering two low prices (in the
lo-lo regime) may not always be a very bad idea either because, although the switch of
the stores is swifter then, the prices are likely to be lower than what the other store has.
Indeed, quite conveniently for the sellers, by mixing between these three diﬀerent regimes,
28The seller’s proﬁt is derived in Appendix B.
29To economize on the notation, we use F i to refer to the marginal of p2i in stead of referring to the joint
price distribution of pi1 and p
i
2 as it was applied earlier on in Ch. 3.2.
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the stores can decelerate the search when they have high prices to oﬀer and they need a
shelter from competition and accelerate the search when they have low prices to oﬀer and
they have less need for a shelter.
Now that we know how the seller’s proﬁt is determined in each of the regimes, we can
immediately make some interesting observations about the equilibrium pricing policies.
First, at least two pricing regimes, the hi-hi and the hi-lo, are needed:
Proposition 13 For any hi-lo equilibrium, the probability that pi1 = p
i
2 = 1 is given by
a =
B1 (1 + c)
B1 + 3B3 + 4B4
∈ (0, 1) .
In other words, any hi-lo equilibrium features an increase in the price level: the lower
price pi2 is the monopoly price for probability a > 0 and the higher price p
i
1 is the monopoly
price for probability a + b = 1 − F (p′) = 1 − c > 0. These equilibria could be compared
to the equilibrium with just one price where every price is a discount price for probability
one.
Next, recall that discount prices above a threshold p′ are called slightly discounted and
discount prices below a threshold p′ are called strongly discounted. Note also that, for
c = 0, all discount prices are slightly discounted but, for c > 0, they come in both slightly
and strongly discounted specimens. Their marginal distribution functions can be solved
in closed form:
Proposition 14 The slight discount prices, pi2 ∈ (p′, 1), are drawn from
F (pi2) = 1− a−
Πtwo − db + ebpi2
sbp
i
2
,
the strong discount prices, pi2 ∈
[
p, p′
]
, are drawn from
F (pi2) = 1− a− b−
Πtwo − ecpi2
scpi2
.
If c = 0, the lowest price is p = Πtwo−dbsb(1−a)+eb and, if c > 0, the lowest price is p =
Πtwo
sc(1−a−b)+ec .
Sketch of proof: The atom size is pinned down by the requirement that the seller’s
proﬁt must be the same in the hi-hi regime with no discount price and in the hi-lo regime
with a discount price near the monopoly price, which leads to a loss of some captive buyers
because the buyers stick to the start store when they ﬁnd a monopoly price but switch
the stores when they ﬁnd a discount price. To compensate for this drastic loss of captive
buyers by a seller who oﬀers a discount price p2 ≈ 1 in stead of the monopoly price p2 = 1,
there has to be a jump in the seller’s proﬁt from the informed consumers: an atom at the
upper bound and, thus, a drastic gain from undercutting it slightly.
The marginal distribution of the lower price, pi2 
→ F (pi2), comes as a direct result of
Essays on Market Dynamics and Frictions 125
the requirement that the seller’s proﬁt must be the same, Πtwo, across all the regimes to
make it optimal for the sellers to randomize in pricing. The lower bound p is the price
where the distributions have to vanish for each case, F (p) = 0, because, if an even lower
price were used, the proﬁt that the seller can obtain from the captive buyers at the upper
bound one would be above the proﬁt that the seller could obtain by selling for that low a
price to the captive buyers and to all the informed consumers. For further details on how
the equilibrium price distributions are calculated, see Appendix B. 
Proposition 14 characterizes the two possibilities for the joint price distribution in a
hi-lo equilibrium for two prices. Proposition 15 gives a condition as for when each of these
cases would arise and when a hi-lo equilibrium for two prices exists. For the next existence
result, recall that a hi-lo equilibrium has two regimes if c = 0 and three regimes if c > 0.
Proposition 15 If there are two prices in two stores,
(i) there exists a simple hi-lo equilibrium where c = 0, for σ(2)θ ∈ (0, θo). The upper
bound of this interval is such that θo ≈ 713
(ii) there exists a simple hi-lo equilibrium where c > 0, for σ(2)θ ∈ (θo, θx). The upper
bound of this interval is such that θx > θo.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
For our model where the frictions are higher for lower Poisson rates σ(2)θ, there exists
a simple hi-lo equilibrium without the lo-lo regime, i.e., such that c = 0, as long as
the frictions are strong enough, i.e., for σ(2)θ ∈ (0, θo), and with the lo-lo regime, i.e.
such that c > 0, as long as the frictions are a bit lower but nevertheless strong enough,
i.e., for σ(2)θ ∈ (θo, θx). With two prices in two stores, the cutoﬀs for the frictions are
θx > θo ≈ 713.
Remark 7 Out of our model, there exists a simple hi-lo equilibrium with two items
also under some other circumstances. To give an example, it is sustainable also in an
environment where the the number of prices the buyers ﬁnd is uniform on {0, 1, . . . , k},
for 4 ≤ k ≤ 99, or Bn = 1/(k + 1), for 0 ≤ n ≤ k – or beyond. In addition, for instance,
the following partitions (ad hoc) would be appropriate:
B∅ = 0.96, B1 = 0.01, B2 = 0.01, B3 = 0.01, B4 = 0.01,
B∅ = 0.01, B1 = 0.96, B2 = 0.01, B3 = 0.01, B4 = 0.01,
B∅ = 0.01, B1 = 0.01, B2 = 0.01, B3 = 0.01, B4 = 0.96,
(3.13)
but not the following
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B∅ = 0.01, B1 = 0.01, B2 = 0.96, B3 = 0.01, B4 = 0.01,
B∅ = 0.01, B1 = 0.01, B2 = 0.01, B3 = 0.96, B4 = 0.01.
Proof. See Table 3.7. 
We consider in the main text also hi-lo equilibria with k prices. Similar results hold
for them:
Remark 8 Out of our model, there exists a simple hi-lo equilibrium with three items
also under some other circumstances. To give an example, it is sustainable also in an
environment where the the number of prices the buyers ﬁnd is uniform on {0, 1, . . . , n},
for 5 ≤ n ≤ 99, or Bp = 1/(n+ 1), for 0 ≤ p ≤ n – or beyond. In addition, for instance,
the following partitions (ad hoc) would be appropriate:
B∅ = 0.94, B1 = 0.01, B2 = 0.01, B3 = 0.01, B4 = 0.01, B5 = 0.01, B6 = 0.01,
B∅ = 0.01, B1 = 0.94, B2 = 0.01, B3 = 0.01, B4 = 0.01, B5 = 0.01, B6 = 0.01,
B∅ = 0.01, B1 = 0.01, B2 = 0.94, B3 = 0.01, B4 = 0.01, B5 = 0.01, B6 = 0.01,
B∅ = 0.01, B1 = 0.01, B2 = 0.01, B3 = 0.01, B4 = 0.94, B5 = 0.01, B6 = 0.01,
B∅ = 0.01, B1 = 0.01, B2 = 0.01, B3 = 0.01, B4 = 0.01, B5 = 0.94, B6 = 0.01,
B∅ = 0.01, B1 = 0.01, B2 = 0.01, B3 = 0.01, B4 = 0.01, B5 = 0.01, B6 = 0.94,
but not the following
B∅ = 0.01, B1 = 0.01, B2 = 0.01, B3 = 0.94, B4 = 0.01, B5 = 0.01, B6 = 0.01.
Proof. See Table 3.8. 
This shows that, generally, it is possible to support a simple hi-lo equilibrium even
when the frictions are quite low as in the uniform case with large k.30 However, there
exists is a proﬁtable deviation from these candidate equilibria if almost every buyer ﬁnds
more items than a single seller is carrying. This appears natural for the only motive to
deviate from a simple hi-lo equilibrium is that of attracting the buyers who start from the
30It appears natural to claim that a partition {Bk}∞k=1 features lower frictions than partition {Ck}∞k=1 if
Bk ≥ Ck for all k
because, in that case, there are more buyers who ﬁnd less prices in partition {Bk}∞k=1 than in partition
{Ck}∞k=1.
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other store; the buyers who start from the seller itself do not switch the store until they
have found a discount price.
So far we have not excluded the existence of other kinds of multi-price equilibria.
Yet, while the perhaps simplest way to make the buyers search longer is oﬀering two
independent and identically distributed prices, we ﬁnd that this cannot be an equilibrium
but in a very restrictive environment where, coincidentally, B3 = 1/4. Otherwise, the
sellers have a proﬁtable deviation to a monopoly price and a discount price or two perfectly
correlated discount prices. In other words, they have an incentive to shift their pricing
strategies towards a hi-lo equilibrium.
Proposition 16 If there are two prices in two stores, there exists an equilibrium where
each seller has two independent and identically distributed prices iﬀ B3 = 1/4.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 10. We start by showing that there exist no pure equilibrium in pricing
policies, whatever the number of stores and the number of items in stock in each of them.
The proof is by contradiction. Assume the sellers use some pure pricing policies. Focus on
the lowest prices and the second lowest prices. If only one store is using the lowest prices
or faces no competition for those prices, it has an incentive to increase them to extract
more revenue from the buyers and, if two competing sellers are using the lowest prices,
they have and incentive to decrease them to undercut the other one; note that since these
are the lowest prices it does not matter if the change in prices triggers a change in search
because the consumers who ﬁnd the lowest prices will anyway return to buy for them. It
is also without loss to assume that the lowest prices are positive because, as long as the
buyers search, there are always some captive buyers in the market from whom the sellers
can extract positive revenue such that the Bertrand outcome is not an equilibrium. Note
that every store must have a randomized price. Otherwise, its competitors can undercut
its price too easily. Obviously, every store must face some competition because, if this was
not the case, it has either only lower prices than others (which it would, thus, have an
incentive to increase to tax the captive buyers) or only higher prices than others (which
would not draw any traﬃc to the store and, in particular, no captive buyers willing to buy
for those higher prices).
To organize our thoughts when the consumer’s response to diﬀerent prices is unknown,
we introduce the notion of competing prices: price pni competes with price p
m
−i if some
group of buyers who ﬁnds them both would sometimes purchase for pni and, at other
times, purchase for pm−i.
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Now, consider the support of a seller’s lowest prices supp(F imin) and the support for
all other competing prices supp(F−imin). We next derive some elementary properties of
those prices. First, if there is no overlap in the supports, ∃S(q, r) = (q − r, q + r) for
(q, r) ∈ [0, 1]× (0,∞) : S(q, r) ∪ supp(F imin) = S(q, r) and S(q, r) ∪ supp(F−imin) = ∅, there
is a proﬁtable deviation to adjust the pricing policies such that all weight in the gap S(q, r)
is put on the upper bound p = q + r. This implies that the support of a seller’s lowest
prices must overlap with those in other competing stores.
Note that as these deviations are on the path, so to say, we need not worry about
the eﬀects on buyers search behavior which might otherwise undermine the proﬁtability
of a change in a price. If we assume out such oﬀ path punishments, we can easily get
additional results.
Assume that the probability that the buyer would switch the seller after seeing a price
is continuous in the price. Then it is immediate to show that, if there is an atom a in some
∃T (q, r) = [q − r, q + r) for (q, r) ∈ [0, 1]× (0,∞) : T (q, r)∪ supp(F imin)∪ supp(F imin) = ∅,
there is a proﬁtable deviation from p ∈ [a, a+ ] to p ∈ (a− , a) for some tiny  > 0 as
the probability of having a lower price than the competition would go up discontinuously
but the selling price would go down only continuously. This shows that the interior and
the lower bound of the support must be clear from atoms.
Observe that, for symmetric strategies, this implies that competing prices should come
from an interval support. In addition, as long as there is no countervailing eﬀect through
an atom at the upper bound or through the switching response that is triggered, the upper
bound of this support must be equal to one because those prices cannot be utilized to sell
but to captive buyers and, thus, should be raised as high as possible to extract maximal
revenue from them. 
Deriving the seller’s proﬁt in the hi-lo equilibrium for two prices. As both of the two
stores play three diﬀerent regimes, we have to go through nine cases in total to determine
a seller’s proﬁt. Each price could be either the monopoly price pm or a discount price pd.
If a buyer ﬁnds the monopoly price ﬁrst, she continues with the same retailer to ﬁnd also
the other price but, if a buyer ﬁnds the discount price ﬁrst, she would either switch the
seller or stop. In the hi-hi regime, the store has two monopoly prices, in the hi-lo regime,
the store has the monopoly price and a discount price and, in the lo-lo regime, the store
has two discount prices. At this early stage, we let it the sellers have any discount price
in the hi-lo regime and any two discount prices in the lo-lo regime without imposing the
equilibrium restriction that the discount is slight in the hi-lo regime and that the discount
is strong and the same for both prices in the lo-lo regime. It is useful as it allows us to
calculate the seller’ proﬁts for any deviations; we derive the equilibrium restriction only
in the end.
Case 1 : Seller i’s proﬁt when it is in the hi-hi regime and has two monopoly prices.
Subcase 1.1: If seller −i is in the hi-hi regime, seller i’s proﬁt can derived from Table 1.
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The buyers who start from seller i or from seller −i switch after ﬁnding the two monopoly
prices, but do not ﬁnd only monopoly prices from the second seller as well and, thus, buy
half the times from seller i and half the times from seller −i:
Πi = 1/2 (B1 +B2 + 1/2B3 + 1/2B4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store i
+1/2 (1/2B3 + 1/2B4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store −i
= 1/2R0.
Subcase 1.2: If seller −i is in the hi-lo regime, seller i’s proﬁt can derived from Table
2. The buyers who start from seller i switch after they have found the two monopoly
prices. If they only ﬁnd the monopoly price from the other store they buy half the times
from seller i and half the times from seller −i but if they also ﬁnd the discount price, they
buy from seller −i. The buyers who start from seller −i switch after they have found the
discount price but, given that store −i’s discount price obviously beats store i’ monopoly
prices, it is the start store −i where they buy from ultimately:
Πi = 1/2 (B1 +B2 + 1/4B3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store i
= 1/2
(
R0 − 3/4R2 − 1/4R3) .
Subcase 1.3: If seller −i is in the lo-lo regime, seller i’s proﬁt can derived from Table 3.
The buyers who start from seller i switch after they have found the two monopoly prices
and, once they ﬁnd a discount price, they buy from seller −i. The buyers who start from
seller −i switch right after they have found a discount price but, given that store −i’s
discount price obviously beats store i’ monopoly price, it is the start store −i where they
buy from ultimately:
Πi = 1/2 (B1 +B2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store i
= 1/2
(
R0 −R2) .
Summing up over these three cases, we obtain the seller’s proﬁt for the hi-hi regime
as:
Πi =
1
2
(B1 +B2) +
a
2
(B3 +B4) +
b
8
B3.
Case 2 : Seller i’s proﬁt when it is in the hi-lo regime and has a monopoly price and a
discount price pid.
Subcase 2.1: If seller −i is in the hi-hi regime, seller i’s proﬁt is given by Table 2 as
we just did for Subcase 1.2 except that we have to change seller i into seller −i and, thus,
seller −i into seller i. The buyers who start from seller i switch after they have found the
discount price but, given that store i’s discount price obviously beats store −i’ monopoly
prices, it is the start store i where they buy from ultimately. The buyers who start from
seller −i switch after they have found the two monopoly prices. If they only ﬁnd the
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monopoly price from the other store they buy half the times from seller −i and half the
times from seller i but if they also ﬁnd the discount price, they buy from seller i:
Πi = 1/2
(
1/2B1 + 1/2B1p
i
d + (B2 +B3 +B4) p
i
d
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store i
+ 1/2
(
1/4B3 + 1/2B3p
i
d +B4p
i
d
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store −i
= 1/4B1 + 1/8B3 + 1/4
(
R0 +R1 +R2 +R3
)
pid.
Subcase 2.2: If seller −i is in the hi-lo regime, seller i’s proﬁt can derived from Table
4. The buyers who start from seller i or from seller −i switch after ﬁnding the discount
price. If they only ﬁnd the monopoly price from the other store, they buy from their start
store but, if they also ﬁnd the discount price from the other store, they buy from the store
whose price is the lowest one:
Πi = 1/2
(
1/2B1 + 1/2B1p
i
d + 3/4B2p
i
d + 1/4B3p
i
d︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store i
+ 1/4B2
(
1− F (pid|b)
)
pid + 3/4B3
(
1− F (pid|b)
)
pid +B4
(
1− F (pid|b)
)
pid
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store i
+ 1/2
(
1/4B2
(
1− F (pid|b)
)
pid + 3/4B3
(
1− F (pid|b)
)
pid +B4
(
1− F (pid|b)
)
pid
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store −i
= 1/4B1 + (1/4B1 + 3/8B2 + 1/8B3) p
i
d +
(
1/4R1 + 1/2R2 + 1/4R3
) (
1− F (pid|b)
)
pid.
Subcase 2.3: If seller −i is in the lo-lo regime, seller i’s proﬁt can derived from Table
5. The buyers who start from seller i switch after they have found the discount price and,
once they ﬁnd a discount price from seller −i, they compare them and buy for the lowest
one. The buyers who start from seller −i switch after they have found a discount price
and, once they ﬁnd the discount price from seller i, they compare them and buy for the
lowest one:
Πi = 1/2
(
1/2B1 + 1/2B1p
i
d + 1/2B2p
i
d + (1/2B2 +B3 +B4)
(
1− F (pid|c)
)
pid
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store i
+ 1/2
(
(1/2B2 +B3 +B4)
(
1− F (pid|c)
)
pid
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store −i
= 1/4B1 + 1/4B1p
i
d + 1/4B2p
i
d +
(
1/2R1 + 1/2R2
) (
1− F (pid|c)
)
pid.
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Summing up over these three cases, we obtain the seller’s proﬁt for the hi-lo regime
as:
Πi = 1/4B1 + 1/4B1p
i
d + 1/4B2p
i
d + a/8B3 + a/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)
pid + b/8 (B2 +B3) p
i
d
+ b/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
) (
1− F (pid|b)
)
pid + c/2
(
R1 +R2
) (
1− F (pid|c)
)
pid.
If we take into account the equilibrium restriction that discount price is lower in the
lo-lo regime than in the hi-lo regime, we get
Πi = 1/4B1 + 1/4B1p
i
d + 1/4B2p
i
d + a/8B3 + a/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)
pid + b/8 (B2 +B3) p
i
d
+ b/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
) (
1− F (pid|b)
)
pid
= 1/4B1 + a/8B3︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:db
+
(
1/4B1 + 1/4B2 + a/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)
+ b/8 (B2 +B3)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:eb
pid
+ 1/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:sb
(
1− a− F (pid)
)
pid.
Yet, the earlier proﬁt expression can also be useful to analyze proﬁtability of diﬀerent
deviations.
Case 3 : Seller i’s proﬁt when it is in the lo-lo regime and has two discount prices pid(1)
and pid(2).
Subcase 3.1: If seller −i is in the hi-hi regime, seller i’s proﬁt is given by Table 3 as
we just did for Subcase 1.3 except that we have to change seller i into seller −i and, thus,
seller −i into seller i. The buyers who start from seller i switch right after they have
found a discount price but, given that store i’s discount prices obviously beat store −i’
monopoly prices, it is the start store i where they buy from ultimately. The buyers who
start from seller −i switch after they have found the two monopoly prices and, once they
ﬁnd a discount price, they buy from seller i.
Πi = 1/2
(
1/2 (B1 +B2 +B3 +B4) p
i
d(1) + 1/2 (B1 +B2 +B3 +B4) p
i
d(2)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store i
+ 1/4 (B3 +B4) p
i
d(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store −i
+ 1/4 (B3 +B4) p
i
d(2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store −i
=
(
1/4R0 + 1/4R2
)
pid(1) +
(
1/4R0 + 1/4R2
)
pid(2).
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Subcase 3.2: If seller −i is in the hi-lo regime, seller i’s proﬁt is given by Table 5 as
we just did for Subcase 2.3 except that we have to change seller i into seller −i and, thus,
seller −i into seller i. The buyers who start from seller i switch after they have found a
discount price and, once they ﬁnd the discount price from seller i, they compare them and
buy for the lowest one. The buyers who start from seller −i switch after they have found
the discount price and, once they ﬁnd a discount price from seller i, they compare them
and buy for the lowest one:
Πi = 1/2
(
1/2B1p
i
d(1) + 1/4B2p
i
d(1) + 1/2 (1/2B2 +B3 +B4)
(
1− F (pid(1)|b)
)
pid(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store i
+ 1/2B1p
i
d(2) + 1/4B2p
i
d(2) + 1/2 (1/2B2 +B3 +B4)
(
1− F (pid(2)|b)
)
pid(2)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store i
+ 1/4 (1/2B2 +B3 +B4)
(
1− F (pid(1)|b)
)
pid(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store −i
+ 1/4 (1/2B2 +B3 +B4)
(
1− F (pid(2)|b)
)
pid(2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store −i
= 1/4 (B1 + 1/2B2) p
i
d(1) + 1/4
(
R1 +R2
) (
1− F (pid(1)|b)
)
pid(1)
+ 1/4 (B1 + 1/2B2) p
i
d(2) + 1/4
(
R1 +R2
) (
1− F (pid(2)|b)
)
pid(2).
Subcase 3.3: If seller −i is in the lo-lo regime, seller i’s proﬁt can derived from Table
6. The buyers who start from seller i or from seller −i switch after ﬁnding the a discount
price and, once they ﬁnd a discount price from the second seller, buy for the lowest price
they have found:
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Πi = 1/2
(
1/2B1p
i
d(1) + 1/2 (B2 +B3 +B4)
(
1− F (pid(1)|c)
)
pid(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store i
+ 1/2B1p
i
d(2) + 1/2 (B2 +B3 +B4)
(
1− F (pid(2)|c)
)
pid(2)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store i
+ 1/4 (B2 +B3 +B4)
(
1− F (pid(1)|c)
)
pid(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store −i
+ 1/4 (B2 +B3 +B4)
(
1− F (pid(2)|c)
)
pid(2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
start store −i
= 1/4B1p
i
d(1) + 1/2R
1
(
1− F (pid(1)|c)
)
pid(1)
+ 1/4B1p
i
d(2) + 1/2R
1
(
1− F (pid(2)|c)
)
pid(2).
Summing up over these three cases, we obtain the seller’s proﬁt for the lo-lo regime
as:
Πi = 1/2B1p
i
d + a/2
(
R1 +R2
)
pid
+ b/4B2p
i
d + b/2
(
R1 +R2
) (
1− F (pid|b)
)
pid
+ cR1
(
1− F (pid|c)
)
pid.
If we take into account the equilibrium restriction that discount price is lower in the
lo-lo regime than in the hi-lo regime, we get
Πi = 1/2B1p
i
d + b/4B2p
i
d + (a+ b)/2
(
R1 +R2
)
pid + cR
1
(
1− F (pid|c)
)
pid
=
(
1/2B1 + b/4B2 + (a+ b)/2
(
R1 +R2
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ec
pid + R
1︸︷︷︸
=:sc
(
1− a− b− F (pid)
)
pid.
Yet, the earlier proﬁt expression is also useful to analyze proﬁtability of diﬀerent
deviations.
Proofs of Proposition 13 and Proposition 14. To support randomized pricing over the
regimes, the proﬁt to the seller in the hi-hi regime must be the same as the the proﬁt to
the seller in the hi-lo regime. In particular, the seller’s proﬁt must be the same when it
has the prices (1, 1) (hi-hi) and the prices (1, 1 − ) (hi-lo) for some tiny  > 0. At the
limit where  → 0, this results in the following condition:
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1
2
(B1 +B2) +
a
2
(B3 +B4) +
b
8
B3
=1/4B1 + 1/4B1 + 1/4B2 + a/8B3 + a/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)
+ b/8 (B2 +B3) ,
which immediately gives the positive atom size
a =
B2 (1 + c)
B2 + 3B3 + 4B4
∈ (0, 1) .
The equilibrium price distribution can be solved from
Πtwo = db + ebp
i
2 + sb
(
1− a− F (pi2)
)
pi2,
for the hi-lo regime, and from
Πtwo = ecp
i
2 + sc
(
1− a− b− F (pi2)
)
pi2,
for the lo-lo regime.
Thus, if the lower bound p is attained in the hi-lo regime already, it is given by
Πtwo = db + ebp+ sb(1− a)p,
but, if the lower bound is attained in the lo-lo regime instead, it is given by
Πtwo = ecp+ sc(1− a− b)p. 
Proof of Proposition 15. Since we now have shown that a > 0 and that every active
store randomizes at least one price, we know that a hi-lo equilibrium features at least two
regimes, the hi-hi regime and the hi-lo regime. We start by constructing an equilibrium
with just these two regimes ﬁrst. This enables us to derive existence conditions for this
simple two regime equilibrium. For the cases where the existence fails, we then move
on to analyze more complex the equilibrium with also the lo-lo regime and the existence
conditions associated with that one.
Hi-lo equilibrium with two regimes: Gathering the results derived so far, we know that
if c = 0, the atom size is given by
a =
B2
B2 + 3B3 + 4B4
∈ (0, 1) ,
the probability that seller i’s discount price beats seller −i’s discount price, if they both
have one discount price, is given by
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(
1− F (pi2|b)
)
=
Πtwo − db
sbp
i
2
− eb
sb
,
and the lowest price quoted in an equilibrium is
p =
Πtwo − db
eb + sb
=
1
2 (B1 +B2) +
a
2 (B3 +B4) +
b
8B3 − (1/4B1 + a/8B3)
(1/4B1 + 1/4B2 + 1/4 (R1 + 2R2 +R3)) + b/8 (B2 +B3)
Note that, since it is with no loss of generality to assume that a seller has a (weakly)
lower price pi2 and a (weakly) higher price p
i
1 and since the lower price is supported on[
p, 1
]
, we have quite much on the equilibrium path already. Note additionally that a
deviation in both prices to some p1 < p and to some p2 < p is dominate by a deviation
to p in both of them since that the price is higher but the gain is the same in terms of
the buyers. In consequence, to look for proﬁtable deviations, we only need to consider
the seller’s proﬁt if he, for some lower price pi2 ∈
[
p, 1
)
, deviates to some higher price
pi1 ∈ [p2, 1) that is a discount price in stead of the monopoly price.
The seller’s proﬁt is
Πi =
1
2
(B1 +B2) +
a
2
(B3 +B4) +
b
8
B3
or, if expressed in the other way,
Πi = 1/4B1 + 1/4B1p
i
2 + 1/4B2p
i
2 + a/8B3 + a/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)
pi2 + b/8 (B2 +B3)
+ b/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
) (
1− F (pi2|b)
)
pi2 + c/2
(
R1 +R2
) (
1− F (pi2|c)
)
pi2
= 1/4B1 + 1/4B1p
i
2 + 1/4B2p
i
2 + a/8B3 + a/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)
pi2 + b/8 (B2 +B3)
+ 1/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
) (
1− a− F (pi2)
)
pi2, (3.14)
on the path, and
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Π′ = 1/2
(
1/2B1p
i
2 + a/2
(
R1 +R2
)
pi2 + b/4B2p
i
2 + b/2
(
R1 +R2
) (
1− F (pi2|b)
)
pi2
+ cR1
(
1− F (pi2|c)
)
pi2
)
+ 1/2
(
1/2B1p
i
1 + a/2
(
R1 +R2
)
pi1 + b/4B2p
i
1 + b/2
(
R1 +R2
) (
1− F (pi1|b)
)
pi1
+ cR1
(
1− F (pi1|c)
)
pi1
)
= 1/2
⎛
⎜⎝(1/2B1 + a/2 (R1 +R2)+ b/4B2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:kd
pi1 + 1/2
(
R1 +R2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ld
(
1− a− F (pi1)
)
pi1
⎞
⎟⎠
+ 1/2
⎛
⎜⎝(1/2B1 + a/2 (R1 +R2)+ b/4B2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:kd
pi2 + 1/2
(
R1 +R2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ld
(
1− a− F (pi2)
)
pi2
⎞
⎟⎠ ,
(3.15)
oﬀ the path.
We can solve for
(
1− a− F (pi2)
)
pi2 from (3.14) to obtain, as before, that
(
1− a− F (pi2)
)
pi2 =
Πi − 1/4B1 − a/8B3 − b/8 (B2 +B3)
1/4 (R1 + 2R2 +R3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ud
− 1/4B1 + 1/4B2 + a/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)
1/4 (R1 + 2R2 +R3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:vd
pi2.
This entails that, the seller’s proﬁt after a deviation is expressed as
Π′ = 1/2
(
kdp
i
1 + ld
(
ud − vdpi1
))
+ 1/2
(
kdp
i
2 + ld
(
ud − vdpi2
))
.
Since the expression is linear in pi1 and p
i
1 it is clear that the maximum or the supremum
is located on the boundaries such that the higher price is either (right below) unity or equal
to the lower price and the lower price is either (right below) unity of equal to the lower
bound:
(
pi1, p
i
2
)
= (1− , 1− ), (pi1, pi2) = (1− , p) or (pi1, pi2) = (p, p) for some tiny
 > 0. We start by checking when it is the case that the seller has a proﬁtable deviation
to (1− , 1− ) or to (1− , p). For the comparisons, we place on-the-path proﬁt on the
lhs and oﬀ-the-path proﬁt on the rhs:
As the case number one, if the deviation is to (1− , 1− ) where  → 0+, it is not
worthwhile if
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1/2 (B1 +B2) + a/2 (B3 +B4) + b/8B3 ≥ 1/2B1 + a/2 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4) + b/4B2
1/2B2 + (1− a)/8B3 − (1− a)/4B2 ≥ a/2 (B2 +B3 +B4)
B2 + 1/4B3 − 1/2B2 ≥ a (1/4B3 − 1/2B2 +B2 +B3 +B4)
B2 + 1/2B3
B2 + 5/2B3 + 2B4
≥ B2
B2 + 3B3 + 4B4
which is an identical truth.
As the case number two, if the deviation is to
(
1− , p) where  → 0+, it is not
worthwhile if
1/4B1 + a/8B3
+(1/4B1 + 1/4B2 + a/4 (B2 + 3B3 + 4B4) + b/8 (B2 +B3)) p
+1/4 (B2 + 3B3 + 4B4)
(
1− a− F (p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−a=b
p
≥1/4B1 + a/4 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4) + b/8B2
+(1/4B1 + a/4 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4) + b/8B2) p
+1/4 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4)
(
1− a− F (p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−a=b
p,
which is equivalent to
a/8B3 + 1/4 (3/4B2 + 5/4B3 + 2B4) p ≥ a/4 (3/4B2 + 9/4B3 + 2B4) p
and a necessary condition of
B2 + 5/3B3 + 8/3B4
B2 + 3B3 + 8/3B4
≥ B2
B2 + 3B3 + 4B4
Again, this is an identical truth.
Finally, consider when there is a proﬁtable deviation to
(
p, p
)
:
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1
2
(B1 +B2) +
a
2
(B3 +B4) +
b
8
B3
< (1/2B1 + a/2 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4) + b/4B2) p+ 1/2 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4)
(
1− a− F (p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−a=b
p
=(1/2B1 + b/4B2 + 1/2 (B2 + 2B3 + 2B4)) p,
which holds whenever
1/2 (B1 +B2)
(
1− p)+ (B3 +B4) (a/2− p)+ b/4B3 (1/2− p) < 0.
For our Poisson model, we ﬁnd numerically that there is no such proﬁtable deviation
iﬀ σθ ≤ θo where θo ≈ 713.31 Otherwise, we have to go for the more complex case where
there is also the lo-lo regime. We analyze that one next.
Hi-lo equilibrium with three regimes : Note that, for any σθ > 0, we could always start
the construction of a hi-lo equilibrium by deriving cdf F and p of a candidate for the
unique, simple hi-lo equilibrium as we just did. If there is no proﬁtable deviation from
prices (1, 1) to prices
(
p, p
)
, we now know we are done since there cannot be proﬁtable
deviations to prices
(
1− , p) or (1− , 1− ) for any tiny  or, thus, to any mixtures of
these by what has been proofed above. However, if there is a proﬁtable deviation from
prices (1, 1) to prices
(
p, p
)
, we proceed as follows:
We start to raise c continuously. To any c we map a price p′ which is a candidate for
a lower bound of the hi-lo regime and thus a candidate for a upper bound of the lo-lo
regime. In other words, p′(c) is such that it equates the seller’s proﬁt in the hi-hi regime
for the given c and the seller’s proﬁt in the hi-lo regime for the given c, and the price p′(c)
is better than any discount price p > p′ in the hi-lo regime but worse than any discount
price p < p′ in the lo-lo regime:
Πi(1, 1; c) :=
1
2
(B1 +B2) +
(
3a
8
+
1
8
)
B3 +
a
2
B4
Πi(1, p′; c) := 1/4B1 + 1/4B1p′ + 1/4B2p′ + a/8B3 + a/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)
p′
+ b/8 (B2 +B3) p
′ + b/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)
(1− a− c) p′.
where a = (1 + c)A := (1 + c) B2B2+3B3+4B4 is increasing in c. This shows that, since
Πi(1, 1; c) is increasing in c and Πi(1, p; c) is decreasing in c, a larger c implies a larger
p′(c). This shows that, in particular, p′(c) > p′(0) for c > 0, where p′(0) = p for the lower
bound in the simple hi-lo equilibrium that was our starting point.
31The numerical ﬁndings are reported in Table 3.7.
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Notice also that as, by construction,
Πi(1, 1; c) :=
1
2
(B1 +B2) +
(
3a
8
+
1
8
)
B3 +
a
2
B4 =
Πi(1, 1− ; 1− a) := 1/4B1 + 1/4B1 + 1/4B2 + a/8B3 + a/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)
+ b/8 (B2 +B3) + b/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)
(1− a− (1− a)) <
Πi(1, 1− ; c) := 1/4B1 + 1/4B1 + 1/4B2 + a/8B3 + a/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)
+ b/8 (B2 +B3) + b/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)
(1− a− c) >
Πi(1, p′; c) := 1/4B1 + 1/4B1p′ + 1/4B2p′ + a/8B3 + a/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)
p′
+ b/8 (B2 +B3) p
′ + b/4
(
R1 + 2R2 +R3
)
(1− a− c) p′.
(3.16)
for c > 0 as  → 0+. Speciﬁcally, Πi(1, 1; c) ∈ (Πi(1, p′(0); c),Πi(1, 1− ; c)). This implies
that, by continuity of Πi(1, p; c) in p, it is indeed possible to always assign to any c < 1−a a
unique price p′(c) < 1 such that Πi(1, 1; c) = Πi(1, p′; c). The mapping that this produces,
c 
→ p′(c), is continuous and increasing in c.
Next, we have to ﬁnd c such that the seller is indiﬀerent between quoting the prices
(1, p′(c)) and the prices (p′(c), p′(c)). This is possible iﬀ there is a proﬁtable deviation
Πi(p′(0), p′(0); 0) > Πi(1, 1; 0) in the candidate for a simple hi-lo equilibrium. In addition,
we can use the ﬁnding that Πi(1, 1; 0) ≤ Πi(1 − , 1 − ; 0). As Πi(1, 1; c) is increasing in
c but Πi(p, p; c) is decreasing in c, these inequalities hold also as we start to raise c; they
hold for any c ∈ (0, 1− a).
Therefore, it is clear that, as we trace the continuous path c 
→ p′(c) from (c, p′(c)) =
(0, p′(0)) to (c, p′(c)) = (1 − a, 1), we necessarily go through a ﬁxed point (c, p′(c)) such
that the seller’s proﬁt is the same for (p′(c), p′(c), c) and for (1, p′(c), c). By monotonicity
of the deviating seller’s proﬁt along the map c 
→ p′(c), the ﬁxed point is unique.
We could also just say that we have two equations Π(1, 1; c) = Π(1, p′(c); c) and
Π(1, p′(c); c) = Π(p′(c), p′(c); c) for two unknowns p′(c) and c. While the equations are
nonlinear in p′(c) and c, due to the cross terms of form pc, we show that there always
exists a solution and it is unique.
To recap, we have shown that, assuming that the buyers search as postulated, it is
always possible to ﬁnd pricing policies consistent with a hi-lo equilibrium. These pricing
policies are unique by construction. This implies that, as long as the condition in Lemma
11,
1/2b
a+ 1/2b
(1− ps) ≥ 1/2b(1− ps) + c(1− pS), (3.17)
is satisﬁed such that the buyers have an incentive to stick to the start store if they ﬁrst
140 Section 3.5
discover a price p = 1 and switch the stores if they ﬁrst discover a price p < 1, there exists
a hi-lo equilibrium for two prices for whatever the level of frictions σθ.
By now we know that, for σθ ∈ (0, θo], the pricing policies are such that c = 0 and,
since (3.17) holds, the buyers are willing to search as required. We have also seen that, for
any frictions σθ ∈ (θo,∞], the candidate pricing policies consistent with hi-lo equilibrium
have c > 0, where the probability of the lo-lo regime c is continuous and increasing in the
frictions σθ. The continuity then implies that there exist a rate θx larger than the rate
θo such that, for any frictions σθ ∈ (θo, θx], since (3.17) still continues to hold, the buyers
are willing to search as required.
Furthermore, since the candidate pricing policies consistent with the hi-lo equilibrium
are unique by construction, for any σθ ≤ θx, there exists a unique hi-lo equilibrium for two
prices. If σθ ∈ (0, θo], it is the unique, simple hi-lo equilibrium with the hi-hi regime and
the hi-lo regime but no lo-lo regime and, if σθ ∈ (θo, θx], it is the unique hi-lo equilibrium
with all these three regimes. 
Proof of Proposition 16. Suppose the sellers have both two prices (p1i , p
2
i ) that are
independent and identically distributed such that pni ∼ F for n = 1, 2. By Lemma 10, the
support has to be an interval, supp(F ) =
[
p, 1
]
, and there could not be atoms in it. The
buyers contact a random seller and, if they have time, search the two prices and, then,
switch the seller. For any two random draws p1i and p
2
i from F , denote by pmax the larger
an by by pmin the smaller. Thus, the proﬁt to the seller is
Π = 1/4B1pmax + 1/4B3 (1− (pmax))2 pmax
+ (1/4B1 + 1/2B2) pmin + 1/4B3 (1− (pmin))2 pmin
+ 1/2B3 (1− (pmin)) pmin +B4 (1− (pmin))2 pmin, (3.18)
which could be decomposed as Π = Πmax +Πmin
Πmax = 1/4B1pmax + 1/4B3 (1− (pmax))2 pmax
Πmin = (1/4B1 + 1/2B2) pmin + 1/4B3 (1− (pmin))2 pmin
+ 1/2B3 (1− (pmin)) pmin +B4 (1− (pmin))2 pmin. (3.19)
Observe that due to the additive structure Πmax and Πmin have to be constant or
else there would be a proﬁtable deviation in maximizing both of them. To keep the seller
indiﬀerent between following the recommended realizations pmax and pmin and some other
feasible draws pmax ∈ [pmin, 1] and pmin ∈
[
p, 1
]
the distribution F has to be such that
Πmax = 1/4B1p+ 1/4B3 (1− F (p))2 p
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for all p ∈ [p, 1] and
Πmin = (1/4B1 + 1/2B2) p+ 1/4B3 (1− F (p))2 p
+ 1/2B3 (1− F (p)) p+B4 (1− F (p))2 p (3.20)
for all p ∈ [p, 1]. Thus,
(1− F (p))2 = Πmax
1/4B3p
− 1/4B1
1/4B3
and
(1/4B3 +B4) (1− F (p))2 + 1/2B3 (1− F (p)) = Πmin
p
− 1/4B1 − 1/2B2. (3.21)
Both hold only for B3 = 1/4. 
Seller’s proﬁt in a simple hi-lo equilibrium for three prices. Applying directly the
formulas for the seller’s proﬁt in Section 3.4.1 for n = 1, we ﬁnd that in the hi-hi regime
the proﬁt is
Π(1, 1) = a/2 (B1 +B2 +B3 +B4 +B5 +B6)
+ b/2 (B1 +B2 +B3 + 2/3B4 + 1/3B5)
and in the hi-lo regime the proﬁt is
Π(1, p) = a/2 (2/3B1 + 1/3B2)
+a/2 (1/3B1 + 2/3B2 +B3 +B4 +B5 +B6) p
+a/2 (1/3B4 + 2/3B5 +B6) p
+a/2 (2/3B4 + 1/3B5) 1/2
+b/2 (2/3B1 + 1/3B2)
+b/2 (1/3B1 + 5/9B2 + 6/9B3 + 3/9B4 + 1/9B5) p
+b (1/9B2 + 3/9B3 + 6/9B4 + 8/9B5 +B6) (1− F (p|b)) p
In comparison, if the seller deviates by lowering one of the two monopoly prices into a
discount price, the seller’s proﬁt is
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Π(p, p) = a/2 (1/3B1)
+a/2 (2/3B1 +B2 +B3 +B4 +B5 +B6) p
+a/2 (2/3B4 +B5 +B6) p
+a/2 (1/3B4) 1/2
+b/2 (1/3B1)
+b/2 (2/3B1 + 7/9B2 + 4/9B3 + 1/9B4) p
+b/2 (2/9B2 + 5/9B3 + 8/9B4 +B5 +B6) (1− F (p|b)) p
+b/2 (2/9B2 + 5/9B3 + 8/9B4 +B5 +B6) (1− F (p|b)) p
The atom size a is the solution to equation
Π(1, 1) = Π(1, 1− )
for  → 0+ and, after we have derived the atom size, the lower bound p can be solved
from
Π(1, 1) = Π(1, p)
where it should be noted that
(
1− F (p|b)) = 0.
As a result,
a =
B2 + 3B3 + 3B4 + 2B5
B2 + 3B3 + 9B4 + 19/3B5 + 9B6
p =
Π−A
B
, where
Π = a/2 (B1 +B2 +B3 +B4 +B5 +B6) + (1− a)/2 (B1 +B2 +B3 + 2/3B4 + 1/3B5)
= 1/2 (B1 +B2 +B3 + 2/3B4 + 1/3B5 + a (1/3B4 + 2/3B5 +B6))
(3.22)
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A = a/2 (2/3B1 + 1/3B2)
+ a/2 (2/3B4 + 1/3B5) 1/2
+ (1− a)/2 (2/3B1 + 1/3B2)
= 1/2 (2/3B1 + 1/3B2 + a (2/3B4 + 1/3B5))
(3.23)
B = a/2 (1/3B1 + 2/3B2 +B3 +B4 +B5 +B6)
+ a/2 (1/3B4 + 2/3B5 +B6)
+ (1− a)/2 (1/3B1 + 5/9B2 + 6/9B3 + 3/9B4 + 1/9B5)
+ (1− a) (1/9B2 + 3/9B3 + 6/9B4 + 8/9B5 +B6)
= 1/2 (1/3B1 + 2/3B2 +B3 +B4 + 5/3B5 + 2B6)
+ 1/2(1− a) (1/9B2 + 1/3B3 + 2/3B4 + 2/9B5)
This information can now be used to ﬁnd out numerically when there is a proﬁtable
deviation from prices (1, 1) to prices (p, p). For our Poisson model, we ﬁnd numerically
that there is no such proﬁtable deviation iﬀ σθ ≤ θo where θo ≈ 719.32
32The numerical ﬁndings are reported in Table 3.8.
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Appendix C: Tables
start store Pr(k = 1) = B1 Pr(k = 2) = B2 Pr(k = 3) = B3 Pr(k = 4) = B4
i: hi-hi Pr(ωim|k = 1) = 12 Pr(ωim|k = 2) = 12 Pr(ω1,2m |k = 3) = 12 Pr(ω1,2m |k = 4) = 12
-i: hi-hi Pr(ω−im |k = 1) = 12 Pr(ω−im |k = 2) = 12 Pr(ω1,2m |k = 3) = 12 Pr(ω1,2m |k = 4) = 12
Table 3.1: Search outcomes: store i in hi-hi and store -i in hi-hi regime
start store Pr(k = 1) = B1 Pr(k = 2) = B2 Pr(k = 3) = B3 Pr(k = 4) = B4
i: hi-hi Pr(ωim|k = 1) = 12 Pr(ωim|k = 2) = 12 Pr(ω1,2m |k = 3) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 4) = 14
Pr(ω−id |k = 3) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 4) = 14
-i: hi-lo Pr(ω−im |k = 1) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 2) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 3) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 4) = 14
Pr(ω−id |k = 1) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 2) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 3) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 4) = 14
Table 3.2: Search outcomes: store i in hi-hi and store -i in hi-lo regime
start store Pr(k = 1) = B1 Pr(k = 2) = B2 Pr(k = 3) = B3 Pr(k = 4) = B4
i: hi-hi Pr(ωim|k = 1) = 12 Pr(ωim|k = 2) = 12 Pr(ω−id |k = 3) = 12 Pr(ω−id |k = 4) = 12
-i: lo-lo Pr(ω−id |k = 1) = 12 Pr(ω−id |k = 2) = 12 Pr(ω−id |k = 3) = 12 Pr(ω−id |k = 4) = 12
Table 3.3: Search outcomes: store i in hi-hi and store -i in lo-lo regime
start store Pr(k = 1) = B1 Pr(k = 2) = B2 Pr(k = 3) = B3 Pr(k = 4) = B4
i: hi-lo Pr(ωim|k = 1) = 14 Pr(ωid|k = 2) = 14 Pr(ωid|k = 3) = 18 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 4) = 18
Pr(ω1,2d |k = 3) = 18 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 4) = 18
Pr(ωid|k = 1) = 14 Pr(ωid|k = 2) = 18 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 3) = 18 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 4) = 18
Pr(ω1,2d |k = 2) = 18 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 3) = 18 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 4) = 18
-i: hi-lo Pr(ω−im |k = 1) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 2) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 3) = 18 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 4) = 18
Pr(ω1,2d |k = 3) = 18 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 4) = 18
Pr(ω−id |k = 1) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 2) = 18 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 3) = 18 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 4) = 18
Pr(ω1,2d |k = 2) = 18 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 3) = 18 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 4) = 18
Table 3.4: Search outcomes: store i in hi-lo and store -i in hi-lo regime
start store Pr(k = 1) = B1 Pr(k = 2) = B2 Pr(k = 3) = B3 Pr(k = 4) = B4
i: hi-lo Pr(ωim|k = 1) = 14 Pr(ωid|k = 2) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 3) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 4) = 14
Pr(ωid|k = 1) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 2) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 3) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 4) = 14
-i: lo-lo Pr(ω−id |k = 1) = 12 Pr(ω−id |k = 2) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 3) = 14 Pr(ω−id |k = 4) = 14
Pr(ω1,2d |k = 2) = 14 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 3) = 14 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 4) = 14
Table 3.5: Search outcomes: store i in hi-lo and store -i in lo-lo regime
start store Pr(k = 1) = B1 Pr(k = 2) = B2 Pr(k = 3) = B3 Pr(k = 4) = B4
i: lo-lo Pr(ωid|k = 1) = 12 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 2) = 12 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 3) = 12 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 4) = 12
-i: lo-lo Pr(ω−id |k = 1) = 12 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 2) = 12 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 3) = 12 Pr(ω1,2d |k = 4) = 12
Table 3.6: Search outcomes: store i in lo-lo and store -i in lo-lo regime
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θ B0 B1 B2 B3 B4 a p Π(1, 1) Π(p, p) Δ(Π)
713 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
714 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
0.0001 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 +
100000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
1 0.368 0.368 0.184 0.061 0.019 0.414 0.757 0.297 0.290 +
2 0.135 0.271 0.271 0.180 0.143 0.196 0.472 0.320 0.306 +
3 0.050 0.149 0.224 0.224 0.353 0.097 0.277 0.240 0.226 +
4 0.018 0.073 0.147 0.195 0.567 0.049 0.156 0.152 0.142 +
5 0.007 0.034 0.084 0.140 0.735 0.024 0.085 0.087 0.081 +
6 0.002 0.015 0.045 0.089 0.849 0.012 0.044 0.046 0.043 +
7 0.001 0.006 0.022 0.052 0.918 0.006 0.022 0.024 0.022 +
8 0.000 0.003 0.011 0.029 0.958 0.003 0.011 0.012 0.011 +
9 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.015 0.979 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.005 +
10 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.990 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 +
20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
40 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
150 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
250 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
500 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
750 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
1000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
1500 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
2000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
2500 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
5000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
10000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
0.333 0.333 0.333 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.333 0.333 -
0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.000 0.250 0.556 0.305 0.304 +
0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.125 0.356 0.247 0.229 +
0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.333 0.083 0.263 0.207 0.185 +
0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.429 0.063 0.208 0.177 0.155 +
0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.500 0.050 0.172 0.155 0.134 +
0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.556 0.042 0.147 0.138 0.118 +
0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.600 0.036 0.128 0.125 0.106 +
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
0.960 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.125 0.356 0.012 0.011 +
0.010 0.960 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.125 0.934 0.487 0.474 +
0.010 0.010 0.960 0.010 0.010 0.932 0.966 0.494 0.503 -
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.960 0.010 0.003 0.150 0.131 0.147 -
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.960 0.003 0.010 0.012 0.010 +
Table 3.7: Proﬁtable deviations (Δ(Π) < 0) and non-proﬁtable deviations (Δ(Π) > 0)
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θ B0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 a p Π(1, 1) Π(p, p) Δ(Π)
719 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
720 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
0.0001 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 +
100000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
1 0.368 0.368 0.184 0.061 0.015 0.003 0.001 0.792 0.929 0.315 0.313 +
2 0.135 0.271 0.271 0.180 0.090 0.036 0.017 0.577 0.745 0.417 0.408 +
3 0.050 0.149 0.224 0.224 0.168 0.101 0.084 0.421 0.560 0.415 0.400 +
4 0.018 0.073 0.147 0.195 0.195 0.156 0.215 0.301 0.408 0.357 0.341 +
5 0.007 0.034 0.084 0.140 0.175 0.175 0.384 0.208 0.287 0.275 0.262 +
6 0.002 0.015 0.045 0.089 0.134 0.161 0.554 0.138 0.194 0.194 0.186 +
7 0.001 0.006 0.022 0.052 0.091 0.128 0.699 0.087 0.125 0.128 0.123 +
8 0.000 0.003 0.011 0.029 0.057 0.092 0.809 0.053 0.077 0.079 0.077 +
9 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.015 0.034 0.061 0.884 0.031 0.046 0.047 0.045 +
10 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.019 0.038 0.933 0.018 0.026 0.026 0.026 +
20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
40 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
150 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
250 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
500 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
750 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
1000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
1500 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
2000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
2500 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
5000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
10000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
0.333 0.333 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.333 0.333 -
0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.375 0.375 -
0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.538 0.708 0.385 0.382 +
0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.000 0.466 0.558 0.372 0.353 +
0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.318 0.438 0.331 0.310 +
0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.250 0.241 0.360 0.295 0.273 +
0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.333 0.194 0.305 0.265 0.243 +
0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.400 0.163 0.265 0.241 0.219 +
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 +
0.940 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.318 0.438 0.023 0.022 +
0.010 0.940 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.318 0.890 0.488 0.473 +
0.010 0.010 0.940 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.841 0.934 0.493 0.491 +
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.940 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.937 0.953 0.494 0.501 -
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.940 0.010 0.010 0.333 0.388 0.385 0.372 +
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.940 0.010 0.316 0.250 0.276 0.245 +
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.940 0.010 0.021 0.025 0.022 +
Table 3.8: Proﬁtable deviations (Δ(Π) < 0) and non-proﬁtable deviations (Δ(Π) > 0)
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Chapter 4
Splitting consumers:
Equilibria with endogenous
shopping frictions
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List of symbols
i ∈ {1, 2} seller/store index
B = [0, 1] the set of buyers
t ∈ [0, 1] time index
d ≡ 1 buyers’ common deadline
STAGE 1
θi ∈ [0,∞] the Poisson arrival/ﬁnding rate of price pi in store i
STAGE 2
F i ∈ Δ [0, 1] store i’s (mixed) pricing strategy
pi ∈ [0, 1] (realized) price in store i
E(p|F i) ∈ [0, 1] expected price in store i
STAGE 3
ti ∈ [0, 1] the fraction of buyers who start from store i
B∅ ∈ [0, 1] the mass of buyers who have not found a price by t = d
Bi ∈ [0, 1] the mass of buyers who have found only pi by t = d
B1,2 ∈ [0, 1] the mass of buyers who have found both p1 and p2 by t = d
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Splitting consumers:
Equilibria with endogenous
shopping frictions
Abstract
We develop a price search model that features endogenous frictions in a duopolis-
tic environment. These frictions originate from the gradual arrival or price
information within stores and the existence of deadlines for buyers. We show
that both sellers have a strategic incentive to generate frictions. There exists
exactly two equilibria with a unique asymmetric pattern: a prominent seller,
whose expected price is higher but the in-store frictions lower, and a non-
prominent seller. The buyers are divided exactly equally into informed and
uninformed consumers, and into those who fail to ﬁnd anything. Under the
Poisson process, this surplus loss is 6 %.
Keywords: Deadlines; Frictions; Prices; Search; Poisson process; Obfus-
cation. JEL-codes: D43, D83.
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4.1 Introduction
Managing the traﬃc of incoming and outgoing consumers is an important part of running
an online store. As consumers are typically busy, it is not irrelevant in which order they
sample the stores and how long a time they tend to stay in. The stores can aﬀect this
consumer turnover in many ways, particularly, ﬁguratively, by putting some sand or oil
in the wheels in terms of how the products are presented; the click paths could be made
either long or short, for example.
We study the eﬀects and origins of search frictions in a duopolistic price competition
model featuring endogenous frictions, inspired by online search. To abstract from hold-up
problems (Diamond, 1971) arising in sequential search setups with upfront payment of the
search cost, we use a model based on deadlines and gradual arrival of price information in
every store; there is no explicit cost of searching nor switching.
This modiﬁcation of the standard framework (Varian, 1980; Stahl, 1989) makes it pos-
sible to capture endogenous frictions in a new reduced way: we allow sellers to adjust the
rates of the Poisson process that determine how fast a buyer ﬁnds a price in a store. These
search frictions aﬀect both the number of trades and the shares of informed consumers and
uninformed consumers in the market, appearing in the classic papers by (Varian, 1980;
Stahl, 1989) that our model nests. This in turn enables us to put a number on the size of
the loss generated by the frictions and comment on where the market is likely to stand in
between the Diamond (1971)1 and Bertrand (1883)2 outcomes.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that there exist precisely two equilibria with pure frictions. In
both of them, one of the stores – called the prominent one – has lower frictions and higher
prices in comparison to the other store. Although the sellers are competing in frictions,
they both generate positive frictions. This implies that some buyers always fail to ﬁnd a
price; under the Poisson process, this surplus loss amounts to 6 %.
Interestingly, using the jargon from Stahl (1989), we also ﬁnd that there are exactly
equally many shoppers (with two price quotes) and searchers (with one price quote).
This is a rather remarkable result because, arguably, our outcome is therefore precisely in
between the Diamond and Bertrand outcomes. While it is well known that models like
this where the buyers are divided into informed consumers and uninformed consumers
span both the outcomes for appropriate parametric assumptions (Varian (1980) and Stahl
(1989)), despite the obvious interest in this division that dictates how competitive the
market is, not much has been said about the actual shares before.
We study a setup with a unit mass of buyers and two similar sellers competing in
frictions, by which we refer to the intensities of the Poisson process that determine how
1Where the sellers get all the surplus, MR=MC.
2Where the buyers get all the surplus, p=MC.
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fast it is for the buyers to ﬁnd a price in a store.3,4 The price is not found right away once
a buyer enters a store but according to this Poisson process. The sellers set their arrival
rates in the beginning of the game (stage 1 of the game) and they are common knowledge
immediately thereafter aﬀecting, thus, prices (stage 2) and search (stage 3). Buyers search
under a deadline. Their search costs are zero before the deadline and inﬁnity after the
deadline.
Apart from being a theory contribution, this paper could hence be regarded as an
attempt to put together some elements pertinent to online search, namely, (i) the negligible
time cost of ”traveling” to a store or switching from store to store, (ii) the positive,
endogenous time cost of ﬁnding payoﬀ relevant information within a store, and (iii) the
signiﬁcance of deadlines in managing our daily lives.
While the buyers are free to switch the seller at any point as long as they have time,
we ﬁnd that in equilibrium they do so only after they have found a price. This entails
that the rates at which price information arrives play a role of an implicit endogenous
switching cost. If the frictions are weaker in the ﬁrst store, there is more time to discover
the price in the second one. That intensiﬁes price competition. As a result, there exist
no eﬃcient equilibria. Although one store could serve the entire market if it chose to play
down all the frictions, it has no incentive to do so because that would also eliminate the
switching cost.
It is noteworthy that both sellers have a strategic incentive to generate frictions, which
does not arise, say, from a cost saving motive. In the unique equilibrium pattern, the
in-store wait time, until the price is found, is drawn from Exp(2.76)5 for the prominent
seller and from Exp(1.03)6 for the non-prominent seller. About 6 %7 of the cake is now
lost due to the frictions. Of what is remaining, 50 % goes to the prominent seller, 25 %
to the non-prominent seller and 25 % to the buyers. As it turns out, the size of the loss is
related to the prominent seller’s incentives and the surplus division to the non-prominent
sellers incentive’s.
The prominent seller’s proﬁt is given by the number of uninformed, captive buyers
it gains. Since consumers switch the store once they ﬁnd a price, the prominent seller
has a tradeoﬀ between maximizing the number of consumers who ﬁnd its own price (by
decreasing the frictions, increasing the inﬂow) and minimizing the number of consumers
who ﬁnd the other seller’ price (by increasing the frictions, decreasing the outﬂow). It is
hence optimal for it to avoid extremes and generate intermediate frictions. This implies
that the number of trades is non-optimal. To summarize, as the seller does not fully reap
3This gives our model a slight ﬂavor of a Poisson bandit problem (see Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2006)
for a compact review).
4Apart from endogenous frictions, our model is essentially the same as in Ha¨ma¨la¨inen (2015) for the
case of one item in stock.
5Rounded to percentiles.
6Rounded to percentiles.
7Rounded to percentiles.
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(bear) the positive (negative) externality that faster (slower) search has on the consumers,
it has no incentive to serve every buyer. As a result, any equilibrium is ineﬃcient.
We observe that the two sellers’ incentives become generally more and more aligned
when price competition intensiﬁes. In the neighborhood of the equilibrium, the non-
prominent seller’s proﬁt is essentially a product of informed consumers and uninformed
consumers. Its demand comes only from the former but it wins them over more frequently
if the other seller has higher prices – if there is a larger number of the latter. Therefore,
the non-prominent seller’s proﬁt is maximized when the number of informed consumers
equals the number of uninformed consumers. This is also reﬂected in the surplus sharing:
50 % - 25 % - 25 %.
Note that our main ﬁndings, the universal incentive to generate frictions for sellers
and the half-and-half division of consumers into to the informed and the uninformed, only
depend on the existence of the deadline, d < ∞, but not on what it is – it could be a
second or a decade.8 However, as the deadline vanishes, d = ∞, every buyer ﬁnds every
price and the Bertrand outcome uniquely obtains. There is hence a discontinuity in the
equilibrium set at d = ∞.
Our results are relevant especially for online search, where the greatest frictions are
not exogenous (limited by the speed at which computers process information) but en-
dogenous (limited by the speed at which consumers process information). They suggest
that, although the base line search technology is constantly improving, frictions may not
disappear. This point has been made also by, for instance, Ellison and Ellison (2009) and
Ellison and Wolitzky (2012).
In their seminal article, Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) show that the sellers have a
universal incentive to raise their prices and, to keep this from aﬀecting the search, increase
the time cost of shopping by various confusing selling practices, coined with the term
obfuscation. Obfuscation aggravates the hold-up problem arising in sequential search
setups. It enables the sellers to raise their prices without losing demand.
In another interesting contribution, Wilson (2010) demonstrates that the incentive to
obfuscate is sustained even when the sellers could attract the buyers by committing to a
lower obfuscation level: while one of the sellers has an incentive play down the frictions
to boost its demand, the others are willing to maintain a high friction position to relax
price competition. There exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria.
However, although this previous work and the complementing empirical evidence (El-
lison and Ellison, 2009) do make a case for the incentive to obfuscate, given the assumed
approach, since the number of trades is ﬁxed in this earlier work, it is diﬃcult to assess
whether the eﬀects of obfuscation are restricted to surplus sharing or whether it impinges
8If the deadline one is scaled up by c ∈ R+, the intensities θ1 ≈ 2.76 and θ2 ≈ 1.03 just have to be scaled
down by c ∈ R+. A similar pattern is likely to arise for cases where the wait time is not exponentially
distributed as long as the deadline is ﬁnite. It is also noteworthy that our model has no parameters except
for this deadline that can be freely scaled up and down; it is essentially parameter-free.
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on eﬃciency as well. Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) and Wilson (2010) are both founded on
a classic model a` la Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989) where the number of trades and the
ratio of informed consumers to uninformed consumers is not responsive to obfuscation.
That is a very nice, basic model to work with in extensions. Nevertheless, since a con-
sumer’s decision to become informed or remain ignorant is likely to depend on frictions,
that ratio is one of the most obvious adjustment margins to obfuscation and, thus, crucial
for welfare analysis.
To take this properly into account, we use a new modeling approach motivated by
the particularities of online search as described. As a key distinction from what has been
done, it is assumed that the buyers can search free of cost, as long as they have time.9,10,11
This entails that the buyer’s optimal stopping problem is trivial (stop when time is up);
instead, we focus on the optimal switching problem.12
The results we thereby obtain extend the previous ﬁndings by demonstrating that
obfuscation is ineﬃcient and, thus, its adverse eﬀects are not restricted to surplus sharing.
Yet, the welfare loss seems small relative to the consequences on the division. It came
also somewhat as a surprise that in our model the frictions get adjusted so as to equate
the numbers of informed consumers and uninformed consumers. Our results also proof
that welfare is not linked in any obvious way with symmetry (as of Ellison and Wolitzky
(2012)) or asymmetry (as of Wilson (2010)) of equilibrium obfuscation, which is shown
to be a matter of degree, rather than of kind: we ﬁnd that both sellers generate frictions.
With its new take on online search with deadlines, our model has obviously also some
interest of its own.
Our ﬁndings can also be juxtaposed with those concerning market prominence. We
ﬁnd that a strict prominence order will arise. As buyers search eﬃciently in equilibrium, it
is the frictions and not the price that determine the order in which the buyers search. The
prominent seller is faster and has, therefore, higher prices and higher proﬁt. In Armstrong
9The assumption is in accordance with the observation that many buyers are quite happy to search for
a bit, but not in extreme amounts: they tire our or run out of time. To put is diﬀerently, the search cost
is zero for t ∈ [0, 1] and inﬁnity for t > 1.
10Note that this extreme form of search cost g(t) ∈ {0,∞} is a special case of convex search cost g(t)
in search time t as in Ellison and Wolitzky (2012). The mechanism that renders obfuscation worthwhile
is not the same, however. In their case, if the ﬁrst price is found slowly, the expected cost of the second
search is higher since the change is the cost that is due, g(t+Δ)− g(t), increases with time, for any given
Δ. In our case, if the ﬁrst price is found slowly, the expected gain of the second search is lower since the
chance of ﬁnding another price, 1− eθ(1−t), decreases with time.
11Observe the 0-∞ search cost also strips the stores from, what some might feel is, too strong control
for the ﬁrm over how many times a ”searcher” (with positive cost of search) pays a visit to a store, which
would, otherwise, frequently, be one; the sellers lose proﬁts if they let the buyers search more. Yet, see
an example in Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) for a more complex search pattern where, as a novelty to this
model class, some of the ”searchers” conduct a single search but others, who obtain a price quote from the
intermediate range of price distribution, search multiple stores.
12It was pointed out to us that our model has some familiarity not only with sequential search models
but also with non-sequential search models; yet, it is not nested any of these model classes. See Baye et al.
(2006) for a paper with both of these approaches.
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et al. (2009) and Rhodes (2011), the non-prominent seller has a higher price whereas, in
Arbatskaya (2007); Wilson (2010), it is the other way.
Our model has also connections with competitive search models a` la Moen (1997);
Peters (2000, 1991) and Burdett et al. (2001). We analyze a market where the sellers
commit to frictions, that indirectly advertize the price. Competitive search models explore
a market where the sellers commit to prices, that indirectly advertize the frictions. The
frictions are modeled by a Poisson process in both. Yet, competitive search equilibria are
usually constrained eﬃcient but our model is not.13
The paper is organized in the following way: The model is given in Section 2. Section
3 derives the equilibrium: a buyer’s search problem, a seller’s pricing problem and, ﬁnally,
a seller’s problem of choosing the frictions. Section 4 oﬀers some closing remarks.
4.2 Model
We analyze equilibria with endogenous frictions in a duopolistic market of simple price
search. To give an application, the frictions could be taken to represent the sellers’ long-
term investments in a particular search technology in their store (for consumer search
oﬄine) or webpage (for consumer search online).14
There are two sellers i ∈ {1, 2} and a unit mass of buyers B = [0, 1], each buyer with
a unit of free time t ∈ [0, 1]. Both sellers have an inﬁnite capacity in the products of the
kind the buyers search for. Every buyer is willing to buy exactly one product.
The products are homogenous.15 The unit production cost to a seller is normalized to
zero and the buyer unit value to one. Payoﬀs are linear in prices: if a mass Bi of buyers
trades with a seller for price pi, each buyer gets 1− pi and the seller Bipi.
The sellers choose their prices pi ∈ [0, 1] or, as equilibria are in randomized pricing
strategies here, their price distributions F i ∈ Δ [0, 1]. The sellers have also full control
13The so called Hosios (1990) condition is typically satisﬁed. Yet, see the models by Albrecht et al.
(2006) and Galenianos and Kircher (2009) in which each worker can apply for many jobs. The authors ﬁnd
that the equilibrium is not constrained eﬃcient. Note that also our model would be trivially eﬃcient if we
required that each buyer can visit one store at maximum, as typical in competitive search models. The
Diamond (1971) outcome would arise but every buyer would ﬁnd a good. This reiterates the idea that the
ineﬃciency in our case arises from the fact that the seller cannot fully extract the beneﬁts of low frictions
– with full monopoly power he could. It also suggests that, as frictions matter both for consumer inﬂow
and for consumer outﬂow, to get the big picture right, it is important to use a model with some consumer
turnover. Moreover, as the shortage or appropriate instruments is one possible source of ineﬃciency, it
might be interesting to extend the setting by allowing the sellers to use two instruments, one to manage
the inﬂow (”advertizing” instrument), the other one to manage the outﬂow (”obfuscation” instrument).
In our present model there is one instrument for both, the intensity of the Poisson process.
14The scrolls and the click-paths can be made either long or short by adjusting some elementary design
parameters and the complexity of the webpage content. The general navigation experience might be
controlled by other means such as a registration requirement, videos, ads etc.
15Or, if the products are diﬀerent, it is assumed that the consumer-speciﬁc match values remain hidden.
If the products are of diﬀerent qualities, it is assumed that the (ﬁxed) quality diﬀerences are oﬀset by
(ﬁxed) price diﬀerences such that the search is about the residual price variation.
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over the ”frictions” in their store θi ∈ [0,∞]. These frictions determine how the buyers
optimally search and how long it takes for a buyer on average to ﬁnd a product in a given
store.
Search is a random gradual process. It goes on in the store where the buyer is at the
moment. As the key diﬀerence to previous models of search frictions, (i) the buyers search
under a deadline and (ii) the prices in the stores, pi, are not found immediately once a
buyer enters a store but after an uncertain wait time which is given by the exponential
distribution, Exp(θi); the intensity parameter θi is the seller’s decision variable.
A buyer’s search cost is zero for t ≤ 1 (before the deadline d = 1) and inﬁnite for t > 1
(after the deadline d = 1). For every point in time t ∈ [0, 1], the buyers can thus decide
afresh weather to search at seller i = 1 or at seller i = 2. At seller one, the price p1 is
found at Poisson rate θ1 whereas, at seller two, the price p2 is found at Poisson rate θ2.
No other restrictions apply: the buyers can switch the seller freely on the go.16,17
The precise timing is as follows:18
1. In stage one, the sellers (simultaneously) ﬁx the rates θ = (θ1, θ2). They become
common knowledge immediately thereafter.
2. In stage two, the sellers (simultaneously) ﬁx the prices p = (p1, p2). They are the
sellers’ private information until discovered.
3. In stage three, the buyers search the prices while time runs from t = 0 to t = d. For
any point in time t ∈ [0, d), a buyer chooses whether to search at seller one or at
seller two, in other words, whether to switch the seller or to continue with the same
one. The ﬁnal purchase decisions will be made at time t = d.
Thus, altogether, we have a three stage extensive game with a dynamic program em-
bedded in the ﬁnal stage. Or, equivalently for this case, a two stage game where, ﬁrst,
the sellers publicly commit to the frictions and, then, the sellers choose their prices (their
randomized pricing strategies) and the buyers select their seller (their sequential search
strategies).19,20
16As a result, they can also recall the prices they have so far observed without any further cost, as long
as they have time.
17The exponential distribution Exp(θ) is the standard way to model an uncertain wait time. If the wait
time is exponential, the number of occurrences taking place during any interval can be modeled by the
Poisson process P (θ).
18Note that our model is quite similar to the one we have in Ha¨ma¨la¨inen (2015) but now there is one
price for one store – not either one, two, or beyond – and here the in-store frictions are a decision variable
in stead of a parameter.
19Observe that like in Wilson (2010) it is important for the sellers to commit to the frictions (as said,
they represent here a long-term investment in a particular search technology within store). Namely, if it
was feasible, a non-prominent seller would prefer to serve immediately all the buyers who visit its store.
If the buyers knew this, the seller would no longer be the last in the line. For that case, there might not
exist an equilibrium in pure strategies for frictions; a solution might involve mixed frictions.
20The model is not equivalent with a strategic game in which the sellers choose a distribution of prices
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Next, this game is solved by backwards induction, starting from the prices and the
search and, then, moving on to the ﬁrst stage in which the sellers determine their frictions.
4.3 Equilibria
4.3.1 Buyer’s problem: Search
A buyer’s problem is captured by the following Bellman equation:
Vt := maxi=1,2V
i
t = maxi=1,2
(
θidt
(
(1− e−θ−i(1−t))(1− E(p|Fmin))
+ e−θ
−i(1−t)(1− E(p|F i))
)
+ (1− θidt)Vt+dt
)
. (4.1)
Recall the buyers can switch the seller free of cost whenever they want. Thus, when
no price is found, a buyer will search at seller i at moment t if the continuation value V it
(of being at seller i at time t) is at least as large as the continuation value V −it (of being
at seller −i at time t).21 When a price is found, the buyer will obviously switch the seller
because that is the only store where they could still ﬁnd a lower price. In continuation,
for probability 1 − e−θ−i(1−t), she will ﬁnd it (and buys for the minimum of pi and p−i)
and, for probability e−θ−i(1−t), she will fail to ﬁnd it (and buys for pi).
Note that it is without loss of generality to assume that θ1 ≥ θ2. In other words,
we can refer to seller one as the faster seller and seller two as the slower seller from here
on. The expected price at the faster seller is denoted by E(p|F 1), the expected price at
the slower seller is denoted by E(p|F 2), and the expected minimum of the two prices by
E(p|Fmin).
Generally, three cases are possible: (i) the faster seller could have a lower expected
price, (ii) both stores could look the same or (iii) the faster seller could have a higher
expected price. The buyer’s search problem is trivial in the ﬁrst case and in the second
one; the interesting case in the third one where we have a tradeoﬀ between frictions and
the price.
To determine how ties in the buyer’s problem are handled, we make the following
assumption:
Assumption 4 The buyers do not switch if they are indiﬀerent between the sellers.
This implies that we only need to focus on where the buyers start their search and
Δ [0, 1] and a distribution of rates Δ [0,∞] and the buyers choose a search plan. Indeed, the reason why
the Bertrand equilibrium is eliminated is that we let the sellers ﬁrst choose the rates and only then the
prices. Note however that, even in this modiﬁcation with simultaneous moves, the Bertrand outcome is
not robust to a slight tremble in a price pi: that would make θ−i > 0 and p−i > 0 a proﬁtable deviation.
21Hence, V it is the continuation value of search at seller i at moment t assuming no price is found.
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whether they have an incentive switch the seller at some time point t ∈ (0, 1) before the
deadline, provided they have not found a price yet. Once they discover a price, they of
course switch the seller to ﬁnd the only remaining price quote. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that
the following holds:22
Lemma 12 The buyers switch the seller only once a price is found.
(i) If θi
(
1− E(p|F i)) > θ−i (1− E(p|F−i)), the buyers start from seller i = 1, 2; they
search there until they ﬁnd its price.
(ii) If θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1)) = θ2 (1− E(p|F 2)), the buyers could start from either seller; they
search there until they ﬁnd its price.
The buyer continuation value is given by
Vt =
θi
θi − θ−i
(
e−θ
−i(1−t) − e−θi(1−t)
)
(E(p|Fmin)− E(p|F i))
+
(
1− e−θi(1−t)
)
(1− E(p|Fmin)) ,
for θi = θ−i, and
Vt =θ
ie−θ
i(1−t)(E(p|Fmin)− E(p|F i))
+
(
1− e−θi(1−t)
)
(1− E(p|Fmin)) ,
for θi = θ−i.
Proof. See Appendix. 
The interplay of frictions and search will ultimately partition the set of buyers as
B = B∅ ∪B1 ∪B2 ∪B1,2,
or, with the usual abuse of notation equating the subsets of B with their mass, as
1 = B∅ +B1 +B2 +B1,2,
where the buyers B∅ fail to ﬁnd any price, the buyers Bi (”captive buyers” or ”uninformed
consumers”) ﬁnd price pi from store i, and the buyers B1,2 (”shoppers” or ”informed
consumers”) ﬁnd both of the two prices.
These sets are easy to determine now. We start by denoting the fraction of buyers who
start from seller i = 1 by t1 and the rest who start from seller i = 2 by t2 = 1 − t1. The
two of them are captured by t =
(
t1, t2
)
.
Thus, the number of buyers who fail to ﬁnd any price is
22We use this later to proof that, in equilibrium, buyers always search eﬃciently.
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B∅ = t1e−θ
1
+ t2e−θ
2
,
and the number of trades is equal to
1−B∅ = 1− t1e−θ
1 − t2e−θ2 .
The numbers of captive buyers to the sellers are
B1 = t
1θe−θ and B2 = t2θe−θ, for θ = θ1 = θ2, (4.2)
and
B1 = t
1
∫ 1
0
e−θ
2(1−τ)θ1e−θ
1τdτ = t1
θ1
θ2 − θ1
(
e−θ
1 − e−θ2),
=
t1θ1
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1) = θ1
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2 −B∅
)
, for θ1 = θ2 (4.3)
and
B2 = t
2
∫ 1
0
e−θ
1(1−τ)θ2e−θ
2τdτ = t2
θ2
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1),
=
t2θ2
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1) = θ2
θ1 − θ2
(
B∅ − e−θ
1)
, for θ2 = θ1 (4.4)
where the terms in the integrands are e−θiτ , the probability that the buyer does not ﬁnd
store i’s price during [0, τ ], θi, the probability that the buyer succeeds to discover this
price exactly at moment t = τ , and e−θ−i(1−τ), the probability that the buyer does not
ﬁnd store −i’s price during [τ, 1]. The shoppers are just the residual
B1,2 = 1−B∅ −B1 −B2. (4.5)
These notions will be used repeatedly in the sellers’ problem. It is clear from above
that
∂B1,2
∂t1
= 0, ∂B∅
∂t1
< 0, ∂B1
∂t1
> 0 and ∂B2
∂t1
< 0. Thus, if buyers search more eﬃciently,
the number of shoppers does not change but the number of trades increases and the faster
store gets more and the slower store gets less of captive buyers.
To maximize the number of trades, the buyers should search in the faster store at least
until one price is found. That is, if store i = 1 is faster than store i = 2, θ1 > θ2, buyers
search eﬃciently iﬀ they all start from store i = 1, t1 = 1− t2 = 1.
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4.3.2 Seller’s problem: Prices
Now, for any partition {B∅, B1, B2, B1,2}, the proﬁt Πi to the seller i is decomposed as
Πi(pi) =
(
Bi +B1,2(1− F−i(pi))
)
pi.
Given a way the buyers search (as captured by the partition into B∅, B1, B2 and B1,2),
the demand has thus a price-insensitive part (the 1st term in the brackets on the rhs)
and a price-sensitive part (the 2nd term in the brackets on the rhs). The captive buyers
Bi, who have only the price quote p
i, buy from seller i = 1, 2 whatever the price pi. The
shoppers B1,2, who have discovered both price p
1 and price p2, buy from seller i = 1 iﬀ
p2 is above p1; it takes place for probability (1− F 2(p1)).
Note particularly that, as in Varian (1980); Stahl (1989) and, say, as in Wilson (2010),
search aﬀects proﬁt only through the number of captive buyers Bi, where i = 1, 2, and
the number of shoppers B1,2. Moreover, the numbers of captive buyers Bi and shoppers
B1,2 are aﬀected only by the expected prices F = (F
i, F−i) but not by the realized prices
p = (pi, p−i); the buyer’s search problem is non-trivial only when no price is found yet.
Once that happens, they of course to switch the seller.
Hence, after the rates θ have been set, the equilibrium of the subgame that follows is
a ﬁxed point between the maximal sequential search strategies t ∈ BR(F) for the buyers
and the maximal randomized pricing strategies F ∈ BR(t) for the stores. This entails
that the analysis of equilibrium pricing strategies goes along the same lines as in Varian
(1980) and Stahl (1989) and, basically, as in Wilson (2010). The diﬀerence is only that
now the numbers of captive buyers and shoppers are determined in equilibrium: In the
preceding literature, they were given by a parameter.23
Lemma 13 Assume Bi > 0, either for seller i = 1 or seller i = 2, and B1,2 > 0. Then,
the following hold true in any equilibrium:
1. The sellers use randomized pricing strategies: F 1 and F 2.
2. Both F 1 and F 2 have the same interval support supp(F ) =
[
p, p¯
]
, where 0 < p <
p¯ = 1.
3. Neither has an atom at p ∈ [p, 1): limx→p−F i(x) = F i(p) for all p < 1 and i = 1, 2.
4. If F 1 has an atom at p = 1, F 2 has not and, if F 2 has an atom at p = 1, F 1 has
not.
Proof. See Appendix. 
23The support is deﬁned as supp(F ) = cl {x|f(x) > 0}, where cl denotes a closure of a set and f is a
point probability or a density function.
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Observe also that, if B1,2 = 0 (no shoppers; would arise under θ = (0, 0), θ = (a, 0)
and θ = (0, a) for a ≥ 0), the sellers use a pure strategy pi = 1 (p : MR(p) = MC(p), this
is basically the Diamond outcome) or, if B1,2 > 0 but B1 = B2 = 0 (no captive buyers;
would arise under θ = (∞,∞)), the sellers use a pure strategy pi = 0 (p = MC, this is
basically the Bertrand outcome). That is, our model nests the Diamond outcome and the
Bertrand outcome as special cases for appropriate θ.
Lemma 14 Consider θ =
(
θi, θ−i
)
and t =
(
t1, t2
)
such that B1 ≥ B2 and B1,2 > 0.
Then, there exists a unique equilibrium price distribution F =
(
F 1, F 2
)
where
F 1(p) =
B2 +B1,2
B1,2
− Π
2
B1,2
1
p
for all p ∈ [p, 1) ,
with an atom α := B1−B2B1+B1,2 ≤ p at the highest price p = 1, and
F 2(p) =
B1 +B1,2
B1,2
− Π
1
B1,2
1
p
, for all p ∈ [p, 1] .
The lowest price is given by p = B1B1+B1,2 and the sellers’ proﬁts by
Π1 = B1 and Π
2 = pB2 + (1− p)B1 ≤ B1
Proof. See Appendix. 
The store with more captive buyers has higher proﬁt and prices. It mixes between
using random discount prices p1 < 1, to compete with the other store over the shoppers,
and the monopoly price p1 = 1, to tax its numerous captive buyers. The other store, who
has fewer captive buyers, is randomizing only the size of the discount, p2 < 1.
In other words, the stores’ equilibrium pricing strategies are wired so as to let them
specialize in diﬀerent groups of buyers. This aligns the sellers’ payoﬀs and helps to relax
the price competition. The proﬁt to the high-proﬁt seller, Π1, equals the number of captive
buyers it attracts, B1, whereas the proﬁt to the low-proﬁt seller, Π
2, is a weighted average
of its own captive buyers, B2, and the other store’s captive buyers, B1.
The weights, p = B1B1+B1,2 and 1 − p =
B1,2
B1+B1,2
could be taken as a measure of how
close the market is to the Bertrand outcome (arising for B1,2 > 0,B1 = B2 = 0) and to
the Diamond outcome (arising for B1,2 = 0,B1 > 0, B2 ≥ 0) – or the competitiveness and
the relative standing of the sellers and the buyers in the market.
This entails that, if the sellers’ have high ”bargaining power”, as captured by a high
p, the sellers’ have less aligned preferences (they compete more ﬁercely) but, if the sellers’
have low ”bargaining power”, a low p, they have more aligned preferences (they compete
less ﬁercely). As it later turns out, the outcome that obtains can therefore be regarded as
a compromise of some sort between the two stores and the buyers.24
24In particular, we show that in equilibrium p = 1/2.
Essays on Market Dynamics and Frictions 165
It is now straightforward to calculate the expected prices that we need:
E(p|F 1) =
∫ 1
p
pf1(p)dp+ α =
Π2
B1,2
ln
(
1
p
)
+ α
≥ E(p|F 2) =
∫ 1
p
pf2(p)dp =
Π1
B1,2
ln
(
1
p
)
.
The ﬁrm who is capable of attracting more captive buyers extracts a higher proﬁt
and has an incentive to set higher prices in expectation. While it tends to oﬀer a lower
discount price, when it does so, Π
2
B1,2
ln
(
1
p
)
≤ Π1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
, it also uses the monopoly price
more often, α ≥ 0. It is next an easy three line homework to show that the latter eﬀect
oﬀsets the former. To calculate the expected minimum of the two prices E(p|Fmin), note
that the distribution function Fmin is given by
1− Fmin =
(
1− F 1) (1− F 2)
and the density function by
fmin = f
2
(
1− F 1)+ f1 (1− F 2) .
A direct calculation results in25
E(p|Fmin) =
∫ 1
p
p
(
f2(p)
(
1− F 1(p))+ f1(p) (1− F 2(p))) dp
=
B1Π
1 +B2Π
2
B21,2
ln
(
1
p
)
+
Π1Π2
B21,2
(
1− p
p
)
.
It is also noteworthy that, by Equations 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5, B1, B2 and B1,2 are
determined by θ and t uniquely whereas, by Lemma 14, F is dependent on θ and t only
through B1, B2 and B1,2. This allows us to construct a hypothetical price distribution
F(θ, t) for any (θ, t) by ﬁrst calculating the associated B1(θ, t), B2(θ, t) and B1,2(θ, t)
and then the induced F(B1, B2, B1,2). We next use this property to characterize the ﬁxed
point between optimal search and optimal prices.
Proposition 17 For any θ, there exists a unique ﬁxed point in search and prices (t,F)
where F = F(θ, t) and t = t(θ,F).
In particular,
1. if θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1(θ, (1, 0)))) ≥ θ2 (1− E(p|F 2(θ, (1, 0)))), then t1 = 1 − t2 = 1,
25Note that a linear approximation of ln(p) around p = 1 yields
1−p
p
≥ ln
(
1
p
)
. This implies that
α ≥ Π1−Π2
B1,2
ln
(
1
p
)
⇐⇒ E(p|F 1) ≥ E(p|F 2).
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B1 > B2 = 0 and E(p|F 1) > E(p|F 2), and
2. if θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1(θ, (1, 0)))) < θ2 (1− E(p|F 2(θ, (1, 0)))), then t1 = 1 − t2 < 1,
B1 ≥ B2 > 0.
In this latter case, t = t(θ,F) is the unique solution to
θ2
θ1
=
1− E(p|F 1(θ, t))
1− E(p|F 2(θ, t)) = 1− α(θ, t).
Proof. See Appendix. 
Corollary 5 (Eﬀects of frictions on search eﬃciency) The buyers search eﬃciently if the
sellers are either distinctly diﬀerent in terms of their frictions, θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1(θ, (1, 0)))) ≥
θ2
(
1− E(p|F 2(θ, (1, 0)))), or exactly similar, θ1 = θ2.
Corollary 6 (Eﬀects of frictions on seller prominence) Lower frictions grant a seller
more prominent position in search and thus higher prices and proﬁt: if θi ≥ θ−i, then
Bi ≥ B−i implying Πi ≥ Π−i and E(p|F i) ≥ E(p|F−i).
In other words, candidate equilibria are of two kinds: If the sellers are equally fast,
the equilibrium is symmetric but, if seller one is faster than seller two, the equilibrium is
asymmetric.
4.3.3 Seller’s problem: Frictions
This section carries our main results. We ﬁrst prove that there exists no equilibrium in
symmetric pure strategies for in-store frictions. This also rules out the Diamond equilib-
rium and the Bertrand equilibrium and makes it possible to divide our analysis into the
prominent seller’s problem and the non-prominent seller’s problem. Moreover, we ﬁnd
that in an equilibrium, frictions are signiﬁcantly lower at the former seller than at the lat-
ter seller. This entails that buyers always search eﬃciently, from the prominent seller to
the non-prominent seller. Despite this ﬁnding, we show that (i) any equilibrium features
ineﬃcient frictions (this comes from the prominent seller’s problem) and (ii) the featured
frictions are such that the shares of informed consumers and uninformed consumers are
precisely the same in the market (this comes from the non-prominent seller’s problem).
Finally, we show that there exist two pure equilibria, that we then describe.
We begin with a strong result:
Lemma 15 There exist no equilibrium in pure strategies for frictions, θ2 ≤ θ1 < ∞,
where the buyers are indiﬀerent between the sellers, t1 = 1− t2 < 1.
In other words, there is a clear prominence order between the sellers:
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Corollary 7 In an equilibrium, the stores diﬀer so much in frictions, θ2  θ1 < ∞,
that all buyers start from the faster (prominent) seller, t1 = 1− t2 = 1.
Corollary 8 There exist no equilibrium in symmetric pure strategies for frictions θ ∈
[0,∞)2.
We can therefore also rule out the Bertrand equilibrium and the Diamond equilibrium.
Lemma 16 There exist no Bertrand equilibrium, where either of the two sellers gener-
ates no frictions and the market price equals zero.
Proof.26 The Bertrand equilibrium requires that both seller choose zero frictions θ =
(∞,∞). But now both sellers gain if one deviates to some ﬁnite rate θ because it raises
their proﬁt up from zero to
BiB1,2
Bi+B1,2
=
(
1− e−θ) e−θ (to the deviator, who has t−i = 0 for
its markedly higher frictions θ−i < ∞) and Bi = 1 − e−θ (to the non-deviator, who has
ti = 1 for its markedly lower frictions θi = ∞). 
Lemma 17 There exist no Diamond equilibrium, where at least one seller generates
inﬁnite frictions and the market price equals one.
Proof. Since the buyers always search, the Diamond equilibrium requires that at least
one seller is practically out of the market due to its inﬁnite frictions, θ =
(
θi, 0
)
,
(
0, θ−i
)
.
As the seller serves no buyers, its proﬁt equals zero. Yet, for any lower level of frictions,
the seller’s proﬁt is positive, Πi = Bi > 0 or Π
−i = pB−i +
(
1− p)Bi > 0. There is hence
a proﬁtable deviation to a lower θ′ < ∞. 
Since we are interested primarily in situations in which frictions represent the sellers’
public long-term choices, we focus here on pure equilibria where the sellers use a ﬁxed
level of frictions in stead of mixed equilibria where the sellers randomize between diﬀerent
levels. In an equilibrium in pure strategies for frictions, we just proved that we must
have a prominent seller and a non prominent seller in the market. Next, we analyze their
problems one by one.
The frictions θ1 ∈ [0,∞] chosen by the prominent (non prominent) seller have to be the
best response to the frictions chosen by the non prominent (prominent) seller θ2 ∈ [0,∞]).
Additionally, we need to make sure the prominent seller wants to be prominent and the
non-prominent wishes to remain non-prominent. This will be checked after getting the
best responses conditional on the assumption that one seller is prominent and the other
one is non prominent.
Prominent seller’s problem
To analyze the tradeoﬀs that the prominent seller is facing, we derive in this subsection
seller i = 1’s conditional best response to frictions θ2 assuming that seller i = 1 is so much
26The proof of Lemma 15 covers also this case but, as this is much shorter, we display it also.
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faster than seller i = 2, θ1  θ2, that t1 = 1− t2 = 1. To facilitate the exposition, we ﬁnd
it useful to introduce the following reparametrizations: ρ = θ2/θ1 ≤ 1 and δ = θ1−θ2 ≥ 0.
Thus, the prominent seller maximizes its proﬁt B1
max
θ1
θ1e−θ
1 eδ − 1
δ
such that the prominence order stays the same:
ρ ≤ 1− α(θ1, θ2).
We show in the Appendix that whether the constraint is slack or binds, the prominent
seller’s problem has a unique solution θ1 < ∞ which satisﬁes the following complementary
slackness constraints (one binds and the other one is slack)
eδ − 1
δ
≥ ρ−1 ≥ 1
1− α(θ1, θ2) . (4.6)
Moreover, if the latter constraint is slack, the solution θ1(θ2) is decreasing in θ2
whereas, if the latter constraint binds, the solution θ1(θ2) is increasing in θ2.27 The
ﬁniteness of θ1(θ2) has the following noteworthy implication:
Proposition 18 There exist no eﬃcient equilibria.
Proof. Appendix. 
This result arises because the prominent seller is facing a tradeoﬀ between lowering the
frictions to increase ”inﬂow” to the store (the number of buyers who have found its own
price p1) and raising the frictions to decrease the ”outﬂow” form the store (the number
of buyers who have found both prices p1 and p2). Stronger inﬂow is beneﬁcial, stronger
outﬂow is detrimental. Since the store has just one instrument to aﬀect this turnover rate,
it is best oﬀ with moderate frictions. It has no incentive to get rid of them altogether. In
consequence, some of the buyers necessarily fail to ﬁnd a price before their deadline; all
the gains from trade are not commensurated.
It is noteworthy that the prominent seller’s proﬁt is a product of θ1e−θ1 and e
δ−1
δ .
The ﬁrst one, θ1e−θ1 ≥ 0, is the number of buyers who would ﬁnd just one price quote if
the frictions were the same in both stores, θ1 = θ2. The second one, e
δ−1
δ ≥ 1, represents
the additional frictions in discovering the second price quote, which arise from the fact
that the prominent store has lower frictions than the non prominent store, θ1 > θ2. The
former factor is maximized by θ1 = 1, minimized by θ1 = 0 and approaches its minimum
for θ1 → ∞ whereas the latter one is the larger for a larger diﬀerence θ1− θ2. The seller’s
proﬁt is thus maximized by some θ1(θ2) ∈ (1,∞).
27See Appendix for the proof.
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Non-prominent seller’s problem
To analyze now the tradeoﬀs that the non prominent seller is facing, we derive in this
subsection seller i = 2’s conditional best response to frictions θ1 assuming that seller i = 1
is so much faster than seller i = 2, θ1  θ2, that t1 = 1− t2 = 1
The non prominent seller maximizes its proﬁt (1− p)B1
max
θ2
Π2
B1B1,2
B1 +B1,2
= max
θ2
Π2
B1B1,2
1−B∅
such that the prominence order stays the same:
ρ ≤ 1− α(θ1, θ2).
Note that the non prominent seller’s proﬁt is of the following very simple form
a(θ)b(θ)
a(θ) + b(θ)
where a(θ) and b(θ) are non negative constants. The maximum of this expression is
reached by choosing θ with the largest feasible a(θ) and b(θ) such that a(θ) = b(θ).28
For our particular case, where a(θ) = B1 and b(θ) = B1,2, the non prominent seller’s
problem has a unique solution θ2 > 0 which satisﬁes the following complementary slackness
constraints (one binds and the other one is slack)
B1 ≥ B1,2 and ρ ≤ 1− α(θ1, θ2) (4.7)
This is so because B1 > 0 and B1,2 = 0 for 0 = θ
2 < θ1 and because a reduction in
frictions at the non-prominent seller decreases the number of uninformed buyers B1 and
decreases the number of informed buyers 1−B1 −B∅
∂B1
∂θ2
< 0,
∂B∅
∂θ2
= 0,
∂B1,2
∂θ2
> 0.
Thus, any equilibrium is characterized by the following property:
Proposition 19 If ρ < 1− α(θ1, θ2), the number of informed buyers, B1,2, is equal to
the number of uninformed buyers, B1.
28Consider function f : f(a, b) = ab
a+b
and maximize it subject to the constraint that a(θ) = B1(θ)
and b(θ) = B1,2(θ) and B∅(θ) + B1(θ) + B1,2(θ) = 1 with θ
2 as the choice variable and θ1 as a ﬁxed
parameter. The ﬁrst order conditions are b
2
(a+b)2
= a
2
(a+b)2
and a + b = 1 − B∅. Solving these gives as a
solution a = b = (1−B∅)/2. The Hessian is negative semi-deﬁnite
H(f) =
(
1
(a+ b)3
)[−2b2 2ab
2ab −2a2
]
.
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If ρ = 1 − α(θ1, θ2), the number of informed buyers, B1,2, is weakly smaller than the
number of uninformed buyers, B1.
A sketch of a proof: Above. 
The non prominent seller has mixed incentives in choosing the frictions θ2: in prefers to
increase both the number of informed consumers B1,2 and that of uninformed consumers
B1. If it reduces the frictions by elevating θ
2, the ﬁrst one increases but the second one
goes down.
To balance these eﬀects, the non prominent seller has thus an incentive to make sure
the outcome is exactly in between the Bertrand equilibrium and the Diamond equilibrium
as measured by the relative numbers of informed consumers p = B1B1+B1,2 and uninformed
consumers 1− p = B1,2B1+B1,2 .
As with the prominent seller’s problem, we again ﬁnd that, if the constraint ρ ≤
1−α(θ1, θ2) is slack, the solution to the non prominent seller’s problem θ2(θ1) is decreasing
in θ1 whereas, if the constraint ρ ≤ 1−α(θ1, θ2) binds, the solution θ2(θ1) is increasing in
θ1.29
Fixed point
The sellers’ reaction curves are presented by Figure 4.1. They have a discontinuity at
(θ′, θ′) ≈ (2.33, 2.33) and they cross each other at (θ1, θ2)	 ≈ (2.76, 1.03) when θ1 ≥ θ2
(the assumed case) and at
(
θ1, θ2
)	 ≈ (1.03, 2.76) when θ2 ≥ θ1 (the inverse case).
Claim 2 The frictions are determined as a ﬁxed point of the sellers’ best response
mappings BRi(θ
−i) := supθi∈[0,∞]Πi(θi, θ−i) for which the following hold:
1. There exist a unique cutoﬀ for the frictions, θ′ ≈ 2.33 such that: if the other seller
if faster, θ−i < θ′, seller i’s best response is to become the prominent seller, i.e.,
BRi(θ
−i) > θ−i, and, if the other seller is slower, θ−i > θ′, seller i’s best response
is to become the non prominent seller, i.e., BRi(θ
−i) < θ−i.
2. The sellers’ best responses are single valued a.e., discontinuous only at the unique
cutoﬀ θ′, continuous decreasing when the constraint ρ ≤ 1 − α(θ1, θ2) is slack and
continuous increasing when the constraint ρ ≤ 1 − α(θ1, θ2) binds. They are also
convex, at least of the constraint ρ ≤ 1− α(θ1, θ2) is slack.
Proof. As for now, we rely on the numerical results presented in Figure 4.1 and the
knowledge of the best responses as derived in Subsections 4.3.3 and 4.3.3. We are conﬁdent
that it is possible to get also a full analytical proof. 
Next, we present an important existence result and lay out the key properties of the
equilibrium.
29See Appendix for the proof.
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Figure 4.1: Best response functions: zoom-out (left), zoom-in (right)
Proposition 20 There exist two equilibria in pure strategies for frictions, with the
same unique form: θ	 ≈ (1.03, 2.76) and θ	 ≈ (2.76, 1.03).
Proof. It is easy to ascertain that conditions (4.6) and (4.7) are satisﬁed and the
constraint ρ ≤ 1 − α(θ1, θ2) is slack for some θ	 in the neighborhood of (2.76, 1.03).
Otherwise, we rely on Figure 4.1 and Claim 2. 
Corollary 9 Both equilibria have the same unique form:
1. Frictions: there is a prominent seller with frictions θi = 2.76 and a non-prominent
seller with frictions θ−i = 1.03. The expected wait time at the former is about 36%
of the total time and the expected wait time at the latter is about 97% of the total
time.
2. Search: The buyers search in the prominent seller until they ﬁnd a price quote, ti = 1
and t−i = 0. 47 per cent of the buyers ﬁnd a price from both the prominent and the
non-prominent seller, B1,2 ≈ 0.47, and 47 per cent of the buyers ﬁnd a price from
the prominent seller only, Bi ≈ 0.47. 6 per cent of the buyers fail to ﬁnd a price,
B∅ ≈ 0.06.
3. Prices: The prominent seller oﬀers the monopoly price (p = 1) and a discount price
(p < 1) equally often, α = 0.5; the non prominent seller always oﬀers a discount
price. Given that a seller oﬀers a discount, the expected discount is 31 per cent of
the monopoly price at either seller; the largest such regularly used discount is 50 per
cent, p = 0.5.
4. Surplus sharing: The prominent seller is making the double of what the non-prominent
seller is making, Πi = Bi ≈ 0.47,Π−i = αB1,2 ≈ 0.5 · 0.47. The prominent seller
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gets half the surplus, the non-prominent seller gets a quarter and the buyers get a
quarter; 6 per cent of the cake is wasted.
Proof. An elementary calculation that uses the fact that θ ≈ (2.76, 1.03) and the
expressions that we have provided above for Bi(θ), B1,2(θ), B∅(θ), and E(p|F). 
This pattern of frictions is the unique one even if we increase or decrease the deadline.
In other words, the outcome is just the same in terms of prices and search if the buyers can
search for a decade or a minute. The sellers have an incentive to adjust the frictions such
that the number of trades and the informed consumers and the uninformed consumers is
constant. However, if there were no deadline, the Bertrand equilibrium would obtain and,
if the buyers had no time whatsoever, the Diamond equilibrium could obtain.
Remark 9 An identical equilibrium outcome arises whatever the deadline d < ∞ is as
long as it is ﬁnite: if (θi, θ−i) is an equilibrium when the search horizon is t ∈ [0, 1], then
( θ
i
d ,
θ−i
d ) is an equilibrium when the search horizon is t ∈ [0, d], and the other way.
Remark 10 There is a discontinuity in the equilibrium set as d → ∞ because, at
d = ∞, the Bertrand equilibrium with p ≡ 0 is the unique equilibrium.
Remark 11 There could be a discontinuity in the equilibrium set as d → 0 because, at
d = 0, the Diamond equilibrium with p ≡ 1 is another equilibrium.
Thus, the set of equilibria is invariant to ﬁnite translations in the deadline, which is
the only exogenous parameter in our model. The Bertrand equilibrium is possible only if
the buyers are extremely patient and the Diamond equilibrium if the buyers are extremely
impatient. Otherwise, the outcome is precisely in between these extremes in the sense
that there are exactly as many informed consumers as there are uninformed consumers.
4.4 Closing remarks
We introduce a novel model of price search that features endogenous frictions in-store,
modeled by the gradual arrival of price information within stores and deadlines. Assuming
that frictions represent a seller’s long-term investment in a particular search technology, we
ﬁnd that there exists a unique ineﬃcient equilibrium pattern. There is a prominent seller,
a non-prominent seller, and exactly equally many informed and uninformed consumers in
the market. The surplus loss amounts to 6 per cent of the cake, approximately.
A similar result arises as long as there is a deadline by which a buyer must stop. It
could be two seconds or two decades; that does not matter. It is because of this deadline
that the sellers gain if they slow down the searching consumers a bit – yet, not in extreme
amounts: If the frictions are very high, the buyers fail to ﬁnd anything but, if the frictions
are very low, the buyers become perfectly informed, which drives the stores into a price
war. Interestingly, as the deadline vanishes, the Bertrand equilibrium reappears.
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Our model is quite ﬂexible and appears well suited to many setups where consumers
are doing their shopping in an exploring, relaxed fashion but constrained by some sort of
a schedule. This is pertinent to online search: most people seem to enjoy it for the ﬁrst
bit but, unequivocally, not for ever. In Ha¨ma¨la¨inen (2015), we develop another variant of
this same model to analyze the retailers’ incentives to expand the number of items they
have in stock.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 12. Note that, as the buyers can switch the seller freely any moment,
their continuation value conditional on not having found a price is the same whether the
buyer is currently at seller i = 1 or at seller i = 2. In other words, Vt+dt in equation (4.1)
is independent of i = 1, 2. This implies that, to maximize the buyer value, Vt, the buyer
should search in the store who is oﬀering the largest marginal descent in buyer value, V˙t:
argmaxiV
i
t = argminiV˙
i
t .
Now, provided the buyer stays in store i during the next short time interval [t, t+ dt],
based on (4.1) the change in the buyer value can be written as follows:30
Vt+dt − V it
dt
=− θi
(
e−θ
−i(1−t−dt)(1− E(p|F i)− Vt+dt)
+ (1− e−θ−i(1−t−dt))(1− E(p|Fmin)− Vt+dt)
)
→ V˙ it = −θi
(
e−θ
−i(1−t)(E(p|Fmin)− E(p|F i)) + (1− E(p|Fmin)− Vt)
)
.
Obviously, the buyer value is positive, V it ≥ 0, and the change in buyer value is
negative, V˙ it ≤ 0, for any t and i. Otherwise, it would pay oﬀ to stay idle. Altogether, this
entails that, for any point in time t ∈ [0, 1], a buyer who has not yet discovered a price
chooses store i = 1 over store i = 2 iﬀ
θ1e−θ
2(1−t)(CS1 − Vt) + θ1(1− e−θ2(1−t))(CSmin − Vt) ≥
θ2e−θ
1(1−t)(CS2 − Vt) + θ2(1− e−θ2(1−t))(CSmin − Vt), (4.8)
or, iﬀ
30Observe that this time derivative is well deﬁned as long as the buyer does not change the store at t.
Furthermore, even if the buyer does switch the store at t, as long as the buyer does not change the stores
inﬁnitely often, we can still use these same expressions which then refer to the right derivative. It is the
right derivative that matters for buyers’ search incentives.
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θ1e−θ
2(1−t)(CS1 − CSmin) + θ1(CSmin − Vt) ≥
θ2e−θ
1(1−t)(CS2 − CSmin) + θ2(CSmin − Vt), (4.9)
where
CS1 := 1− E(p|F 1), CS2 := 1− E(p|F 2), CSmin := 1− E(p|Fmin).
To see which store the buyers actually prefer, we next analyze three cases, from simpler
to more complex:
Case 1. Suppose the (faster) seller i = 1 has lower prices than the (slower) seller
i = 2: θ1 ≥ θ2 and E(p|F 2) ≥ E(p|F 1) ≥ E(p|Fmin) implying CSmin ≥ CS1 ≥ CS2.
Then, by reference to condition (4.8), the buyer prefers seller one to seller two as
θ1e−θ
2(1−t)(1− E(p|F 1)− Vt)− θ2e−θ1(1−t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤θ1e−θ2(1−t)
(1− E(p|F 2)− Vt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1−E(p|F 1)−Vt
≥ 0
and
(
θ1(1− e−θ2(1−t))− θ2(1− e−θ2(1−t))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(1− E(p|Fmin)− Vt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ 0.
The latter one is always satisﬁed because the function
f : f(θ) =
θ
1− e−θ(1−t)
is increasing in θ ∈ [0,∞) for any t ∈ [0, 1).
Case 2. Suppose the sellers are equally fast but seller i = 1 has lower prices than
seller i = 2, θ1 = θ2 and E(p|F 2) ≥ E(p|F 1) ≥ E(p|Fmin) implying CSmin ≥ CS2 = CS1.
Again, by reference to condition (4.8), the buyers prefer seller i = 1 over seller i = 2 as
θe−θ(1−t)(1− E(p|F 1)− Vt)− θe−θ(1−t)(1− E(p|F 2)− Vt) ≥ 0
and
(
θ(1− e−θ(1−t))− θ(1− e−θ(1−t))
)
(1− E(p|Fmin)− Vt) = 0.
Case 3. Suppose the (faster) seller i = 1 has higher prices than the (slower) seller
i = 2: θ1 ≥ θ2 and E(p|F 1) ≥ E(p|F 2) ≥ E(p|Fmin) implying CSmin ≥ CS2 ≥ CS1.
This last case is next handled by showing that, if a buyer prefers one store over the
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other at a given point in time, t′, this is her preference order also later, for any t > t′.31
To proceed, suppose that the buyer prefers store one to store two at moment t:
θ1e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)+ θ1 (CSmin − Vt)
−θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)− θ2 (CSmin − Vt) ≥ 0
and
V˙t = −θ1e−θ2(1−t)
(
CS1 − CSmin
)− θ1 (CSmin − Vt) .
Now, to see whether the buyer’s preference for store i = 1 over store i = 2 becomes
stronger or weaker over time, we diﬀerentiate (4.9) with respect to time to obtain
θ1θ2e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)− θ1V˙t
− θ1θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)+ θ2V˙t
= θ1θ2e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)− θ1θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)
+
(
θ1 − θ2) (θ1e−θ2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)+ θ1 (CSmin − Vt))
+ θ1θ2 (CSmin − Vt)− θ1θ2 (CSmin − Vt)
= θ1
(
θ1e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)+ θ1 (CSmin − Vt))
− θ1
(
θ2e−θ
1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)+ θ2 (CSmin − Vt)) ≥ 0
This implies that, if the buyer is in store i = 1, then the buyer also stays in store i = 1.
A similar calculation demonstrates that, if the buyer is in store i = 2, then the buyer also
stays in store i = 2. For this case, suppose that the buyer prefers store two to store one
at moment t:
θ1e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)+ θ1 (CSmin − Vt)
−θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)− θ2 (CSmin − Vt) ≤ 0
and
V˙t = −θ2e−θ1(1−t)
(
CS2 − CSmin
)− θ2 (CSmin − Vt) .
Again, to see whether the buyer’s preference for store i = 1 over store i = 2 becomes
stronger or weaker over time, we diﬀerentiate (4.9) with respect to time to obtain
31One could say that the stores are absorbing.
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θ1θ2e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)− θ1V˙t
− θ1θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)+ θ2V˙t
= θ1θ2e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)− θ1θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)
+
(
θ1 − θ2) (θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)+ θ2 (CSmin − Vt))
+ θ1θ2 (CSmin − Vt)− θ1θ2 (CSmin − Vt)
= θ2
(
θ1e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)+ θ1 (CSmin − Vt))
− θ2
(
θ2e−θ
1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)+ θ2 (CSmin − Vt)) ≤ 0
In other words, if the buyer is in store i = 2, then the buyer also stays in store
i = 2. Note also that the derivative V˙t is well deﬁned in both cases since the buyer has no
incentive to switch the seller: by continuity of (4.1), there exist no kink in Vt unless the
buyer changes the store.
Altogether, this implies that the buyers have no incentive to switch the store before
they ﬁnd a price. They start their search from the store which they would choose at the
very last moment, had they not found a price by that time. They continue with that store
until they have found its price.
To identify this store where the buyers ﬁrst search, note that, at the deadline t = 1,
buyers prefer store i = 1 over store i = 2 iﬀ the following condition holds
θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1) ≥ θ2 (1− E(p|F 2) .
Observe that this condition is satisﬁed automatically for Case 1 and Case 2 in which
the buyers always prefer store i = 1 over store i = 2. It thus covers them all.
We next need to solve explicitly for the buyer value. We start by assuming that buyers
prefer store i over store −i. Note ﬁrst that
V˙ it = −θi
(
e−θ
−i(1−t)(CS1 − CSmin) + CSmin − Vt
)
deﬁnes a linear ﬁrst order diﬀerential equation
V˙ it − θiVt = −θi
(
e−θ
−i(1−t)(CS1 − CSmin) + CSmin.
)
A solution to the related homogenous equation is
Vt = ce
θit,
where c is a constant. To solve the non-homogenous equation, we can use the variation of
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the constants in which we let the constants c(t) be dependent on time such that
Vt = c(t)e
θit, V˙t = c(t)θ
ieθ
it + c′(t)eθ
it.
This implies that
V˙ it + θ
iVt = c
′(t)eθ
it = −θi
(
e−θ
−i(1−t)(CSi − CSmin) + CSmin
)
and
c(t) = −
∫
θie−θ
ite−θ
−i(1−t)(CSi − CSmin)dt−
∫
θie−θ
itCSmindt+ d,
=
θi
θi − θ−i e
−θite−θ
−i(1−t)(CSi − CSmin) + e−θitCSmin + d,
where d is a constant. As a result, the buyer value is given by
Vt =
(
θi
θi − θ−i e
−θite−θ
−i(1−t)(CSi − CSmin) + e−θitCSmin + d
)
eθ
it,
where the constant d is determined by the terminal condition
V1 =
θi
θi − θ−i (CS
i − CSmin) + CSmin + deθi = 0
implying
deθ
i
= − θ
i
θi − θ−i (CS
i − CSmin)− CSmin.
A general solution to the terminal value problem is given by
Vt = V
i
t =
θi
θi − θ−i
(
e−θ
−i(1−t) − e−θi(1−t)
)
(CSi − CSmin) +
(
1− e−θi(1−t)
)
CSmin
= Bti
(
CSi − CSmin
)
+
(
1−Bt∅
)
CSmin = B
t
iCS
i +Bt1,2CSmin, (4.10)
where
Bti =
θi
θi − θ−i
(
e−θ
−i(1−t) − e−θi(1−t)
)
, for θi = θ−i,
Bti = e
θi(1−t), for θi = θ−i,
Bt1,2 =
(
1− e−θi(1−t)
)
.
Note that, the last expression (4.10) is applicable to generalize the buyer value from case
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θi = θ−i also to the other case where θi = θ−i. Indeed, when the frictions are identical
in both stores, it is particularly easy to see that the buyer value must be just a weighted
average of buyer value if she ﬁnds one price (which occurs for probability Bti) and that if
she ﬁnds two prices (which occurs for probability Bt1,2). 
Proof of Lemma 13. We assume in this proof that B1,2 > 0 (there are shoppers) and
B1 > 0 or B2 > 0 (there are captive buyers). We also take ε > 0 to represent some tiny
(inﬁnitesimal) number.
First, we analyze three cases to prove by contradiction that both sellers mix in equi-
librium. In doing so, we make the assumption that one of the sellers uses a pure strategy
pi. Case 1: pi < min supp(F−i). As the demand Bi + B1,2 > 0 is unchanged as long as
pi stays below min supp(F−i), there is a proﬁtable deviation for seller i from price pi to
price pi + ε. Case 2: pi > max supp(F−i). As the demand B−i + B1,2 > 0 is unchanged
as long as pi stays above max supp(F−i), there is a proﬁtable deviation for seller −i from
a price p ∈ supp(F−i) to a price p + ε. Case 3a: pi > 0 and pi ∈ supp(F−i). As the
demand B−i+B1,2(1−F i(p)) jumps up at p = pi, there is a proﬁtable deviation for seller
−i from price p−i to price p−i − ε. Case 3b: pi = 0 and 0 ∈ supp(F−i). Note that there
are some captive buyers but, as both of the sellers use the price zero, both of them are
making zero proﬁt. Thus, the seller who has captive buyers has a proﬁtable deviation up
from zero to extract some proﬁt from the captive buyers. Altogether, Cases 1, 2, 3a and
3b show that (i) both stores use randomized pricing strategies, (ii) both stores’ prices are
bounded away from zero and (iii) both stores’ proﬁts are bounded away from zero.
Next, we consider the supports supp(F i) and supp(F−i) of the seller’s randomized
strategies F i and F−i. Suppose that supp(F i) = supp(F−i). This implies that there
is some open set U = ∅ such that, with no loss of generality, U ⊂ supp(F i) and U ∩
supp(F−i) = ∅. But now, as the demand is unchanged for all pi ∈ U there is a proﬁtable
deviation up from the lower prices in U to the higher prices in U . This shows that the
seller mix over the same set of prices supp(F ) := supp(F i) = supp(F−i).
Last, we examine the support for possible gaps and jumps/atoms and delineate its
boundaries. Gaps : Suppose the support is not connected but has a gap
[
g, g
]∪supp(F ) = ∅
but for some
[
g − ε, g]∪supp(F ) = ∅ and [g, g + ε]∪supp(F ) = ∅. Then, as the demand is
unchanged for all p ∈ [g, g], there is a proﬁtable deviation from some price p ∈ [g − ε, g]
to some price p ∈ [g, g + ε]. Atoms : Suppose the strategy F i is not continuous but has
an atom αi > 0 at piα ∈ supp(F ). Then, as the demand from shoppers,
(
1− F i(p))B1,2,
is reduced by αi at piα, there is a proﬁtable deviation for seller −i from a price piα or some
price piα + ε to some price p
i
α − ε. This implies that there can be an atom at the upper
bound only and used by a single seller only; this makes sure the other seller does not
use pα or any p
i
α + ε, from which it would have a proﬁtable deviation. Boundaries: (i)
Consider the highest price p the sellers use. Note that the seller who has that price is only
selling to its captive buyers Bi > 0. Hence, there is a proﬁtable deviation up in p unless it
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equals 1. (ii) Consider the lowest price p the sellers use. As both of the stores make some
proﬁt, there is a proﬁtable deviation up in price p unless it is bounded away from 0. 
Proof of Lemma 14. Based on Lemma 13, we only need to determine the sellers’ proﬁts
Πi, the lower bound p > 0 of the support, whether we need an atom αi > 0 at the upper
bound p¯ = 1 of the support for seller i = 1 or i = 2, and the cumulative distribution
functions F 1 and F 2.
Note ﬁrst that, if seller i prices right below the upper bound, it sells for p = 1 to its
captive buyers and, provided seller −i sometimes prices at the upper bound, for that case
also to shoppers. Thus, the seller’s proﬁt is given by Πi = Bi + α
−iB1,2, for i = 1, 2.
Instead, if a seller prices at the lower bound, it sells for p = 1 to its captive buyers and all
shoppers such that the seller’s proﬁt is Πi = (Bi +B1,2) p, for i = 1, 2. As the proﬁt has
to be the same over the whole support to sustain randomized pricing strategies, equating
Πi = Bi + α
−iB1,2 = (Bi +B1,2) p
for i = 1 and i = 2 gives us the lower bound
p =
Bi + α
−iB1,2
Bi +B1,2
=
B−i + αiB1,2
B−i +B1,2
.
For Bi ≥ B−i, this is solved only if αi = Bi−B−iBi+B1,2 ≥ 0 such that α−i = 0. In consequence,
the lower bound is p = BiBi+B1,2 and the sellers’ proﬁts are Π
i = Bi and Π
−i = B−i+αiB1,2.
To simplify, we shorten α−i into α.
The cumulative distribution functions F 1 and F 2 can now be obtained in closed-form
by observing that the proﬁt has to be invariant everywhere in the support. Therefore, a
seller i = 1, 2 whose price is p makes
Πi =
(
Bi + (1− F−i(p))B1,2
)
p, for i = 1, 2,
which gives
F i(p) =
B−i +B1,2
B1,2
− Π
−i
B1,2
1
p
, for p ≤ 1,
as required.
Observe that the proﬁt Π−i ≤ Πi can be rewritten as
Π−i = B−i + αB1,2 = B−i +
Bi −B−i
Bi +B1,2
B1,2
Π−i =
(
1− B1,2
Bi +B1,2
)
B−i +
B1,2
Bi +B1,2
Bi
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Π−i = pB−i + (1− p)Bi,
which shows that it is a convex combination of seller i’s and seller −i’s captive buyers:
the higher the lower bound p = BiBi+B1,2 , the more weight put on own captive buyers B−i.
Also, if we continue from here,
Π−i = −p (Bi −B−i) +Bi
= − Bi
Bi +B1,2
(Bi −B−i) +Bi
=
(
1− Bi −B−i
Bi +B1,2
)
Bi
= (1− α)Πi.
This will be needed a bit later. 
Proof of Proposition 17. By Lemma 12, if
θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1) > θ2 (1− E(p|F 2)) .
then t1 = 1− t2 = 1, and, if
θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1) < θ2 (1− E(p|F 2)) .
then t1 = 1− t2 = 0. Otherwise, any t1 = 1− t2 ∈ [0, 1] and t2 ∈ [0, 1] such that t1 = 1− t2
would do.
Note ﬁrst that, if θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1(θ, (1, 0)))) ≥ θ2 (1− E(p|F 2(θ, (1, 0))))), then we
have F(θ, (1, 0)) and t = (1, 0) is clearly a ﬁxed point. As a result, the buyers are willing
to start from store i = 1 even for the price ratio E(p|F 1(θ, (1, 0)))/E(p|F 2(θ, (1, 0))).
It is also clear that, if we increase t1 from the level t	 where B1 = B2 up to one, by
continuity of E(p|F 1(θ, t)) > E(p|F 2(θ, t)) in t, we must span all the values of E(p|F 1) >
E(p|F 2) between one and E(p|F 1(θ, (1, 0))) > E(p|F 2(θ, (1, 0))). Hence, assuming that
θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1(θ, (1, 0)))) < θ2 (1− E(p|F 2(θ, (1, 0)))))
and recalling that
θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1(θ, (t	, 1− t	)))) > θ2 (1− E(p|F 2(θ, (t	, 1− t	))))) ,
there necessarily exist a ﬁxed point F(θ, t) and t in between t = (1, 0) and t = (t	, 1− t	),
where
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θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1(θ, t))) = θ2 (1− E(p|F 2(θ, t)))) .
When the price ratio is exactly E(p|F 1(θ, t))/E(p|F 2(θ, t)), the buyers are indiﬀerent
between the sellers. They are thus willing to be assigned to any start store. If they are
assigned according to t, the sellers willing to price in accordance with F(θ, t). We have a
ﬁxed point.
For uniqueness, we use the monotonicity of E(p|F 1(θ, t))/E(p|F 2(θ, t)) in t:
1− E(p|F 1(t))
1− E(p|F 2(t)) =
1− Π2B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
− α
1− Π1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
=
1− pB2+(1−p)B1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
− α
1− Π1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
=
1 +
pB1−pB2
B1,2
ln
(
1
p
)
− B1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
− α
1− Π1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
=
1 + α B1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
− B1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
− α
1− Π1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
=1− α,
where
∂α
∂t1
=
∂
∂t1
B1 −B2
B1 +B1,2
≥ 0,
because ∂B1
∂t1
≥ 0, ∂B2
∂t1
≤ 0 and ∂B1,2
∂t1
= 0. This implies that, if we begin with t1 = t	 such
that B1 = B2 and start to raise it up to one, E(p|F 1(θ, t))/E(p|F 2(θ, t)) either decreases
or remains constant: the ﬁxed point is unique. 
Proof of Lemma 15. We just proved that, if θ1 ≥ θ2 and t1 = 1− t2 ∈ (0, 1), then
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θ2
θ1
= 1− α
θ2
θ1
=
B2 +B1,2
B1 +B1,2
θ2
θ1
=
1−B∅ −B1
1−B∅ −B2
θ2
θ1
=
1−B∅
(
1− θ1
θ1−θ2
)
− θ1
θ1−θ2 e
−θ2
1−B∅
(
1 + θ
2
θ1−θ2
)
+ θ
1
θ2−θ2 e
−θ1
θ2
θ1
=
θ1 − θ2 + θ2B∅ − θ1e−θ2
θ1 − θ2 + θ2e−θ1 − θ1B∅
.
We can hence solve for B∅ as
B∅ = −
1
2
θ2
θ1
(
1− e−θ1
)
− 1
2
θ1
θ2
(
1− e−θ2
)
+ 1.
From here on, it is useful to work with the reparametrization ρ = θ
2
θ1
under which
B∅ = −
1
2
ρ
(
1− e−θ1
)
− 1
2
ρ−1
(
1− e−θ2
)
+ 1
and, since ∂θ
1
∂ρ = − θ
1
ρ and
∂θ2
∂ρ =
θ2
ρ ,
∂B∅
∂ρ
= −1
2
(
1− e−θ1
)
+
1
2
θ1e−θ
1
+
1
2
ρ−1
(
1− e−θ2
)
+
1
2
ρ−2θ2e−θ
2
or, returning to the original variables,
∂B∅
∂ρ
=
1
2
(
−
(
1− e−θ1 − θ1e−θ1
)
+
θ1
θ2
(
1− e−θ2 + θ1e−θ2
))
.
This is positive for all θ1 ≥ θ2 > 0 because
1− e−θ1 − θ1e−θ1
θ1
<
1− e−θ1
θ1
<
1− e−θ2
θ2
<
1− e−θ2 + θ1e−θ2
θ2
and the function 1−e
−x
x is decreasing in x.
We can now revert to ρ = θ
2
θ1
= 1−B∅−B11−B∅−B2 to solve it for B1 and B2 as a function of ρ
B1 = (1− ρ) (1−B∅) + ρB2,
B2 =
(
1− ρ−1) (1−B∅) + ρ−1B1.
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Their partials with respect to ρ are given by
∂B1
∂ρ
= − (1−B∅ −B2)− (1− ρ)
∂B∅
∂ρ
+ ρ
∂B2
∂ρ
,
∂B2
∂ρ
= ρ−1 (1−B∅ −B1)−
(
1− ρ−1) ∂B∅
∂ρ
+ ρ−1
∂B1
∂ρ
.
In other words, as we can take ρ = ρ(θ1, θ2) as a seller’s choice variable, the ﬁrst order
conditions are
∂Π1
∂ρ
= 0 ⇐⇒ ∂B1
∂ρ
= 0 ⇐⇒ ρ∂B2
∂ρ
= 1−B∅ −B2 + (1− ρ)
∂B∅
∂ρ
> 0
and
∂Π2
∂ρ
= 0 ⇐⇒ (1− α)Π
1
∂ρ
= 0 ⇐⇒ ∂ρB1
∂ρ
= 0 ⇐⇒ B1 + ρ∂B1
∂ρ
= 0.
Both or them cannot be satisﬁed for the same ρ because a seller’s proﬁt is positive,
Π1 = B1 > 0.
This implies that it cannot be optimal for both the sellers to use θ1 and θ2 such that
t1 < 1. 
Proof of Proposition 18.
Consider seller i’s best response θi to seller −i’s frictions θ−i.
Case 1: θ−i = 0.
As seller −i is essentially out of the market, seller i will act like a monopolist and set
θi = ∞ and pi = 1.
Case 2: θ−i ∈ (0,∞).
First, if the seller chooses an extremely slow rate θi = 0 it serves nobody and extracts
no revenue, Πi = 0.32
Second, if the seller chooses an extremely fast rate θi = ∞ such that ti = 1, the seller’s
proﬁt is given as33
Πi = e−θ
−i
.
Third, if the seller chooses a ﬁnite but suﬃciently fast rate θi >> θ−i such that ti = 1,
the seller’s proﬁt is given as
Πi =
θi
θi − θ−i
(
1− e−(θi−θ−i)
)
e−θ
−i
.
32For θi = 0, B−i = 1− e−θ−i and B∅ = e−θ−i while Bi = B1,2 = 0.
33For θi = ∞, Bi = e−θ−i and B1,2 = 1− e−θ−i while B−i = B∅ = 0.
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It is now easy to show that
θi
θi − θ−i
(
1− e−(θi−θ−i)
)
> 1
as long as
∣∣θi − 1∣∣ > ∣∣θ−i − 1∣∣.
This implies that, by choosing a large enough ﬁnite θi, the seller is guaranteed to
extract more revenue than by choosing θi = 0 or θi = ∞.
Case 3: θ−i = ∞.
Note ﬁrst that, if both sellers have an inﬁnite rate, θi = ∞, all buyers ﬁnd all prices
and both sellers’ proﬁts go to zero, Πi = 0.
Instead, if seller −i has an inﬁnite rate and seller i has a ﬁnite rate, θ−i = ∞ and
θi < ∞ such that t−i = 1, seller i’s proﬁt is34
Πi =
B−i −Bi
B−i +B1,2
B1,2 = e
−θi
(
1− e−θi
)
,
It is maximized by θi = ln(2) < ∞.
It is thus clear from Cases 1 to 3 that θi = ∞ cannot arise in equilibrium. 
The prominent seller’s problem
Proof that there is a unique solution θ1(θ2) to the seller’s problem:
Start by considering a relaxed unconstrained problem
max
θ1≥θ2
P 1,
where the prominent seller’s proﬁt is represented by
P 1(θ1, θ2) :=
θ1
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1
)
.
The ﬁrst partial with respect to θ1 is
∂P 1(θ1, θ2)
∂θ1
=
θ1
θ1 − θ2 e
−θ1 − θ
2
(θ1 − θ2)2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1
)
.
Hence, an increase in θ1 increases P 1 if
f(θ1, θ2) := −e
δ − 1
δ
+ ρ−1 ≥ 0.
34Here, B−i = e−θ
i
and B1,2 = 1− e−θi whereas Bi = B∅ = 0.
Essays on Market Dynamics and Frictions 185
Therefore, the existence and uniqueness of the solution to this relaxed problem basically
come from on the fact that the growth rate of e
δ−1
δ =
e(θ
1−θ2)−1
θ1−θ2 is exponential in θ
1 whereas
the growth of ρ−1 = θ
1
θ2
is linear in θ1. Let us consider this in more detail.
We can now diﬀerentiate this function f we just deﬁned with respect to θ1 to obtain
f ′(θ1, θ2) := −δe
δ − eδ + 1
δ2
+
1
θ2
< −eδ + e
δ − 1
δ
+ ρ−1.
This implies that, if f = − eδ−1δ + ρ−1 is negative, the change in f ′ = − e
δ−1
δ + ρ
−1 is
negative (strictly negative for δ > 0 and zero for δ = 0) because clearly
eδ = 2
eδ − 1
δ2
, for δ = 0,
eδ > 2
eδ − 1
δ2
, for δ > 0.
In consequence, e
δ−1
δ and ρ
−1 cannot cross more than once. The solution to the ﬁrst order
condition for an interior optimum e
δ−1
δ = ρ
−1 is thereby unique.
Regarding existence, note that, if we start with θ1 just above θ2 and, thus, with ρ ≈ 1
and δ ≈ 0,
lim
θ1→θ2+
f(θ1, θ2) = 0 and lim
θ1→θ2+
f ′(θ1, θ2) =
1
θ2
− 1
2
.
The existence of interior solution θ1 > θ2 to this relaxed problem thus hinges on the
condition that the other store has strong enough frictions, θ2 < 2. Otherwise, the seller
would prefer to raise its own frictions by setting a smaller θ1, as e
δ−1
δ > ρ
−1 for all θ1 ≥ θ2.
Returning back to the original problem, it is hence clear that, if the constraint θ1 ≥
θ2 11−α binds,
eδ − 1
δ
> ρ−1
(without the constraint, the seller would choose a lower θ1) but, if the constraint θ1 ≥
θ2 11−α is slack,
eδ − 1
δ
= ρ−1
(without the constraint, the seller would choose the same θ1). 
Proof that the solution θ1(θ2) is decreasing if the constraint is slack:
Diﬀerentiating totally the condition
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eδ
δ
=
θ1
θ1
gives
dθ1
dθ2
=
ξ(δ)− θ1
(θ2)2
ξ(δ)− 1
θ2
,
where
ξ(x) :=
ex
x
− e
x − 1
x2
≥ 0.
This is negative if ξ(δ) ∈
[
1
θ2
, θ
1
(θ2)2
]
.
(I) We ﬁrst prove that ξ(δ) ≥ 1
θ2
, when e
δ
δ = ρ
−1 holds:
eδ
δ
− e
δ − 1
δ2
≥ 1
θ2
eδ
δ
− ρ−1 1
δ
≥ 1
θ2
eδ − 2ρ−1 ≥ −1
which holds because,
eδ − 2ρ−1 = e
δ(δ − 2) + 2
δ
geq0 ≥ −1.
(II) We then prove that ξ(δ) ≤ θ1
(θ2)2
, when e
δ
δ = ρ
−1 holds:
eδ
δ
− e
δ − 1
δ2
≤ θ
1
(θ2)2
eδ
δ
− 1
δ
ρ−1 ≤ 1
θ2
ρ−1
eδ ≤ ρ−2
which holds because,
eδ ≤
(
eδ − 1
δ
)2
.
Altogether, this implies that dθ
1
dθ2
≤ 0 where eδδ = ρ−1 binds. 
Essays on Market Dynamics and Frictions 187
The non prominent seller’s problem
Proof that the solution θ2(θ1) is decreasing if the constraint is slack:
When t1 = 1− t2 = 1, B1 = B1,2 is equivalent to
2
eδ
δ
=
eθ
1
θ1
.
Diﬀerentiating it totally results in
dθ1
dθ2
=
2ξ(δ)− ξ(θ1)
2ξ(δ)
,
where
ξ(x) :=
ex
x
− e
x − 1
x2
≥ 0.
This is negative if
2ξ(δ)− ξ(θ1) ≤ 0
2
(
eδ
δ
− e
δ − 1
δ2
)
−
(
eθ
1
θ1
− e
θ1 − 1
(θ1)2
)
≤ 0
2
eδ − 1 + 1
δ
− 2e
δ − 1
δ2
− e
θ1 − 1 + 1
θ1
+
eθ
1 − 1
(θ1)2
≤ 0
2
1
δ
− 21
δ
eδ − 1
δ
− 1
θ1
+
1
θ1
eθ
1 − 1
θ1
≤ 0(
2
1
δ
− 1
θ1
)
−
(
1
δ
− 1
θ1
)
2
eδ − 1
δ
≤ 0
1
δ
+
(
1
δ
− 1
θ1
)(
1− 2e
δ − 1
δ
)
≤ 0
1 + ρ
(
1− 2e
δ − 1
δ
)
≤ 0.
We can now solve ρ from 2 e
δ
δ =
eθ
1
θ1
as
ρ = 1− 2 e
δ − 1
eθ1 − 1
and then continue with the above calculation
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(
1− 2 e
δ − 1
eθ1 − 1
)(
1− 2e
δ − 1
δ
)
≤ −1
−2 e
δ − 1
eθ1 − 1 − 2
eδ − 1
δ
+ 4
(eδ − 1)2
δ(eθ1 − 1) ≤ −2
eθ
1 − 1
eθ1 − 1
− (e
δ − 1)δ
(eθ1 − 1)δ −
(eδ − 1)(eθ1 − 1)
(eθ1 − 1)δ + 2
(eδ − 1)2
(eθ1 − 1)δ +
(eθ
1 − 1)δ
(eθ1 − 1)δ ≤ 0
−(e
δ − 1)δ
δ
− (e
δ − 1)(eθ1 − 1)
δ
+ 2
(eδ − 1)2
δ
+
(eθ
1 − 1)δ
δ
≤ 0
−(eδ − 1)− (e
δ − 1)(eθ1 − 1)
δ
+
(eδ − 1)(eθ1 − 1)
θ1
+ (eθ
1 − 1) ≤ 0
(eθ
1 − 1)
(
eδ − 1
δ
− 1
)
≥ (eδ − 1)
(
eθ
1 − 1
θ1
− 1
)
(eθ
1 − 1)
eθ
1−1
θ1
− 1
≥ (e
δ − 1)
eδ−1
δ − 1
.
This is true because θ1 ≥ δ and (ex−1)ex−1
x
−1 is increasing in x. As a result,
dθ1
dθ2
≤ 0 where
2 e
δ
δ =
eθ
1
θ1
binds. 
Proof that the solutions θ1(θ2) and θ2(θ1) are monotone if the constraint binds:
When t1 = 1− t2 = 1, 1− α = ρ is equivalent to
eδ − 1
δ2
=
eθ
1 − 1
(θ1)2
.
Since e
x−1
x2
is strictly decreasing for x < x′ and strictly increasing for x > x′ for x′ > 0,
this can be satisﬁed only if δ = θ1 − θ2 < x′ and θ1 > x′. Moreover, if θ1 increases, then
δ = θ1 − θ2 decreases. Therefore, if 1− α = ρ binds, then dθ1
dθ2
≥ 0 holds. 
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